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
A WORLD AFFAIRS JOURNAL

NOVEMBER, 1984

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Current History

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Current History

NOVEMBER, 1984

VOL. 83, NO. 496

How stable are the nations of East Europe? In many states of that area, economies are in disarray and the East Europeans are frustrated. Still, as our introductory article points out, "latent nationalism throughout the bloc and the man in the street's indifference to government decrees appear to be destroying slowly what the Soviet Union has attempted to establish by force."

Soviet Relations with East Europe

BY RICHARD F. STAAR

Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution at Stanford University

IN Leonid Brezhnev's era, East European leaders were summoned individually to Oreanda in the Crimea every summer for visits with the de facto head of the "socialist commonwealth of nations."¹ In contrast, President Konstantin Chernenko sees each one of these viceroys at his office in the Kremlin. The February, 1984, funeral of President Yuri Andropov provided an opportunity for these leaders to become acquainted with Chernenko, although the periods before and during the economic summit in Moscow at midyear more than made up for the earlier, necessarily brief occasion.

The first to arrive in Moscow was Prime Minister Wojciech Jaruzelski from Poland. After two days (May 4-5), he signed a 15-year economic agreement that tightens Soviet control over Poland and received the Order of Lenin in return from Chernenko. Next came First Secretary Todor Zhivkov from Bulgaria on May 31, followed by Romanian President Nicolae Ceaușescu on June 4. The latter was decorated with the Order of the October Revolution, having previously been awarded the Order of Lenin by Brezhnev.

The remaining three East European leaders were also received individually during the economic summit: First Secretary Janos Kadar of Hungary and President Gustav Husak from Czechoslovakia on the morning and afternoon of June 13, the latter receiving both the Order of Lenin and the gold star making him a "Hero of the Soviet Union"; and the East German leader, President Erich Honecker, on the following day. Albania and Yugoslavia are not currently members of the bloc, and

their leaders have little reason for annual pilgrimages to Moscow. They also refrained from joining other East European governments in decorating Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on his seventy-fifth birthday.

Only one of the Soviet Union's client states in East Europe—Romania—seems to be continually aggravating Soviet decisionmakers. Gromyko stopped off in Bucharest the month before Andropov died, after Ceaușescu made a statement that both the United States and the U.S.S.R. should remove their intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe. The Soviet foreign minister had visited Romania exactly four years earlier, when that country abstained from the United Nations vote calling for the withdrawal of foreign (that is, Soviet) troops from Afghanistan.

Gromyko returned to Moscow with a joint Soviet-Romanian statement, insisting that only NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) dismantle its 41 newly deployed ground-launched cruise and Pershing 2 ballistic missiles without any mention of the 284 Soviet triple-warhead SS-20's already in place and targeted against West Europe. By coincidence (or perhaps as a reward), the U.S.S.R. reportedly promised to deliver 1.5 million metric tons of coal and 1.8 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Romania during calendar year 1984.²

At a state dinner in the Kremlin five months later, Chernenko told Ceaușescu that there were still a few possibilities for the further development of bilateral relations in the political, ideological, economic, cultural and other fields. Unmentioned (at least in the final communiqué) was Romania's decision to participate in the Los Angeles summer Olympics, which made Romania the only bloc member not supporting the Soviet boycott. Other loyal client regimes (Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, North Korea, Mongolia,

¹See the entire issue of *Current History*, vol. 81, no. 478 (November, 1982), which is devoted to East Europe. A comprehensive survey can be found in Richard Löwenthal and Boris Meissner, eds., *Der Sowjetblock zwischen Vormachtkontrolle und Autonomie* (Cologne: Markus Verlag, 1984), p. 339.

²The Economist (London), February 11, 1984, p. 46.

Table 1: Warsaw Pact Armed Forces

Country	Manpower				Equipment			Expenditures	
	Army	Air	Navy	Tanks	Combat aircraft (incl. hel.)	Vessels (incl. subs)	Per capita (dollars)	Percent of GNP	
Bulgaria	105,000	34,000	9,000	1,860	272	85	150	4.2	
Czechoslovakia	142,500 (80,000)	54,000	—	3,400	483	—	24	n.a.	
East Germany	113,000 (380,000)	38,000	15,000	1,500 (1,600 storage)	364	154	415	7.7	
Hungary	85,000 (65,000)	21,000	—	1,330	152	—	115	3.0	
Poland	207,000 (40,000)	88,000	22,000	3,190	710	93	151	4.3	
Romania	140,000	34,000	7,000	1,800	328	122	60	2.0	
U.S.S.R.	1,825,000 ^a	475,000 ^b	450,000	ca. 50,000	ca. 6,780	698	490 ^c	8.4-15.0	

Notes: ^aOnly 565,000 are located in Central and Eastern Europe, as given in parentheses. Total includes Soviet forces also in the Western military districts of the U.S.S.R. that would reinforce those deployed against NATO.

^bExcluding long-range air force

^c1975 dollars

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 1983-1984* (London: IISS, September, 1983), pp. 11-24; Drew Middleton, "East Europe is Said to Preoccupy Soviet Leaders," *The New York Times*, June 21, 1984; NATO Information Service, *NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Force Comparisons* (Brussels, 1984), pp. 3-14.

Poland) announced over Moscow radio that during August they would join the Soviet Union in hosting different types of international sports competition in their respective countries.³

Soviet problems with Poland's population, rather than its leadership, could be resolved only by ordering the indigenous Polish armed forces in effect to become a surrogate occupation authority for the Soviet Union. Invoking martial law on December 13, 1981, the government in Poland implemented a plan that had been drawn up under the supervision of army General A. F. Shcheglov, who heads the 800-member Soviet military mission in Warsaw. By that time, the de jure ruling Polish United Workers' [Communist] party had lost all credibility and most of its membership.⁴ Economic power, and hence political authority, appeared to be gravitating toward the 12-million strong urban and rural Solidarity labor unions.

³*Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), June 5, 1984; *Pravda*, June 6, 1984; Moscow radio, June 1, 1984; United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), vol. 3 (June 4, 1984), p. CC-1.

⁴Martial law plans were revealed by a high-ranking Polish defector, General Leon Dubicki, to *The Wall Street Journal*, June 4, 1984, p. 24. Some 800,000 members left the party during 1980-1982, according to Jozef Barecki et al., eds., *Rocznik polityczny i gospodarczy 1981-1983* (Warsaw: PWE, 1984), p. 151.

⁵Amnesty International, *Report* (London, 1983), pp. 265-270; A. V. Kuznetsov, "Theoretical Concepts of a Certain Policy Political Scientist," *Voprosy filosofii*, no. 12 (Moscow, 1983), pp. 27-39; Milovan Djilas, "The Militarization of the Soviet Bloc," *The Wall Street Journal*, May 30, 1984, p. 31.

⁶A. Ross Johnson et al., *Die Streitkräfte des Warschauer Pakts in Mitteleuropa: DDR, Polen und CSSR* (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1982), pp. 26-38.

Nineteen months of military rule under Jaruzelski (first party secretary, Prime Minister, defense minister, Commander in Chief of the armed forces, and junta chairman), officially ended on July 21, 1983. However, many of the government's controls had become institutionalized through additions to the penal code, after the ban on Solidarity as a legal organization. Regime spokesmen admitted that at least 60 of the 190 remaining political prisoners (nongovernment estimates placed the total at between 4,000 and 5,000) would not be released under the amnesty. This should have pleased Moscow, which blamed the Polish crisis on previous administrations in Warsaw. The militarization of Poland, however, is unlikely to be repeated in any other bloc country, since it results in the disintegration of Communist ideology.⁵

WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION (WTO)

The East European members of WTO provide lines of communication and logistical support between the Soviet Union proper and its forward military deployments facing NATO. Status of forces agreements exist for this reason with Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and Poland. All four of these countries host Soviet troops in division-size units (see Table 1).⁶ Only the Bulgarians and Romanians lack such arrangements.

The most recent WTO maneuvers took place in several segments last spring and summer. Units from the southern tier (Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania) and the Soviet Union held joint command post exercises called "Soyuz-84" in the southwestern part of the Soviet Union and on the Black Sea during March 12 through 20, 1984. Headquarters staffs and token contingents participated in command post exercises conducted on maps, testing command and control as well as cooperative action. The

Romanians still refuse to allow any foreign armed forces on their national territory.

Another joint exercise in the northern tier between March 26 and 31 involved actual troop movements. Code-named "Yug-84," it took place in the southern areas of East Germany, with East German, Polish, and Soviet units participating. A third set of maneuvers, "Danube-84," which took place in Hungary from June 22 to 30, straddled the two tiers; 16,000 local soldiers were joined by unspecified numbers from Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. "Summer-84" command staff exercises had taken place earlier in northwestern Poland.⁷

The largest maneuvers (with 160,000 troops) began on June 28 in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the southern part of the Baltic Sea under the command of Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov and assisted by his three counterparts. Soviet troops alone were training near the border between the two Germanys in new tactics, designed for a deep strike against NATO. According to West German Defense Minister Manfred Woerner, the objective of the 60,000 Soviet troops might have been a city or a significant military target.⁸

Arrangements have been made to place the armed forces of WTO member states under direct Soviet military command in the event of a war with NATO. Romania probably would resist such an attempt. It is known that elite units from other East European armies have been selected and already integrated with the second echelon, behind forward deployed Soviet troops. None of the client states, however, is allowed to produce enough weapons for its national army. Furthermore, East European officers who aspire to flag rank must be graduates of Soviet military schools and must speak Russian.⁹

Despite these controls, there seems to have been a noteworthy lack of enthusiasm for the emplacement of new Soviet battlefield nuclear missiles in both East Germany and Czechoslovakia. All three countries announced simultaneously on October 24, 1983, that prepa-

⁷ Belgrade radio, March 16, 1984; FBIS, vol. 3 (March 19, 1984), p. BB-1; *Krasnaya zvezda*, March 22, 1984; East Berlin radio, March 31, 1984; FBIS, vol. 3 (April 3, 1984), p. BB-1; Budapest radio, June 30, 1984; FBIS, vol. 3 (July 2, 1984), p. AA-1; Warsaw television, May 30, 1984; FBIS, vol. 3 (May 31, 1984), p. BB-1.

⁸ *Pravda*, July 4, 1984; *Krasnaya zvezda*, July 5, 1984. Woerner cited in *The New York Times*, July 14, 1984.

⁹ Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone et al., *Warsaw Pact: The Questions of Cohesion* (Ottawa, Canada: Department of National Defense, 1984), pp. iii-xii.

¹⁰ *Pravda*, May 15, 1984. After a conference in Czechoslovakia, a West German disarmament expert stated that WTO regimes look upon the new Soviet missiles as "punishment for their countries." Hamburg radio, June 25, 1984; FBIS, vol. 7 (June 26, 1984), p. J4.

¹¹ Cited by *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich), April 6, 1984. See the article on the construction of a fourth transit gas pipeline across Czechoslovakia in *Pravda* (Bratislava), July 12, 1984.

¹² *Die Presse* (Vienna), April 19, 1984; Oleg Bogomolev, director of the U.S.S.R. Institute on Economics of the World Socialist System, in *Rudé Právo* (Prague), May 5, 1984, p. 6.

ratory work had begun for the deployment of "operational tactical missile complexes" in response to the planned introduction of new intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) into West Europe by NATO by the end of 1983. Negotiations, of course, were still being conducted in Geneva when the bloc announcements came out.

Despite the fact as well as the time frame of five years before complete INF deployment, the first SS-22 appeared in East Germany in January, 1984. The SS-21 and SS-23 missiles had been emplaced in advance of the October statements as part of a long-range Soviet modernization program, even though the East Europeans must have felt uncomfortable with these developments. All three of these weapons systems carry either conventional or nuclear warheads. The Soviet press agency Tass revealed in mid-May that the German Democratic Republic had agreed to accept additional "enhanced-range theater missile complexes" that would be kept "strictly within the limits necessary for maintaining the balance of forces and neutralizing" the NATO threat.¹⁰ In the meanwhile, it had been public knowledge that no further INF missiles would be delivered to NATO until the fall of 1984, to augment the first 41 deployed nine months earlier.

COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (CMEA)

Financial problems throughout East Europe result in part from the worldwide recession that occurred during the late 1970's and early 1980's and also reflect the slowdown in the Soviet economy. The latter has been supplying energy and raw materials to other CMEA member states in return for machinery and agricultural products in quantities that have not been sufficient to balance the accounts. In 1983, only one trading partner, Romania, had a positive financial balance with the U.S.S.R. (see Table 2). The Soviet Union has found it difficult to export fuel at the same levels as before. In early April, 1984, Nikolai Baibakov, chairman of the U.S.S.R. state economic planning commission (Gosplan), said during an interview over Budapest television that his country could not guarantee the same petroleum deliveries to East Europe even over the short term. He suggested that East Europe make greater use of natural gas.¹¹

At the mid-1984 summit meeting in Moscow, the Soviet intention to attempt closer integration of all CMEA economies met with opposition from those governments that fear a limitation on their access to Western markets and deterioration into second-class status. East Germany wants to expand its profitable relations with the neighboring Federal Republic (West Germany), and Hungary would like to continue its own modified market economy and pursue closer trade relations in the West without interference. Meanwhile, intrabloc trade among CMEA members increased from 53.4 percent (1981) to 58.6 percent (1983) of total turnover.¹² However, overall national income has experienced a sustained decline over the past 15 years (see Table 3).

Table 2:
Soviet Trade Within CMEA, 1983
(millions of rubles)

Country	Exports	Imports	Balance
1. East Germany	6,797.8	6,595.7	- 202.1
2. Bulgaria	5,510.8	5,053.3	- 457.5
3. Czechoslovakia	5,871.6	5,420.4	- 451.2
4. Poland	5,274.3	4,812.9	- 461.4
5. Hungary	4,058.0	4,007.0	- 51.0
6. Cuba	3,399.9	2,693.3	- 706.6
7. Yugoslavia	2,671.2	2,324.3	- 346.9
8. Romania	1,639.6	1,665.3	+ 25.7
9. Mongolia	994.1	351.1	- 643.0
10. Vietnam	904.1	234.9	- 669.2
Totals	37,121.4	33,158.2	- 3,963.2

Sources: Insert to *Vneshniaia torgovlia*, no. 3 (Moscow, 1984); V. Klochek, "Foreign Trade of the USSR in 1983," *Ekonomichekskaia gazeta*, no. 13 (Moscow, March, 1984), p. 21.

Table 3:
Produced National Income in CMEA, 1971-1985
(Average Growth/Decline in Percent)

	1971-1975	1976-1980	1981-1985 (projected)
Bulgaria	7.8	6.1	4.1
Czechoslovakia	5.6	3.7	1.7
East Germany	5.4	4.1	3.4
Hungary	6.2	3.2	2.0
Poland	9.8	1.6	- 3.3
Romania	11.3	7.3	3.1
Eastern Europe	7.6	4.3	2.0

Source: Wharton Econometric figures, as cited by *The Wall Street Journal*, March 1, 1984, p. 30; projected figures are from David E. Albright, "On Eastern Europe: Security Implications for the USSR," *Parameters*, vol. 14, no. 2 (Summer, 1984), p. 25.

The first economic summit meeting since 1971 of party-government leaders from all ten CMEA states (except Cuba, whose President Fidel Castro sent a representative) deliberated from June 12 to 14, 1984, in Moscow.

¹³Poland's status was suspended in October, 1982, after the Solidarity trade unions were banned. For earlier developments, see Jadwiga Staniszkis, *Poland's Self-limiting Revolution* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 352. The amnesty bill of July 21, 1984, and the scheduled release of 652 political prisoners by the Warsaw regime did not bring most-favored-nation treatment from the United States, although other sanctions were lifted.

¹⁴David E. Albright, "On Eastern Europe: Security Implications for the USSR," *Parameters*, vol. 14, no. 2 (Summer, 1984), p. 30, citing Paul Marer. Other estimates, between \$16.5 billion and \$21.7 billion, are given by Charles Wolf Jr., et al. in *The Costs of the Soviet Empire* (Santa Monica, Calif.: The Rand Corporation, 1983), Table 6, p. 29.

¹⁵*Pravda*, April 17, 1984. One aspect of control is the economic leverage exercised by Moscow, which depends on the amount of trade by each country within the CMEA. That of Czechoslovakia increased from 64 percent (1960) to 72 percent (1983), according to Prague radio, May 14, 1984; FBIS, vol. 3 (May 15, 1984), p. D-5.

Participants agreed to coordinate their industrial planning and to cooperate in research on high technology. The communiqué called for the production of equipment and machinery that would compare in quality as well as in technical levels with that manufactured by the highly industrialized countries of the Western world. Emphasis will be placed on electronics, microprocessors and robots, where the lag between East and West is most evident. Programs for the development of atomic energy and "heat supply stations" are to extend through the end of this century.

Apart from the problems involved in satisfying their future energy requirements, most countries in the Eastern bloc are deeply in debt to Western financial institutions. The total amounts to more than \$100 billion, most of which has been used to buy modern plants and equipment from capitalist countries (see Table 4). In addition, Hungary, Poland and Romania, as well as Yugoslavia, have received at different times most-favored-nation treatment¹³ from the United States (see Table 5).

Economic relations between the Soviet Union and its East European colonial empire probably will become more strained in the future, because the Soviet Union is less able and/or willing to help its satellites. Over the two most recent decades, Soviet subsidies have been estimated to have grown from \$186 million (1960) to \$17.8 billion (1980) per year. This last figure represents the equivalent of about 70 percent of the total Soviet imports from the West.¹⁴ Obviously, these subsidies cannot continue to increase at such an astounding rate or be maintained even close to the above level for an indefinite period.

At the same time, several East European regimes perceive the advantage of closer trade relations with the West. The Soviet Union is thus caught in a dilemma: either continue the spiral of subsidies and buy off its client states or tighten controls by utilizing all the means of coercion at the Kremlin's disposal. Moscow has apparently opted for the latter.

THE CURRENT CRACKDOWN

An article in the official Soviet Communist party newspaper issued a strong warning to all East European regimes against "bowing to the pressure of NATO."¹⁵ It also referred specifically to the plenary session, held in 1969 by the Czechoslovak ruling movement's Central Committee, which ousted reformist leader Alexander Dubček. His name was not mentioned in the article. In

(Continued on page 386)

Richard F. Staar, a contributing editor to *Current History*, is author of *Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe*, 4th rev. ed. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), and editor of the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press). From 1981 to 1983 he served as United States Ambassador to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations.

"The decline of Soviet imperialism, including the weakening of its leadership in Moscow, has given added incentive to the decentralization of the Communist bloc. In order to operate efficiently, the ruling parties in East Europe must become more responsive to nationalism. To use Marx's terminology, this is the 'objective' cause of Polish socialism."

Poland's Socialism

BY ARTHUR R. RACHWALD

Associate Professor of Political Science, United States Naval Academy

THE political-military outcome of World War II is the point of departure for contemporary politics in Poland. That traumatic experience began with a crushing military defeat at the hands of Germany and the Soviet Union, followed by fruitless attempts to reconstruct postwar Poland along Western liberal-democratic lines. These aspirations were frustrated by the country's forceful incorporation into the Soviet sphere of influence. A pro-Soviet profile became a condition for Poland's statehood, as did rule by a pro-Soviet Communist party. The familiar Soviet propaganda line—the country can exist only as a socialist state—was the justification for the Communist takeover. This indirect warning against tampering with the conditions of friendship between Poland and the Soviet Union produced a considerable degree of acceptance for the basic principles of "normative socialism," as it came to be called in Poland, but it did not result in the endorsement of Soviet political and economic practices.

The principles of socialism that have the support of the majority of Poles are social justice, economic equality, democracy and self-government. Poland has been disappointed with socialism as it is practiced by Communist authorities, who cannot live up to the standards of their own ideology. This creates an embarrassing situation: the ruling Communist party is confronted by the working class. Polish popular opinion holds that communism is the main roadblock to real socialism in Poland.

Recurrent social explosions have been the dominant characteristic of the Polish political system since the Soviet model was imposed. Instability first became evident in 1956, when a decade of Sovietization and Stalinization ended and an indigenous form of socialist construction, the "national road to socialism," received full legitimacy. Moscow was forced to accept the reality that there is more than one way to build a socialist system; consequently, its model would not be automatically duplicated in every Communist-ruled state. A sort of ideological equality among the ruling Communist parties in East Europe was thus introduced.

In principle, license to take national conditions into account in the process of socialist construction was seen by Moscow as a temporary departure from the Soviet

model. It was an "All roads lead to Moscow" compromise whose limits were clearly drawn by the Brezhnev Doctrine, which put a ceiling on national experimentation with Leninism. Both Hungary and Czechoslovakia were invaded by Soviet forces because they trespassed on the elementary conditions of a Soviet-style state. Two other Communist states, Yugoslavia and China, were declared infidels.

The several revolts that took place in Poland between 1956 and 1980 contributed significantly to the broadening of the Polish road. The trend was toward evolutionary accommodation to national patterns rather than to the Soviet model, and it was allowed so long as the conditions of the Brezhnev Doctrine were respected. This progressive "Polandization" of communism, particularly evident in the liberal nature of the system and the growth of the private sector of the economy, culminated in the labor union Solidarity, which reflected a public demand for overt pluralism, including free elections.

This transgression of the Brezhnev Doctrine was checked when the Polish military imposed martial law. Moscow was determined not to tolerate institutionalized pluralism in Poland. However, although the military takeover precluded free elections, it has preserved the Polish model of a socialist state and has shielded Poland from a bloody conquest and a second Sovietization.

Soviet orthodoxy did not return to Poland. Instead, Moscow agreed to live with the humiliating fact that in Poland the military had to take over the reins of state and could use its power only to return to the *status quo ante bellum*, rather than to a pure form of communism. Left without any viable alternative, Soviet leaders accepted the "*e pluribus unum*" principle of an empire whose centrifugal tendencies cannot be halted.

Poland's drift from Soviet practices has received official recognition; the need for structural economic and political reforms has been endorsed in the political program of the Communist party. The regime in Poland is taking few cues from Moscow. The general inertia of the Soviet system and the immobility of its leadership leave the satellites without guidance; they continue to be responsible for their own internal stability and for the well-being of their people. Socialism in Poland is a unique, self-

generated system whose content and destination are predominantly Polish; only its overall contours resemble the Soviet mold. Polish socialism is a function of the Soviet form of authority combined with Polish tradition and values.

Since the October, 1956, revolt in Poland, the political system has been characterized by a liberalism unequaled in any other Soviet bloc state. The party fought its famous battles with the intellectuals, the working class, the Roman Catholic Church and, above all, with itself. The results were never conclusive; all these social groups became more assertive and more critical of official policies. Once Polish society reached a mature, industrialized stage, it was recognized that unless some form of political pluralism were introduced, Poland would drift toward either anarchy or despotism.

Poland has recently experienced both these extremes. At the end of the Solidarity period it reached a stage of virtual anarchy, followed by the tyranny of martial law. Military rule was effective in preserving stability and a pro-Soviet orientation, but the army is even less able than the party to provide leadership for a complex and assertive society. Alliance with the Soviet Union is enough to keep the Communists in power but unless they are in alliance with the nation, they are unable to govern.

To cope with the external situation, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the Prime Minister, reassured Moscow by pledging support for the principle of Communist leadership and by promising that Poland would not return to the pluralism of the Solidarity era. To cope with the internal situation, he promised the Polish people that he would follow a policy of "class alliance" that would revise the Leninist dogma of class struggle. While this concession has not included the resumption of a dialogue with Solidarity, it has included businesslike cooperation with the Church and the creation of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON), a permanent, constitutionally mandated forum for various political groups that the party is inherently unable to represent.

The Solidarity movement in Poland expanded the autonomy of the Polish authorities vis-à-vis Moscow, but it did not bring freedom from the Soviet Union. It had a "Romanian effect" in that it produced a more authoritarian form of communism that is also more confident and assertive in relations with Moscow. This by-product of martial law demonstrates the new limits of Soviet power and is most evident in the new compromise between the state and the Church.

THE CHURCH

The Roman Catholic Church in Poland is not so much a religious as it is a political phenomenon. Despite officially orchestrated prejudice, it is in the comfortable position of being in opposition to the ruling minority. It is an organization that constantly expands its influence. Grassroots support is the primary source of its strength, a tie that makes it the embodiment of national values. The

Church is regarded as a permanent element of national existence; the party belongs to the realm of transient political regimes that have come and gone for the last 300 years without leaving any lasting impression.

The Church is undergoing an intellectual renaissance parallel to communism's decline in intellectual and political stamina. The Church is confident and cautiously assertive, while the party is defensive and confused, ruling with the help of bayonets. Moreover, the Church emerged as the sole winner in the recent duel between Solidarity and the party, a duel that destroyed the union and disabled the party. The Church has identified itself with many of Solidarity's programs while avoiding excessive entanglement with that union's zealots.

The Polish tendency to neutralize the most extreme and politically self-defeating axioms of Marxism-Leninism confirms the general belief that neither the theory nor the practice of Soviet doctrine is applicable to Poland. Consequently, if socialism is to be the ideology of Poland, it has to be drastically modified to take into account national idiosyncrasies. In effect, the regime is gambling, equating the social goals of socialism with Christianity.

This new approach to the Church resulted in Church-state cooperation on various socially important projects. Despite fear of the Church's social militancy, a joint effort is being made in such fields as consolidation of the family and combating alcoholism and drug addiction. Moreover, the regime is particularly pleased with the Vatican's support for the Oder-Neisse Line, relations with the West European states, and the issue of peace in Europe. This partial overlap in foreign policy goals gives moral justification to the Communist claim that communism provides the best protection against the hostile international environment.

The most important expansion of the Church's power in Poland involves the construction of new churches, schools and other buildings at an unprecedented rate, and its promotion of private agricultural production by administering the agricultural fund provided by the West.

The Church has taken control of a considerable sphere of public life because the Communist state cannot supply its citizens with all the necessities of life. This calls for a serious reexamination of the state's political ambitions. It is, in effect, a retraction of the typical Marxist-Leninist claim to omnipotence based on an allegedly scientific view of the world. The Jaruzelski regime in Poland has publicly admitted its inability to provide its citizens with adequate food and shelter and has advised them to seek a private solution. The Communist state in Poland has thus been deprived of its functions and responsibilities and has been reduced to what, according to Marxism, is the role of a capitalist state: police duties, taxation and foreign affairs. In this context, the state-Church compromise and the official effort to promote the private economy is especially meaningful. The implication of the Church's expanded impact on the main spheres of life in

Poland is that the socioeconomic ideas of Marxism are not unique and that Christianity continues to be the spiritual essence of Poland.

Another characteristically Polish form of political thinking is recognition of the need for an honest dialogue between the Communist state and the nation it governs. This is a step beyond the standard and meaningless practice of "consultation with the people" which, even in principle, assumes that the party is guided primarily by ideology. The fact that dialogue is needed implies that politics in Poland is antagonistic in nature despite the Marxist prediction that the elimination of socioeconomic classes would guarantee social harmony. Social differences can be minimized only by give-and-take bargaining, not by coercive measures.

It was generally hoped that Poland's military dictatorship would eventually reestablish dialogue with Solidarity. This approach was rejected, however, because Solidarity was viewed as a political party dedicated to the destruction, rather than the improvement, of communism in Poland. The party does not want to take chances when its political survival is at stake. Instead, to demonstrate its good will and implement the August, 1980, Gdansk Agreement, the regime created its own partner, PRON, for social dialogue.

Under no circumstances can either PRON or the newly established trade unions be compared with independent Solidarity. One-third of PRON's members are Communists, and it exists mainly to provide a body through which the Communist party can appear to be carrying on a dialogue with the Polish people that will lead to stability. Consequently, it can never raise the issue of Communist legitimacy in Poland.

THE PRON FORMULA

The PRON formula in Poland is not intended to replace party leadership and, by and large, it is a lifeless movement. Its significance lies in its expectation that its members will be patriots and solid workers (regardless of their political views) and in its wide-ranging relations with society. PRON is assuming functions previously reserved for the party itself, marking another advance toward political diversification and toward a break from Communist centralism. Except for the few issues that are absolutely critical to the survival of the state, everything can be questioned and openly examined in the name of national interest.

Another feature of socialism in Poland is its public-private economic system. The private system, which includes agriculture, cottage industries, small stores and various services, is no longer viewed as a remnant of the capitalist system to be eliminated in the process of socialist construction. It is seen as a legitimate partner, whose principal tasks are to supply food and consumer goods and to earn hard currency. Despite occasional accusations by orthodox members of the party that it violates ideological purity and the principles of socialist equality,

the private system in Poland receives considerable support from the state. It is eligible for tax exemptions, favorable loans and raw materials supplied by the state, and it is protected by law. Private agriculture controls about 75 percent of the land. By enacting a constitutional amendment that guarantees private ownership of agricultural land and obligating itself to the full support of individual farmers, the government has disavowed any intention to proceed with collectivization.

Poland is not heading toward a Soviet type of monolithic centralized system. Having recognized and admitted the limits of its power, the regime has been compelled to scale down its own responsibilities. Moreover, the dynamics of Poland's internal economy favor private enterprise, which is more efficient, more flexible, and pays better wages.

Meanwhile, state policy centers attention on plotting a course out of the economic crisis by controlling runaway inflation and revitalizing selected sectors of industry. Specifically, the state has taken full responsibility for the industries that require large outlays of capital and long periods of construction (energy, heating, metallurgy and mining). In areas less critical to the national economy, the current policy of the Polish government establishes a well-defined division between private and cooperative activities, while maintaining equilibrium in the general market as well as political control. This policy has both economic and political advantages: it is a cushion against unemployment and shortages of goods that also gives the regime the final authority in all basic matters concerning the national economy.

In 1982, the government initiated economic reforms to extricate itself from the crisis. This highly publicized attempt to restructure production along the lines of the Hungarian model, to decentralize decision making, and to introduce a rational pricing policy was a total failure. It was discovered that the socialist sector of the national economy could be maintained only by Stalinist methods. Consequently, expansion of the private sector was the only possible economic reform. It has done what the public sector is inherently incapable of doing: it has created a market-oriented system and reduced the monstrous bureaucracy.

Another pioneering venture, a "first" in the Soviet bloc, is the system of so-called "Polonia" firms. These firms are created with Western capital and operate like a miniature free-trade zone, entitled to deal in both domestic and foreign markets. Although the regime is irritated and embarrassed by this very successful form of private enterprise in Poland, it is not in a position to discontinue the experiment. The main issue is that the old socialist and the new private segments of the economy are in direct competition. They compete for resources, labor and political influence, and the centralized system is unquestionably the loser.

Perhaps the most persistent political trend of postwar Poland is a commitment to improve East-West relations.

Unlike the Russians, no xenophobic cultural barriers divide the Poles from the West. In fact, since the end of World War II, every Communist leader in Poland has actively pursued a conciliatory policy toward the West, with the exception of West Germany. Since World War II, Warsaw's ambition has been to establish itself as a bridge between East and West. Thus immediately after the war, Poland applied for various forms of Western economic aid and expressed great interest in cultural, scientific, and some security cooperation with the West, notably with France.

All these expectations were cut short by the cold war, but they returned as a by-product of de-Stalinization. As early as the 1950's, Poland began an intensive, semi-independent search for an all-European security system that would include active United States participation and so-called partial solutions like a nuclear-free zone or a freeze on nuclear weapons in Central Europe. Poland was also the first state in the Soviet bloc to receive economic assistance from the United States. Since 1956, Western aid has been indispensable to Polish industrial development and agricultural modernization. Indirectly, the West holds the key to prosperity and political stability in Poland.

Consequently, the politics of détente had a very significant effect on Poland. International recognition of the Oder–Neisse Line and the improved international climate assured a continuous flow of Western aid. The regime in Poland, having taken advantage of all the benefits of East–West cooperation, soon found out the destabilizing nature of the breakdown of détente at the end of the 1970's. The economic crisis in Poland and the emergence of Solidarity were direct results of the deterioration in United States–Soviet relations.

The Soviet Union viewed détente as a policy that would lead to an irreversible shift in the global correlation of forces in its favor. Soviet global ambitions became evident in the mid-1970's and culminated a few years later in the invasion of Afghanistan and the deployment of SS-20's aimed at West Europe. Poland, on the other hand, viewed détente as a policy that would preserve the Soviet–American balance in the least threatening manner. Only under such circumstances could a country like Poland become actively involved on both sides of the East–West line.

The necessity for good relations with the West is not a partisan issue in Poland. With the possible exception of the most fanatic faction of the Communist party, all political orientations, including the ruling center, favor improvement of international relations and are reluctant to put all the blame for the current state of affairs on the United States. The martial law regime in Poland has tried to revitalize Poland's contacts with the West, particularly to persuade the United States to lift its economic sanctions. The consequences of total political and economic integration into the Soviet orbit are still well remembered, and every reasonable politician in Poland

knows that the situation that prevailed in the early 1950's must not be allowed to recur.

In sum, Poland has developed a system of its own, and nothing short of Soviet invasion can reverse it. Disagreement with the Soviet Union occasionally becomes a public issue carried by the press of both countries or is evidenced by a change of tone in the Polish government's statements. Such a disagreement might focus on the meaning of a basic principle of Communist dogma or the behavior of high-ranking officials. Recently, the Soviet Union openly attacked certain practices of Jaruzelski's government and tried to remove Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski. In both cases it was strongly and publicly rebuffed and its only course was to back down.

Very strong anti-Russian sentiments instilled by generations of bitter experience are a permanent cultural-political factor with which the ruling Communist autocracy in Poland has to deal. The great majority of Polish people, especially the workers and intellectuals, are convinced that the cause of all the failures of socialism in Poland is its imposition from above and its perpetuation by coercive measures and Soviet pressure. As they did during the partitions and annexations in the nineteenth century, the Polish people feel they are being ruled by a culturally and economically backward civilization whose roots are of non-European origin; Czarist Russia was never able to inspire the Poles. The Poles see their subjugation to Soviet Russia as a nationally humiliating experience, only emphasized by the fact that study of the Russian language is now compulsory.

In addition, a comparison between the Soviet standard of living and the standard of living in the West serves as a sober reminder to the Poles of the underdeveloped nature of the Soviet system. In effect, the Poles regard themselves as attached to a country that fundamentally belongs to the third world.

Unhappily, too, the Polish economy is geared toward Soviet markets; the goods it exports to the Soviet Union could be sold to Western customers at a higher price and paid for in hard currency. By the same token, many of the poor quality goods it imports from the Soviet Union could be purchased elsewhere at lower prices. The Poles see this situation as economic entrapment; they are being denied a chance to catch up with the West. This was one of the principal causes of anger among the workers in 1980. The unfavorable consequences of trade with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union's use of economic means to manipulate Poland's domestic affairs are the main reasons for the current anti-Russian fervor in Poland.

Official propaganda in Poland is making a tremendous
(Continued on page 393)

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"The conflict between the egalitarianism of Hungary's official ideology and the inequality permeating the system cannot be solved easily. . . . Today, . . . unable to undertake true democratization, the regime is trying to attain 'cosmetic democratization.' "

Kadar's Hungary in the Twilight Era

BY IVAN VOLGYES

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JÁNOS Kadar came to power as a traitor to Hungary—a traitor to the revolution of 1956, to the nation, and to the people. Although Kadar admits that the revolution of 1956 was a national tragedy, he believes that he came to power in order to "save" the nation, the state and, naturally, Communist rule.¹ Indeed, Kadar was a Quisling during the first few years of his rule, a traitor to the aims of the 1956 revolution, and in fact to the government of Imre Nagy to which he swore allegiance. His transformation to legitimacy is the most remarkable feat of political life in East Europe in the last half of the twentieth century. Kadar is clearly an extraordinary politician, a perceptive and shrewd leader whose powers of analysis and observation are matched only by his cautious and even-tempered approach and a basic pragmatism that have enabled him to remain in power since 1956.

Hungarian Communist party rule has remained in place without serious challenge since 1957; but there have been four different political styles in Hungarian post-1956 political life.

The first style, the style of unbridled terror, was exhibited between 1957 and 1962. Opponents were incarcerated; those who were the leaders of the Hungarian October—mostly top Communist elites themselves, including Prime Minister Imre Nagy—were hanged at Kadar's direct order. The graves of those executed in 1959, two years after the revolution, remain unmarked, and Kadar has never apologized for their murder. Literally thousands were jailed during those years, and Hungarian intellectual life was decimated by fear and self-exile. The regime destroyed the workers councils that sprang up spontaneously in 1956 and forcibly collectivized the entire Hungarian agricultural sector between 1959 and 1961, although terror per se was used less rigidly during the collectivization than it was used during an earlier drive between 1950 and 1953.

The second period was marked by a different ruling style. Between 1962 and 1965, the regime slowly began to

¹On his own views concerning the revolution, see his semiofficial biography by László Gyurko, *Arckép a vezetők történetéről* (Budapest: Magveto, 1982).

²On definitions of the reform periods see Ivan T. Berend, "A reformviták sorujeben," *Elet és Irodalom*, April 13, 1984, p. 6.

seek a modicum of consensus and relented on the use of terror, although it never relented on its aims: to maintain its rule. It took no chance with political opposition, but it loosened the reins of power sufficiently to allow the population to breathe a little easier. Administrative sanctions decreased and the cooption of the intellectuals began.

The third period, the slow move to reform, was most clearly observable in the period between 1965 and 1968, perhaps the most intellectually vibrant period for those observers who weighed the potentialities of the future and the possible options.² A cautious debate on the future of the economy—and hence that of the society and politics—outlined the regime's directions and options, and suggested that the leadership should take a "reform road." This period is most clearly linked to the name of Rezső Nyers and his comrades and coworkers, and this option is known as the New Economic Mechanism (*Új gazdasági mechanizmus*).

The "final" period of political rule marked by a distinctive style is the "reform" period that has been in existence since 1968. With more or fewer setbacks, this period has been one of curious dynamism intermingled with stagnation. Brief periods of four years between 1968 and 1972 and then again from 1980 to 1984 have been interesting and experimental, alternating with repressive setbacks (1972–1974), plain stagnation (1976–1980), or a curious and intermittent mixture of all these factors. The regime has used repression, but not terror; there have been remarkable instances of free expression, although not free association or free political action.

Kadar's celebrated phrase—"Those who are not against us are with us"—went against the accepted Marxist precept that all must enthusiastically and continually express their support of the Communist party, regardless of the issue. The "alliance policy"—creating, in fact, an alliance between the people (regardless of party membership) and the regime—promised the nation that the party itself could be coopted. While the party remained the ruler, it promised that in exchange for the acceptance of its rule that rule would not be excessively dictatorial. The alliance policy had three main characteristics.

The first was the total "depoliticization" of Hungarian

life. Hitherto every issue had been a political issue; every debate was primarily a political debate.³ By depoliticizing every aspect of life, the party seemed to be saying: "Discuss issues in terms that are not political and we can debate about their merit." Educational or economic reform, the draft or abortion, should be attacked as issues and not as political topics; hence their resolution no longer required political solutions.

The second, concomitant element was the "Greyhound" effect. In essence, this meant that people could discuss everything and make any decisions as long as they did not challenge the concept of party rule in the party's hands. "Leave the driving to us," said the party; but in reality it had already conceded aspects of party rule that had not become political bones of contention.

The adoption of the "*ez van—ezt kell szeretni*" (this is what there is—this is what you must love!) mentality was the third characteristic of the alliance policy. By the conscious inculcation of the lack of options for the better—the acceptance of the Kadar rule as the only possible type of rule and as the absolute limit of potentiality—the regime created a politically stable situation. Unlike the situation in most other Communist states, the regime is not based on terror, but on the popular acceptance of the basic rules of the game.

The characteristics of this alliance policy had three consequences: the privatization of the system (the regime leaves people alone to privatize everything, including agriculture and labor); an economically based legitimacy—as long as the standard of living is maintained or advanced, the regime in power is considered legitimate by the people; greater individual autonomy for the individual in anything but political decision making.

PROBLEMS OF SOCIETY

It would be foolish to suppose, however, that all is well in Hungarian society today. Indeed, several major problems developed during the last 15 years of reform rule (the NEM period).

The first difficulty was economic.⁴ After the December, 1964, meeting of the top economic planners of the socialist states and their political counterparts, Poland, Hungary and Romania all chose to "integrate" their economies with the West to a greater or lesser extent. While Poland and Romania decided to use their new trade ties with the West to ask for enormous loans for the creation of (largely inefficient) industries, Hungary used its ties for loans for agricultural improvements and, to some extent, for industrial improvements. But not until 1978 did the regime begin to take seriously the fact that the loans would have

³Ivan Volgyes, "The Kadar Years in Hungary," *Current History*, April, 1981, pp. 159–163.

⁴Paul Marer, "Hungary's Economic Reforms," United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee Studies on the Economies of Eastern Europe (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), pp. 57–90.

⁵Jeno Andics, "Politika es gazdasag," *Valosag*, no. 7(1983), pp. 1–9.

to be paid back with hard currencies in real terms, and not in inflated figures, and that restrictions on scarce imports by monetary policy impositions would cut down on much needed growth. In addition, Hungary's integration with Western economies took place at the end of the West's "boom" cycle, and Hungary (whose share of foreign trade with the West is larger than that of any other socialist state) consequently suffered more from the crisis in the West than any other socialist economy.

The Hungarian economy also responded far more sluggishly than expected during the reform period (from 1968 to the present). The "commanding heights of industry"—as Stalin used to call them—retained their central organizational structure; even with the "reform" orientation, the centralized areas of the economy (some 275 production units) still account for more than two-thirds of the total production, and in these areas "decentralization," local initiatives and local management really mean very little. The "vested interests" of the large and important units, the personnel policies—however humane—of the Kadar regime, were all too strong to change the central control procedures and allow greater autonomy at local levels. Thus, there was a major contradiction between a "planned" economy and the "reform demands"; and the directive-oriented system came into direct conflict with the need for autonomy for a dynamic and modern economy. These conflicts remain unresolved.

Politically, the emerging difficulty came from varying sources. The first was the party's decision to try to retain its role as "controller" of the polity when it was desperately searching for mechanisms of limited autonomy that could help maintain control.⁵ In Soviet-style Communist systems (and the Hungarian system is no exception), the first task of any regime coming to power is to destroy the autonomy of any small unit—a Catholic boys' club, or the organization of the handicapped—and to crush any attempts at the recreation of such autonomy. But a modern society struggles for that very autonomy, which the party maintains could conceivably result in a loss of party power. This fear, in turn, impels the party to try to hold back authority from such organizations at practically any cost.

A second source of difficulty in the political sphere was the fact that the party has not been able to find any channels for "blame substitution." In a pluralist society, one can blame the difficulties of the system on high interest rates, low efficiency, political incompetence, corruption, the strength of certain interest groups and the like. In Communist states, the Communist party is regarded as the sole source of success, inspiration and truth; but conversely, there is no one else to blame for the problems of the political system. Consequently, the very insistence by the party on its monopoly has placed it in the most awkward situation; there are no other factors to blame for potential and real failures.

A third source of political difficulty was the tremendous

fear of those in middle-level management and the middle ranks of the party that they might lose their power.⁶ Long accustomed to the "service" of the party—frequently involving no more than paper pushing—their positions permitted the dispensing of patronage and allowed for some corruption. Fearing that they might lose from decentralization, middle-level bureaucrats simply sabotaged the decisions of their superiors.

A final source of the emerging difficulties in the political sphere was the regime's fear of going too far out on a limb. The "let's keep this thing off the books" mentality and the fear of being termed a "reformist" system and thus inviting Soviet-East European intervention have limited open discussions with regard to political alternatives both inside and outside Hungary. Thus both false expectations and reluctant gropings were abruptly terminated, leaving the notion of reform never quite clear.

Difficulties also surfaced in Hungarian society. Basically their causes could be easily seen in the modernization of society and in the consequent gap between ideology and reality. The first issue, the result of 30 years of forced social change, can best be viewed from the perspective of the forces loosed by the vast social transformation that began in 1945-1948. The emergence of a new elite class, the practically wholesale removal of a large part of the rural population from agrarian occupations, the creation of a special working class—the lumpenproletariat of the semiskilled—all turned Hungarian society away from the egalitarian static system of the interwar years with its limited social mobility. But the new dynamic class system started to explode at the restrictions placed on it by the temporary stops of 1972-1974 and by the official inability to overcome the periodic static forces that tried to put the cork back into the bottle of social egalitarianism.

The basic difficulty lies precisely here. The theory of egalitarianism so characteristic of the official view of society came into direct clash with the reality of a dynamic society, with its mandate for unequal economic performance and rewards, and with the demands for privatization and the advancement of a small, skilled sector of the population. The temporary slowing of social mobility in the 1970's contributed to the problem. Even that problem could have been handled, however, except for the fact that the need to reward various groups and individuals brought about a double crisis in social system management. The inequality of opportunity, with the haves, the official holders of power, maintaining their privileges vis-à-vis the have-nots and the underprivileged, in whose name they theoretically ruled, created a backlash of dissatisfaction the limits of which are hard to gauge.⁷

⁶Sandor Erdelyi, "Egy mintakatona ertetlensegei—I," *Valóság*, no. 7(1983), pp. 60-66.

⁷Andras Bencsik, "Egyenlotlensegek," *Népszava*, July 1, 1983, p. 5.

⁸Maria Petsching, "Az orvosi halapenzről," *Valóság*, no. 11(1983), p. 54, provides the lowest estimate of per capita involvement in the secondary economy, 33 percent.

Looking at the Hungarian scene today, one can observe six major difficulties that threaten the system's ability to function. Alone, none of these difficulties are strong enough to alter the course that Kadar and his regime have so far followed; together they represent the regime's greatest challenge.

First is the growing importance of the "nationality" question. Linked to the mistreatment of Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia, the nationality question clearly pits a nationalist population against a regime that says openly that it cannot do anything about the problem. It thus raises the very question of legitimacy: "If you cannot protect our kin, then why are you in power?" is a question one hears openly time and time again. Thus the nationality problem brings together all potential "opponents" of the Kadar regime, creating a common front against a party rule that does not even allow national discussion of this topic. Constrained by the perceived impossibility of intervention in the affairs of other socialist states and by the reality of anti-Hungarian animosity in Romania and Czechoslovakia, the regime's only answer has been to try to impose limited sanctions against those Hungarian citizens raising the nationality issue.

Hungary's greatest violations in the human rights area do not compare to the violations of human rights in the other Communist states of Europe, but they occur, nonetheless, precisely in the area of "nationality." The regime dares not lose legitimacy as the protector of the Hungarian nation; at the same time, it is afraid to allow Romanian, Czech or East German intervention in Hungary's internal affairs.

The second problem is the growing distance between the haves and the have-nots. The success of private individuals, the two-car garage and the 36-million-forint houses, contrast sharply with the mediocre and low living standards of many hardworking but luckless Hungarian families. The difference in living standards is not class based as it was in the 1930's; it is based on skill, convertible in the relatively open economic market. Among the haves one finds owners of boutiques and middlemen, doctors and lawyers, peasants and mechanics, electricians and popular writers. Among the have-nots one finds officials and bureaucrats, plumbers, lathe operators, writers and school teachers, academicians and musicians. Egged on by their ability to participate in the "secondary economy" that today includes at least 50 percent of Hungary's actively employed families, the successful individuals are strongly resented by the have-nots of society.⁸ The social stress between the rich and the poor is so strong that one wonders how long an ideologically egalitarian society can tolerate such open and visible expressions of disequilibrium.

The third problem lies in the fact that as a class the working class—in whose name the regime is still forced to rule officially—lags behind those engaged in the "private" sector, even if many members of the working class

participate in the rewards of the secondary economy. A workers ideology of power without the reality of working class rule is a potentially exploitative topic for the left-wing, demagogic and Moscow-oriented groups that would like to see a return to the late 1940's and early 1950's.

A PERMANENT UNDERCLASS

There is also a fourth problem: the creation of a permanent underclass,⁹ although this class is perhaps not so clearly visible as it is in New York, nor so dangerous as it is in Latin America. Nonetheless, members of the new underclass are no longer able to move upward, because of Hungary's closed society. Efforts to offer special college admission procedures for these less privileged infuriate those who "earn" their rights, and even special procedures are ineffective: studies indicate that very few of these special college "admittees" remain in college more than a year.

The new underclass has led to the reemergence of the visible poor, whose "existence" was recently highlighted by the abortive efforts of some intellectuals to create a charity society called SzETA (Szegényeket Tamogató Alap, Foundation to Support the Poor). The poor include people with minimal pensions, with nonconvertible skills, women at home caring for two or three small children, women with alcoholic husbands (or alcoholics themselves), women alone, abandoned old men and young hapless dreamers—all once again visible. They do not yet scrounge for food or live as bagwomen à la New York, but one sees them in public parks and in crowded markets. And the inability of the system to admit their existence and thus to deal with their needs is one of the most striking features of Hungary's social policy today. Like all socialist states, Hungary has no social safety nets, no food stamps, no regularized assistance programs; thus the regime is generally unable to deal with this problem of poverty.

A related issue—though, of course, not directly attributable to it—is a tremendous increase in violent crime. Robberies, knifings and murder are commonplace. Crime is spawned by the new slums of planned neighborhoods going rapidly downhill, fostered by the inattention of the police to roving thugs and marauding gangs and aided and abetted by the unlit streets of abysmally dark squares of a Budapest constantly engaged in conserving energy. Thus today the capital of Hungary is less safe at night than many American cities. Acts of random violence are committed by Gypsies or Arabs, Hungarian workers or peasant lads, or the children of party elites. They are signs of a tremendous social malaise, character-

⁹Bulcsu Bertha, "Csikkszedo a Pasareten," *Elet es Irodalom*, April 13, 1983, p. 1.

¹⁰For a summary of debates on the general social malaise, including the debate on the enormous suicide rate, see Mihaly Gergely, "Ilyen kozombosek vagyunk?" *Elet es Irodalom*, April 13, 1983, p. 5.

ized by increased drug use, by widespread alcoholism, by the highest suicide rate in the world, by an appallingly high divorce rate and by an appallingly low birthrate.

The "growing malaise" of Hungarian society is clearly related to the regime's legitimacy.¹⁰ For most of the last two decades that very legitimacy has depended largely on the Communist regime's ability to provide a rising standard of living. If the best the regime can offer is a stagnant or declining standard of living and a yearly inflation rate of 15 to 20 percent, then the legitimacy of the system is in question. By what right can it rule? The coming international Communist revolution? No Hungarian gives a hoot about that. The need to "defend oneself from the West?" No Hungarian believes in that threat. This growing malaise reflects the popular suspicion that the system will not be able to muddle through. Unable to make major reforms without undermining its own base of power, without new ideas, the regime faces the problem of, "What next?"

WHAT NEXT?

The question of choosing directions for Hungarian society for the near future is obviously a political question. The regime's external constraints are quite clear; it cannot leave the Warsaw Pact; it cannot oppose Soviet foreign policy initiatives and interests; it cannot "meddle" in affairs of other socialist states. But beyond these limits, the Soviet Union probably does not prescribe a "direction" for the Hungarians to follow; Hungary is responsible by and large for the policy initiatives and directions the Hungarian leadership follows. Kadar may be loyal to Moscow, but it is clear that he does not have to ask for Moscow's permission for most policy initiatives. Thus it seems obvious that the Hungarian elite should be held accountable for most of its political acts.

Domestically, internal constraints limit the regime's policy. Economically, Hungary is "market oriented" in form, although the regime continues to emphasize that it is "socialist in content." The economy needs greater autonomy for the units of production, but the regime cannot grant much more autonomy because of its fear that economic autonomy will result in the sharing of power, and because most middle-level managers are not willing to accept the responsibility that goes with autonomy. Consequently, the regime is likely to adopt only cosmetic changes, perhaps even implementing some cautious, positive tax reforms and incentive policies.

In a domestic political context, the regime is afraid that any change may weaken its unchallenged control. Another political issue is the "successor" question, i.e., who is to succeed Kadar. Communist systems are notori-

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Ivan Volgyes specializes in Soviet and East European affairs. An author and editor of more than 20 volumes, his most recent book is *The Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1982).

"The government of Czechoslovakia is increasingly dependent on Moscow and increasingly isolated in its own country. The rulers have no sense of legitimacy that might encourage them to follow the Hungarian path of détente."

Czechoslovakia in 1984

BY OTTO ULČ

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Less than three months after Richard M. Nixon's inauguration as President of the United States in 1969, Gustav Husák was chosen by the Kremlin to administer the affairs of postinvasion Czechoslovakia. Husák is still in office—combining the title of the First Secretary of the Communist party (CPCS) and the President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (ČSSR)—and so are the other Czech leaders chosen in 1969.

On the day of his inauguration, Husák pledged to the nation: "We are not giving up a single one of the great ideas that have become a part of our life in the last year."¹ Among the "great ideas" implemented during the "Prague spring" of 1968 were the abolishment of censorship, the enhancement of civil rights, the modernization of the economy, the rehabilitation of the victims of judicial and police repression and, above all—what the Soviet Union correctly perceived and feared—the weakening of the role of the Communist party. It was this particular deviation that triggered the Soviet invasion in August, 1968, the largest military undertaking in Europe since World War II.

Except for the federalization of the country, all the reforms were erased in a process officially known as "normalization." This dismantling went beyond the restoration of the status quo ante. In comparison, the pre-1968 rule of the colorless apparatchik Antonín Novotný is now viewed as an almost golden period of tolerance, and Novotný is posthumously called Antonín the Benevolent.

The leading cadres have not changed in the past 15 years; the Prague spring was followed by a winter in which the country's politics seem to have frozen into immobility. On the surface nothing moves, but below, under the thick layer of ice, various trends can be detected—trends that are likely to alter the society, the economy and the state.

The same Husák who (in 1954) was found guilty by his

fellow comrades of bourgeois nationalism and was sentenced to life imprisonment is now conducting a national, or even an antinational policy. According to a postinvasion quip, Czechoslovakia has become the most peace-loving country on earth: it does not interfere even in its own domestic affairs. Its dependence on Moscow is total. The party Politburo does not conduct Czechoslovak affairs without thorough Soviet guidance and is second to none in its devotion to the Kremlin. The regime's intense feeling that it lacks legitimacy makes it imperative that Czechoslovakia hold tightly to Moscow's apron strings.

Thus the sycophancy the Prague régime displays to all things Soviet is second to none. According to *Rudé Právo*, when Leonid Brezhnev died, the sun refused to shine, "covering itself in a mourning shroud of clouds." On Yuri Andropov's demise, the elements once again paid their respect. The prominent journalist Jaroslav Kořínek defined the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968, as "the honest fulfillment of the pledge of non-interference into domestic affairs."² Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Měčislav Jablonský characterized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a fraternal measure "in full conformity with the norms of international law."³

Simultaneously, the United States became the target of a propaganda overkill covering various subjects and periods. Even United States President Jimmy Carter, who embraced and kissed the unsuspecting President Leonid Brezhnev in Vienna, acquired satanic features: "The Carter Doctrine is the crudest policy of violence. It is ruthless, and completely overrides the inalienable rights of nations to sovereignty, to a social evolution of their own choosing."⁴ During the presidency of Ronald Reagan, especially because of Moscow's failure to prevent the stationing of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in West Europe, the visceral anti-American campaign reached another peak. President Reagan is termed worse than Hitler, a madman, a puppet of the military-industrial complex, determined in "this period of exceptionally rapacious American imperialism" to unleash a nuclear holocaust.⁵

In June, 1983, a World Peace Congress convened in Prague to endorse the Soviet foreign policy line. Sporadic voices of disapproval of all the missiles regardless of

¹*Projevy a Stati* (Prague: Svoboda, 1970), pp. 5-9.

²*Rudé Právo*, August 21, 1972, p. 2.

³*Nová Mysl*, no. 10 (October, 1980), p. 91.

⁴*Rudé Právo*, January 28, 1980.

⁵*Rudé Právo*, editorial, April 9, 1983, p. 1; Jan Fojtík, a prominent secretary of the Central Committee, *Tvorba*, April 21, 1982, p. 3.

ownership and direction of targeting were heard. Four months later—on October 24, 1983—a statement was simultaneously issued in Moscow, East Berlin and Prague about the “deployment of operational-tactical missile complexes” on the territory of East European allies. Neither sites nor types of rocketry were identified. The organizers of peace rallies went on to organize rallies to express support and indeed gratitude for this Soviet martial innovation. However, a unanimous endorsement of Soviet policies failed to materialize. Bombarded with ominous predictions of a war catastrophe, the public realized that their country, the repository of the nuclear arsenal, might well become the first target, Czechoslovakia's status of limited sovereignty notwithstanding.

In several factories and schools, petitions circulated protesting the installation of lethal Soviet hardware. *Rudé Právo* acknowledged receiving letters from concerned citizens, and carried the statement of Prime Minister Lubomír Štrougal that “none of us is rejoicing over the recent decision” to deploy the missiles.⁶

Government-sponsored civil defense programs do not add tranquility. Over 40 percent of the population was reported to have taken part in civil defense training in 1983.⁷ The obligatory military service of two years for young males receives considerable attention from the media, which stresses toughness and patriotism. An unusual amount of publicity was accorded to the February, 1984, Warsaw Pact exercises in Bohemia. However, career officers are in short supply in Czechoslovakia and an energetic recruitment campaign is under way. Traditionally, the country does not associate a military uniform with glamor and admiration.

The years 1971–1975 were the most successful in the country's history of socialist planning. Anesthetized by political defeat, the population seemed to have found a compensatory self-assertion in economic performance, and made an effort to gear their energies toward material satisfaction, often illicitly obtained: consumerism rather than communism. And the party encouraged this trend. According to the principles of normalization, the rulers rule; for not meddling in public affairs the citizenry is rewarded with the opportunity to attend to its private affairs. However, the social contract of the 1970's has come under a strain, making it increasingly difficult for the government to live up to its part of the bargain—to provide the opportunity for a steady though unspectacular rise in living standards.

⁶*Rudé Právo*, November 21, 1983.

⁷*Práce*, January 23, 1984, p. 3.

⁸Quoted by David Binder, “Czechoslovakia, the East's New Economic Disaster,” *The New York Times*, November 8, 1981, p. 21.

⁹*Nové Slovo*, (Bratislava), May 22, 1980, pp. 1,3.

¹⁰*Hospodářské Noviny*, January 1, 1984, p. 15; *Rudé Právo*, November 11, 1983, p. 1, editorial. Compare *Rudé Právo*, November 8, 1983, p. 1, for the editorial complaint: some enterprises assume that their customers will have full understanding for their difficulties, that they will accept late delivery of products unfinished or defective.

When the oil-exporting countries struck in 1973, Czechoslovakia applauded and encouraged them to raise the prices of crude oil further, expecting that such a step would injure the capitalist orbit—which it did—and thus would benefit the socialist orbit—which it did not. The Soviet Union, the virtual monopolist supplier of crude oil and natural gas to Czechoslovakia, has gradually abandoned its system of preferential, so-called friendship prices. With reduced purchases, the bill continues to rise. According to recent calculations, in 1984 Prague was paying 25 rubles a barrel (\$30) for Soviet oil, above the world price of \$29 a barrel.

Czechoslovakia emerged relatively unscathed from World War II, and in 1945 it had at its disposal the best industrial equipment in Central Europe. Several decades later, the advantage turned into a substantial handicap. An estimated 70 percent of its entire industrial properties were scrap iron. In contrast to Poland, which indulged in ruinously excessive borrowing from capitalist nations, the Prague rulers chose the other extreme; they resisted the capitalist lure and in consequence failed to obtain modern technology. The relatively pragmatic Prime Minister Lubomír Štrougal is credited with the quote, “If things go on this way, we'll have to put up signs on the frontier saying 'Entering Czechoslovakia, the Museum of an Industrial Society.' ”⁸

Because of obsolescence, outdated factory equipment and technological procedures, Czechoslovakia consumes energy and material at a much higher rate than Western countries. And labor productivity is much lower—about 50 percent. Czechoslovakia's share of world trade dropped from two percent in 1974 to less than one percent in 1984. Vasil Bilak, the hard-line member of the Politburo and Husák's main rival for power, acknowledged that only two percent of the nation's manufactured goods met world standards.⁹

Instead of technologically advanced products, the country is forced to export consumer goods, food and raw material like timber. Other East European countries, including Bulgaria, the latecomer to industrialization, obtain higher prices for their exported machinery on Western markets than does Czechoslovakia.

Blaming outsiders for one's inadequacy is a habit popular all over the world. Thus the Communists now charge the capitalist countries, and especially the United States, with a large share of responsibility for the economic malaise.

But Czechoslovakia's failure to meet export goals on nonsocialist markets cannot be explained by reference to the capitalist countries' discriminatory measures, real or imaginary. In addition to the generally inadequate quality of home-produced goods, Czechoslovak exporters fail to meet delivery deadlines; they react slowly to customers' requests; and service and spare parts are not available. Clearly, a manager accustomed to the directives of central planning is bound to do poorly in an environment requiring imagination and a speedy response.¹⁰

There is no flexibility in the domestic market either. Svatopluk Potáč, the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of overall planning, has acknowledged that economic conditions in the 1980's are "substantially more difficult" than in the 1970's. For both domestic and external reasons, the prognosis is not encouraging and the current seventh five-year plan is likely to be the last one. According to Potáč, "The era of long term continuity of economic development and fundamental stability of five year plans is over."¹¹ In his address to the Central Committee of the CPCSS, Štrougal characterized Czechoslovakia's current economic problems as "unprecedented in their scope and complexity."¹²

No one expects that the economic machinery will fall apart. In 1981, the Czechoslovak economy registered negative growth, in 1982, barely zero growth. In 1983, productivity improved somewhat because of tightened discipline, and the control of costs, energy and material consumption. This slight improvement notwithstanding, the estimated rate of growth for 1983 (0.9 percent) is by far the lowest in comparison to all other countries of the Warsaw Pact, Poland included. The prospects of growth in 1984 are minimal, partly because of the costs of new nuclear and conventional weapons systems.

If the economic machinery is defective, is there the will and capacity to repair it? If repaired, will the vehicle require a different driver? "Economy" and "reform" are Siamese twins in any socialist vocabulary, though in Czechoslovakia the word *reforma*, much tainted by the heresies of 1968, has been replaced by "measures," a bland, innocuous synonym. In a way reminiscent of the perennial rewriting of the curricula in American colleges, the politicians and economists constantly refer to the need to improve the economic structure and its performance.

Both the cause of the malady and the cure are known. The old, essentially primitive industrialization through investment-heavy programs has outlived its usefulness, yet it survives. "The basis of all troubles and hindrances is the conflict between the economic interests of the center and those of the enterprises," diagnosed Miroslav Křížek, professor of economy in Prague.¹³ The insecure, noninnovative leadership is incapable of considering a remedy for economic ills other than the traditional exhortations and austerity. The regime is not inclined to introduce a market-oriented reform or much needed decentralization, precisely because of its perceived threat to their power. Although a "set of measures" was promulgated in 1983 with great publicity as "the way of modernization and rationalization," central management is not being eliminated.

¹¹ *Nová Mysl*, no. 1 (January, 1983), p. 27.

¹² *Rudé Právo*, October 31, 1983, pp. 3-4.

¹³ *Politická Ekonomie*, no. 9 (September, 1983), pp. 885-898.

¹⁴ "Dynamics or Stagnation," dated February, 1984, published by *Listy* (Rome), April, 1984, pp. 47-52.

¹⁵ Compiled by West German and Austrian sources. *Americké Listy* (New York), August 26, 1983, p. 2.

The Czechoslovak human rights movement, Charter 77, frequently issues various position papers. An analysis of Czechoslovakia's economy was authored by Vladimír Kadlec, former president of the Prague School of Economics and minister of education in 1968.¹⁴ Kadlec questions the official figures and the interpretation of recent economic development, and charges that the national distributed income was smaller in 1983 than in 1978, as were investment inputs and real wages. "If we want to achieve truly dynamic and effective economic progress, we can no longer build our hopes on the desires of ideologues and economic amateurs," states Kadlec, pointing out the need for changes in the social and psychological climate, adversely affected by widespread corruption and cynicism.

No reasonable person believes that economic improvement will come through Czechoslovakia's gradual detachment from its East European partners. Thousands of strings tie Prague to Moscow. The Soviet Union remains the principal supplier of energy and, conversely, the Soviet market is needed to absorb Czechoslovak products that cannot compete on Western markets. Further negative phenomena have also to be considered. The alienated populace is increasingly apathetic, and the damage cannot be undone with an avalanche of administrative fiats (in 1978, 84 laws and ordinances about quality control programs were adopted). Yet because of poor discipline there are considerable losses; in the construction industry, an estimated one-third of all working time is lost. Nor has the damage caused by the purges of hundreds of thousands of individuals been undone with the passage of time. The primacy of political criteria for employment, promotion and demotion continues.

Economic difficulties are aggravated by an altogether unexpected novelty: socialist unemployment, which defies all the efforts of centralized planning. The media have started to mention this embarrassing issue. On October 20, 1983, *Rudé Právo* disposed of a query about the unemployment of recent university graduates with a reference to the fact that 660,000 positions require university education, yet these criteria are met by only two-thirds of the job holders. Thus 220,000 politically qualified appointees are the stumbling block. Among them, 17,000 leading cadres have not advanced beyond a grade school education. When intellectuals are assigned as dishwashers, such an allocation may well be viewed as innovative, but hardly rational.

STANDARDS OF LIVING AND RULING

In 1960, the Czechoslovak and the Austrian average per capita income was about even. Twenty years later, the Czechoslovak per capita income has dropped to one-half the income of Czechoslovakia's capitalist neighbor.¹⁵

Prague's boastful clichés about the unprecedented growth in Czechoslovak living standards is no longer heard. Despite the erosion of vigor, the per capita gross national product (GNP) amounts to the equivalent of

US\$6,627; within the Warsaw Pact community this is second only to East Germany (\$7,513) and considerably higher than the per capita GNP in the Soviet Union (\$3,399).¹⁶ In 1983, the average increase in earning has been sharply outstripped by rising prices, especially in the service sector.

The Czechoslovak diet is plentiful but nutritionally ill-balanced; there is an excessive consumption of grains, potatoes and fats. It is said that in 1984 the country has probably reached the world heavyweight record, with the most overweight population.¹⁷ The annual consumption of cigarettes is 2,000 per capita, infants included, and one-fifth of all deaths are attributed to smoking. As to the consumption of alcohol, the country ranks fifth in the world.¹⁸ Drug addiction, a phenomenon almost unknown a decade ago, has risen to an alarming degree, especially among teenagers. "Tens of thousands of people" are affected, according to the findings of a secret conference on drug abuse, held in Prague in November, 1983; the national count is most likely much higher, numbered in hundreds of thousands.¹⁹

The population ratio of the two sections of the country is roughly two to one: 10 million in the Czech Republic (CSR) and 5 million in the Slovak Republic (SSR). Since 1975, the number of live births has been declining; each third pregnancy is terminated by abortion. In 1982, in the CSR though not in the SSR, a *minus zero* growth was reached, to the expressed concern of the authorities.²⁰ When Communist party rule began in 1948, in comparison to industrial Bohemia and Moravia the Slovak region was predominantly rural and rather backward. The government's program of rapid industrialization and catching up has been almost accomplished: in 1982, with 32.9 percent of the total population, Slovakia produced 28.7 percent of all industrial goods. The preferential investment policy remains in force.

Living standards improved most in the countryside. The agricultural cooperatives, the Czechoslovak version of Soviet *kolkhozy*, which were established under duress in

¹⁶"East Germany's Pre-eminent Position," *The New York Times*, June 3, 1984, citing data from Wharton Econometrics (University of Pennsylvania).

¹⁷*Mladá Fronta*, January 13, 1984, p. 2; *Tribuna*, February 29, 1984, p. 2.

¹⁸*Mladá Fronta*, February 20, 1984, p. 2; *Rudé Právo*, August 24, 1983, p. 5 and October 19, 1983, p. 2.

¹⁹Radio Free Europe, *Czechoslovak Situation Report*, no. 2 (February 8, 1984), pp. 14-19.

²⁰*Rudé Právo*, February 3 and 14, 1983, p. 2; *Práce*, August 10, 1983, p. 3; *Lidová Demokracie*, October 6, 1983, p. 4; *Mladá Fronta*, October 13, 1983, p. 2.

²¹An interesting study by Pavel Pácl in *Sociologia*, no. 4 (1983), pp. 430-435, based on an in-depth survey of changed life-styles in several South Moravian villages.

²²*Lidová Demokracie*, July 25, 1983, p. 1; *Rudé Právo*, March 9, 1983, p. 2.

²³*Práce*, January 5, 1983, p. 3.

²⁴*Doprava*, no. 3 (1983), pp. 198-202.

²⁵James M. Markham in *The New York Times*, April 8, 1984.

the 1950's and were widely regarded as places of poverty and semiservitude, have flourished, partly because some controls were wrested away from the state, and partly because the cooperatives took advantage of the permitted activities of ancillary private enterprise—often a source of more income than the income from the communal fields. The quality of life in some rural districts today is superior to urban living. The villagers own their houses; the townspeople are assigned miniature apartments in prefabricated complexes in nondescript suburbias. Migration to the cities has stopped, and cultural and service amenities that are lacking in the rural areas may be reached by car, which is an increasingly common property item.²¹

There is an acute shortage of housing in Prague as well as in remote townships. A plague especially for the newly wed, the waiting period for the issuance of a coveted *Bytový dekret*, an apartment assignment, often lasts more than 10 years, by then frequently too late for a marriage wrecked by the stress of temporary living with various relatives and in-laws.

Complaints over service in the retail and repair business rank second to the laments over the housing shortage. Various controlling state agencies report that the frequency of cheating the customer has reached the 30 percent to 50 percent probability range.²²

A growing number of urban residents own a second home—a country cottage, often a dilapidated village abode that has been lovingly restored by illegal means. On average, city escapees spend 100 to 120 days each year in their second homes. Exit roads are jammed; cities are depopulated. The number of dwellers acquiring a second home is expected to triple during the 1980's.²³

Although Czechoslovakia lacks the tourist appeal of neighboring Austria and is far less equipped to offer tourist services, it nonetheless obtains over 50 percent of all its hard currency earnings from the tourist trade. Ten million Czechoslovaks, most of whom can visit only eastern, socialist countries, were reported to have gone abroad in 1981—an exodus of two-thirds of the population (150 million Americans would have to travel to match this accomplishment).²⁴

THE ENVIRONMENT

After almost four decades of extensive industrialization and a total disregard of any environmental impact, the monothematic planners now face the consequences. Forests have been destroyed by acid rain; fields have received lethal doses of excess chemical fertilizers; waste products have reached a level 10 times the world average. The extraction of ore alone produces around 35 tons of per capita solid waste. Czechoslovakia suffers one of the world's highest levels of sulphur dioxide. Water resources are contaminated. These findings were reported by the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences.²⁵ The government commissioned the study and then declared the results a state secret.

Yet, it is no secret that the air is foul, that the environment is damaged and that north Bohemia, an area rich with chemical industries and surface mining, is starting to resemble a moonscape. Several Western movie companies have paid hard currency for the right to shoot devastating war scenes in the area. Schoolchildren are instructed to protect themselves with handkerchiefs when they walk outdoors. Regularly, children are shipped to less affected areas, just for breathing exercises.²⁶ With the help of unnamed individuals within the establishment, Charter 77 obtained copies of official studies and findings. A thorough study including data on miscarriages, the birth of mongoloid children and the increase of diseases in affected areas has reached the West.²⁷

PARTY MEMBERSHIP

Once the life of the people becomes a matter of indifference, what are the inducements for joining the party? Only conformism and career interest. The party membership—1,623,000 strong in January, 1984—is organized in some 46,000 primary cells. Two-thirds of the members were originally manual laborers but today less than one-third are workers and their proportion is declining. Each third member is said to be under 35 years of age.

In the 1983 campaign to reinvigorate the party, 60,000 candidates were admitted. "A new flow of young people into the party; what a joyous sight," rhapsodized *Rudé Právo* on October 22, 1983. Behind the barrage of self-congratulation a different picture emerges: a slight but steady decline in the percentage of the young recruits. Many of them fail to complete the two-year probationary period and never become card-carrying members. Occasional candor seeps through in the party publications. "Selection and grooming of new cadres for leading roles remains our weakest link," said *Život Strany*, journal of the apparatchiks and the activists. The average age of the leading cadres is steadily increasing.²⁸

Party veterans occasionally complain about the unwillingness of young people to get involved. The current term for party recruitment is "mobilization," that is, persuasion fortified by coercion. Some local cells resist the mobilization practices; some cells do not even bother to respond to the charges of revolutionary malpractice.

Above all, the Communist party of Czechoslovakia is afflicted by and indeed is based on opportunism. Neither genuine belief nor devotion to the cause are required. Docility and conformism are the important requirements.

²⁶*Rudé Právo*, September 24, 1983, p. 2.

²⁷Published as a supplement to the February, 1984, issue of *Listy*.

²⁸*Život Strany*, no. 19 (1983), pp. 3-4.

²⁹*Tribuna*, September 28, 1983, p. 2.

³⁰*Listy*, vol. 14, no. 2 (April, 1984), pp. 4-5, is edited by a group of prominent ex-Communists, led by Jiří Pelikán, former member of the Czechoslovak Parliament and of the Central Committee of the CPCs; he is currently a member of the European Parliament for the Italian Socialist party.

Rank-and-file members nod, attend meetings and pay their monthly dues.

Women constitute half the labor force. They account for 28 percent of party membership, but their representation and influence in top decision-making bodies is practically nil.

According to current wisdom, a Czech has only three friends—his car, his weekend cottage and himself. Selfishness, egotistical disregard for public good, obsession with consumerism, envy and greed—these are the symptoms of the malady termed the "mold of petty bourgeois mentality," and diagnosed as "the most dangerous anti-socialist deformation in the lives of the people."²⁹ *Prestižní spotřeba* is the term denoting ostentatious, status-conscious consumption. Excessive prestige value is accorded to Western and Japanese consumer products.

Under the banners of collectivist solidarity, individualism, crass and insensitive, characterizes the mood of Czechoslovak society. Socialist citizens erect "No Parking" signs in front of their homes. On camping grounds the vacationers turn on the engines of their cars with the exhaust pipe facing unwelcome intruders. For some of the damage to socialist property only the socialist system is to be blamed. A citizen deprived of the opportunity to purchase an electric bulb is left no other option but to unscrew the bulb in a public place. Perennial shortages explain the swift disappearance of toilet seats from the lavatories along the first, still unfinished, Czechoslovak superhighway. However, the damage to public telephones (on average, 90 percent are out of order) and to park benches cannot be blamed on the deficiencies of the domestic market; these are acts of vandalism, especially of the young and the frustrated.

Husák's regime does not acknowledge its responsibility for these phenomena. To offset the stationing of a half-million foreign troops and the dismantling of the achievements of 1968, the carrot of economic betterment was offered: those who did not meddle into public affairs were given the right to pursue socialist petty bourgeois goals—ownership of a house, a car, occasional trips abroad and an occasional mistress—pursuits eminently more pleasurable and rational than the 1968 goal—to rewrite Marx and defy the Kremlin. The social contract—absolute docility in exchange for relative prosperity—worked during the early years of the 1970's, but it is no longer effective, and the nation, the cheated contractual party, is responding accordingly.

Listy, the Rome-based prominent Czech language bimonthly, carried a brilliant short essay entitled "The Revenge of the Bourgeoisie,"³⁰ which focused on an ex-

(Continued on page 388)

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“... In Yugoslavia, the move from charismatic authority to institutional solutions is painful. Yet the complex territorial/ethnic/army quota system mirrors the fundamental reality of Yugoslav political life. Yugoslavia can survive only if it accepts the principle of mutual advantage.”

The Politics of Scarcity in Yugoslavia

BY ROBIN ALISON REMINGTON

Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri-Columbia

IN 1984, the Western press focuses primarily on gloomy reports of Yugoslavia's economic time of troubles. As the Yugoslav economy totters on the brink of collapse, Western security concerns intensify. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Western bankers come reluctantly to Yugoslavia's rescue with yet another austerity program, the price of yet another short-term solution.

Nonetheless, the prophecies of doom must be placed in perspective; Yugoslav options must be evaluated in light of the real (if little understood) political accomplishments that have taken place in that East European nation in the four and a half years since Tito died in May, 1980.¹

From the time the Yugoslav Communist party came to power in 1945 until his death, Josip Broz Tito emerged as the godfather of Yugoslavia. His personality dominated the experiment in self-managing socialism, thus subtly subverting it. This process is epitomized by an old Belgrade joke: Yugoslavia is a country the size of Wyoming with a personality cult the size of China's. In the West, Tito was regarded as a modern David standing up to the Soviet Goliath. Other able political leaders remained faceless, and institutional developments were largely ignored.

Tito embodied the myth of partisan solidarity that revitalized the Yugoslav philosophy during and after World War II. He personally arbitrated student strikes and ethnic crises, whipped the regional Communist parties into line behind the restyled League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), and became the last genuine statesman of the World War II generation, the last living architect of nonalignment. Tito walked on a world stage, larger than life.

¹Although this analysis benefits from interviews conducted in Yugoslavia during my Fulbright Faculty Research Abroad Fellowship, May through December, 1981, and an American Council of Learned Societies East European fellowship that enabled me to return to Belgrade during the twelfth League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) congress in June, 1982, none of the scholars and policymakers that I met with are responsible for the views expressed here.

²Robin Alison Remington, “Yugoslavia,” in Teresa Rakowska Harmstone, ed., *Communism in Eastern Europe*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984).


It is not surprising that Tito was increasingly seen as an essential linchpin, holding back a tidal wave of historic South Slav nationalism that threatened to pull the country apart. After Tito, would Yugoslavia be standing on glass legs? Indeed, for ten years before this giant of Yugoslav communism died, Yugoslav watchers premised political disaster, unmanageable ethnic hostilities, civil war, military coups, and Soviet intervention. None of these worse-case scenarios occurred, although they remain in the wings as grim reminders that the future is not clear. Beneath the somewhat hysterical journalism, there was and is the serious question of whether the Yugoslav political system could move from reliance on Tito's charisma to legitimate, generally accepted institutional processes.

In June, 1982, the twelfth congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia essentially ratified the provisional political solutions that went into effect when Tito died two years earlier. Tito himself had stage-managed the initial steps of the transition. After the abortive challenge of the “Croatian mass movement” in the early 1970's, Tito conducted his own mini-Cultural Revolution. He struck in favor of a streamlined, united LCY, a federal party with the power “to interfere” when necessary and to which the republic-level parties would be accountable. These reforms, embodied in the 1974 constitution adopted at the tenth party congress, represented more of a flirtation than a “return” to Leninism.² For this congress quietly adopted the confederal structure that had been at the heart of the aborted constitutional amendments of 1971. The 1974 constitution recognized the “sovereign rights” of the nations of Yugoslavia. It granted these “nations” (i.e., national/ethnic groups rather than territorial republics) the essentially fictitious right to secede. Equally important, with the exception of the federation's presumed authority concerning defense, foreign policy and the slippery notion of a “united” market, the former powers of the federal center in principle devolved back to the six republics and the two autonomous provinces.

Thus the federation found itself increasingly relegated to a mechanism for achieving agreement between republic and provincial political actors. The organizational arenas provided to facilitate such agreement included

Figure 1:

**THE POWER CIRCLES THAT MAKE UP YUGOSLAVIA'S
COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP***



*Twenty-eight key positions are involved: 8 members of the State Collective Presidency, 15 members of the LCY CC Presidium (8 are ex-officio as presidents of the republic and province party organizations), the president of the National Assembly, the Prime Minister, plus the federal secretaries of defense, foreign affairs, and internal affairs.

**Although Planinc remained Prime Minister, one deputy and nine ministers changed during the spring of 1984.

***Continuity is assured by staggered election schedules. The State Collective Presidency (5 year terms) was elected in May, 1984; the party Presidium is scheduled to turn over at the thirteenth party congress set for 1986.

state and party collective presidencies, the Federal Executive Council, and a newly constituted Federal Assembly that also functioned on the basis of regional parity with delegates tied to regional assemblies.


The pieces were in place and had, indeed, begun to function. Yet there were genuine fears that without the psychological buffer of Tito as a court of last resort, the elaborate succession machinery might simply grind to a halt.

At the twelfth party congress, the "provisional solution" was apparently working well enough; in any event, there was no generally accepted alternative. Slow, labor-intensive politically and with some dreadful squeaks in its economic parts, the machinery designed to search for consensus has been institutionalized in federal structures and procedural rules.

On the state side, the Collective Presidency is composed of one representative for each republic and province (plus whoever happens to be the president of the

LCY CC presidency). In terms of the party, the Central Committee (itself composed of 20 representatives from each republic, 15 for each autonomous province plus 15 from the party organization in the armed forces) elected its own presidency (Presidium). Although this election was conducted for the first time by secret ballot, the actual range of choice was limited. Of the three representatives for each republic, two for each province, it was predetermined that one would be the head of the regional party involved. Although it was theoretically possible, it was highly unlikely that the other republic representatives would deviate from a previously expressed preference of that republic's/province's delegation to the congress. One seat was reserved for a representative of the JNA—this time the head of the army's party organization rather than the defense minister, as was the case following the 1978 congress. In short, the top hierarchy of both state and party has been firmly tied to a system of power sharing among regional units, while the political

The Regions of Yugoslavia



Republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia

Autonomous Provinces: Vojvodina and Kosovo, both located in the Republic of Serbia

access of the Yugoslav military has been assured at the highest party level. Not only has decision making been "pluralized" to depend on interregional consensus, but those who occupy the key central state and party posts do so at the discretion of their regional power bases.

At the same time, to accumulate the remaining fragments of central power once in Belgrade has been made exceedingly difficult under the new rules. Both collective presidencies have Presidents with one-year terms that rotate on an already established schedule. The office of party Secretary is on a two-year rotation cycle. There are similar rotation schedules for a wide range of important, if less generally visible, federal positions.

In short, Yugoslav collective leadership is perhaps the most elaborate quota system in the world. It is based on a mix of "national" (ethnic) and territorial/bureaucratic considerations. This, too, is Tito's legacy. For among his major political initiatives during those last years was a bold move to assure that the principle of "collective work" would extend to all levels of party organization. He wanted collective responsibility and the constant rotation of leading positions to protect Yugoslav society from "unhealthy ambitions" and the power grabs of political

cliques. He intended to deal with the long-standing Yugoslav problem of powerful informal groups whose members switch back and forth between party/state/trade union positions in a kind of musical chairs with the top regional and local positions, a process called "horizontal rotation."

The result was to ensure that there could be no more Titos, that power would be too dispersed to be captured by another charismatic leader with a silver tongue and a firm hand. There is considerable ambivalence as to whether this was good or bad political judgment. However, the staggered rotation schedules add predictability in that each republic/province knows when to expect its turn. On the plus side, the system narrows the arena of ongoing political struggle, even as it cuts down on the number of countrywide decisions that must be made.³

As of this writing, the rotation schedules have been routinely observed. Montenegrin Veselin Djuranović is the President of the Collective State Presidency, elected in May, 1984, while the Kosovo representative on the LCY CC Presidium, Ali Sukrija, replaced Dragoslav Marković of Serbia in the summer of 1984. Party Secretary Nikola Stojanović from Bosnia-Herzegovina has stepped down in favor of a representative from Macedonia, Dimce Be-lovski.

On the minus side, this political merry-go-round is

³See Dennison I. Rusinow, *Universities Field Staff International Reports*, no. 39 (1982), "Yugoslavia's First Post-Tito Party Congress: Part I: Problems on the Agenda," p. 5.

confusing both to Yugoslavs and to outsiders. Whatever advantages exist in summit diplomacy, they are lost when state and party presidents rotate every year. Yet one should not underrate the political experience of Yugoslavia's collective leadership. Tito's intentions aside, there are advantages to the reality of "horizontal rotation" at the highest levels.⁴

For example, in the newly elected State Presidency, the 59-year-old President is a former Prime Minister. Stane Dolanc, also 59, from Slovenia, has served as Secretary of the LCY under Tito, in earlier versions of the current CC Presidium and most recently as the federal secretary for internal affairs (security). Lazar Mojsov, 64, of Macedonia, has held top ranking party positions and comes to the State Presidency from the job of federal secretary for foreign affairs. General Nikola Ljubičić, 68, was Yugoslav defense minister for many years, recently president of Serbia. And there are others with impressive government records. With one exception—Radovan Vlajkovic, 62, of Vojvodina—all members of the State Presidency are in their first five year term and could be reelected. (Which is not to say that reelection to the State Presidency is a sure thing, because in the 1984 election, of the three members eligible for reelection, only one was returned to office.)

This is an impressive group. Its relationship to the LCY CC Presidium remains to be seen, and indeed that relationship may change again depending on who is elected to the party Collective Presidency at the 1986 thirteenth LCY congress. Formerly there was an overlapping membership in these two bodies, but the practice of horizontal rotation appears to have replaced dual membership. In times of emergency,⁵ the State Presidency is instructed to make the appropriate decisions at sessions to which it is instructed to invite the president of the national assembly, the Prime Minister, the president of the CC Presidium, the secretary of the CC Presidium, and the federal secretaries of national defense, internal affairs and foreign affairs.

THE PROBLEMS

Yugoslav leaders have a tough job in 1984. They face intimidating economic, ethnic and organizational problems that would trouble decisionmakers in any political system.

First, and most painfully, Yugoslav politicians are trapped by the politics of scarcity for the foreseeable

⁴This is not to say that Yugoslav leaders are unanimously convinced of such advantages. The process by means of which the same people stay at the top while switching positions was strongly criticized by Professor Najdan Pasic, member of the LCY Central Committee, in a recent interview in *Duga* (Belgrade), March 24, 1984. For English language excerpts, see Slobodan Stankovic, "Yugoslav Economists Say Change Must Come," Radio Free Europe (RFE) Background Report, April 5, 1984.

⁵Article 22a of the Standing Rules of the State Presidency, *Sluzbeni List*, no. 8 (February 15, 1980).

⁶Bogdan Denis Denitch, *The Legitimation of a Revolution: The Yugoslav Case* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).

Table 1: The "Nations" of Yugoslavia
(Total Population: 22.4 Million)

Serbs	8.1 million	36.0%
Croats	4.4 million	19.7%
Muslims*	1.9 million	8.9%
Slovenes	1.7 million	7.8%
Macedonians	1.3 million	5.9%
Montenegrins	577 thousand	2.5%

*This is Muslim in an ethnic, not religious sense. The majority of Yugoslav Muslims live in the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, an important political dynamic results from the fact that (with the exception of the Slovenes) Yugoslav nations live in republics with the same name although these republics are far from ethnically homogeneous. For example, Serbia includes two autonomous provinces: Kosovo, where 1.2 million ethnic Albanians make up the majority of the province and Vojvodina, the home of the majority of Yugoslavs of Hungarian origin.

future. Although the country's foreign debt has been generally assumed to be some \$20 billion, Yugoslavia's inability to repay has led to more borrowing. According to Yugoslav sources, by 1990 debt-servicing obligations will have almost doubled the financial burden borne by Yugoslav citizens. Indeed, that \$40 billion may rise much higher, depending on interest rates in the international financial world.

On a yearly basis, Yugoslavia's most recent agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) means somehow repaying \$5 billion—\$6 billion in interest alone by 1989, \$4.9 billion in 1990. At the Central Committee session in February, 1984, Milos Minić warned that the current 60 percent inflation rate might reach the Latin American proportions of 130 percent by the end of 1984.

Moreover, there is no guarantee that Yugoslavia will be able to pay these bills without going still deeper into debt. Unless Yugoslav exports improve still more dramatically, those in charge of the country's finances will be forced to continue their Orwellian behavior of buying raw materials in the West for hard cash and, because of low quality controls, selling in the East for nonconvertible currencies or elaborate barter arrangements. Such economic strategy does nothing to help pay the Western debt.

In this context, Yugoslav housewives face a bleak life of more shortages and rationing, while the Yugoslav standard of living continues to slide. The economic tensions flowing from IMF-imposed austerity are exacerbated by uneven regional development, which makes it even more difficult to deal with political and social pressures rooted in the historic national (ethnic) antagonisms that undermine the Yugoslav party's efforts to create a socialist political culture (see Table 1).⁶

The 1.2 million Albanians living in the Kosovo make up 78 percent of the provincial population. As of the 1981 census, the number of ethnic Albanian citizens in Yugoslavia was more than double the number of Montenegrins and more than the number of Macedonians, both groups with republic status. Today, Albanians are the fifth largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia and, given the

discrepancy between the Albanian and Slovene birth rates, Albanians may move into third place before the next census. Numbers and time are on the Albanian side. However, the strength of Serbian passions and the legal problem of redrawing boundaries make it most likely that the Kosovo will have to settle for less than a republic. Rather, there is a trend toward giving both Serbian provinces—Kosovo and the Vojvodina—de facto equality.

In March, 1981, Albanian nationalism and frustration at high unemployment and the continued gap between the Serbian standard of living and that of the rest of the country erupted into riots serious enough to bring the Yugoslav army to the Serbian autonomous province of Kosovo.⁷ The subsequent search for someone to blame brought the normal operation of Yugoslav political life virtually to a halt, with calls for "differentiation" (a euphemism for purges of provincial officials) to distinguish loyal and disloyal Albanians. Although it is not clear that efforts to pacify the province have succeeded, the more violent forms of Albanian nationalism have been contained. Yet repercussions continue.

From an economic perspective, the containment of Albanian nationalism requires sustained efforts to eliminate the gap between the Kosovo and the more prosperous parts of Yugoslavia. The political consequences of failing to move forward are unavoidable, and those who make such decisions are not unaware of them. Indeed, when I was in Yugoslavia in 1981, my landlady's husband brought coffee from the Kosovo (where he was on an engineering project) when we could not get it in Belgrade. Yet under conditions of austerity, what goes to improve standards in one region must be paid for by others. And in more developed areas there is increasing resentment of the cost even for security-related defense to ensure stability, never mind economic equalization.⁸

ECONOMIC STABILIZATION

Festering Albanian nationalism, Serbian backlash, and unhappiness in Yugoslavia's more developed areas because these areas foot a high proportion of the bill all feed into the core political dilemma facing Yugoslav leaders. National/ethnic tensions have their organizational

⁷For more detailed analysis see Pedro Ramet, "Problems of Albanian Nationalism in Yugoslavia," *Orbis*, vol. 25, no. 2 (Summer, 1981), pp. 369-388 and Mark Baskin, "Crisis in Kosovo," *Problems of Communism*, March/April, 1983, pp. 61-74.

⁸Complaints concerning the defense burden have been openly expressed in Slovenia; see for example, *Delo* (Ljubljana), December 4, 1982.

⁹Report by Vojvodina representative on the party presidency General Petar Matić to a session of the Central Committee, *Borba* (Belgrade), February 29, 1984.

¹⁰Pasic, *Duga* interview, March 24, 1984. Quoted by Stan-kovic, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

¹¹*Borba* (Belgrade), March 24-25, 1984.

¹²*Danas* (Zagreb), January 24, 1984.

counterpart in demands for expanded political access. Although the twelfth party congress in 1982 was called the congress of "continuity," it is hard to have continuity without party unity.

An economic stabilization program is in place. Yugoslavia is torn in a fierce tug of war between political leaders convinced of the necessity for market-oriented reform and political/economic resisters unwilling to make the needed sacrifices in power, privilege and money. Moreover, the top ranks of the party and government are far from agreed on the political direction to take on the road to economic stabilization.

There is a fundamental difference between those who see the answer as "more democratization" and those who favor more "centralization." In fact, these are political code words for a struggle between supporters of the present highly confederal system and those wanting to return to "a firm hand." There are open attacks on those who "negate everything,"⁹ warnings that "our system cannot be maintained [as it is, and] cannot be repaired if we close our eyes to [its] weakness."¹⁰

Prime Minister Milka Planinc bluntly admitted that she might be forced to form "a new kind of government," if the policies she worked out with the International Monetary Fund in the spring of 1984 were not supported. She disagreed with unnamed opponents over the "well-intentioned suggestion that we sever ties with the International Monetary Fund," and concluded that "either our political system must become more effective or it will be assaulted on all sides by pressure to change it."¹¹ This is a basic split between two incompatible solutions: striving for economic stability in close cooperation with the West (most particularly the IMF) and cutting off the dependence on Western loans with far-reaching implications for Yugoslav nonalignment and independent socialism.

Another important component of the demand for more democratization is the issue not only of the party's relationship to self-managing institutions, but its monopoly of political access. There is frank criticism of Communists who resist "real dialogue" with non-Communists and assume that they have some kind of "monopoly on the truth."¹² This move to draw on the political energies of more non-Communists so that the most diligent and responsible people are given a chance to govern combines with increasing insistence that "the Club of 1941"—

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"The apparent atomization of Romanian society, in which people turn inward, to themselves, their families, their immediate communities, is an old phenomenon that helped the Romanian nation survive in the face of rapacious, often foreign, leaders . . . Thus contemporary Romanian society may have more political resources than most Western analysts realize." Yet, as this author points out, "The current economic crisis . . . is so severe that there may be few resources to utilize . . ."

Romania's Growing Difficulties

BY TROND GILBERG

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IN 1984, Romania is engulfed in a political, economic, social and cultural crisis of major proportions; in other words, the country is in the midst of a societal crisis that threatens the very fiber of the system. By contrast, the political leadership of the country, now increasingly concentrated in the hands of the Nicolae Ceaușescu "clan" and the Petrescu family (the family of Elena Ceaușescu, the General Secretary's wife), is engaged in intensifying a personality cult that equals that of President Kim-Il-Sung in North Korea and outstrips the worship of Stalin at the height of that inglorious era. This cult describes Romania as a Mecca of achievements in all fields and the Ceaușescus as the greatest leaders of all time. The enormous difference between propaganda and reality creates widespread cynicism, indifference, privatization and, at times, open defiance and expressed dissent. The contradictions thus produced in Romanian society and the polity provide the dynamics of contemporary life in that Balkan republic.

The current economic crisis in Romania is multifaceted and very serious. First of all, agriculture, the perennial problem of all socialist systems, has worsened in Romania because of persistent underfunding, the faulty use of equipment and wholly inadequate stocks of spare parts, lack of fuel for machinery and irrigation systems, irrational planning priorities and frequent recycling of personnel (with a corresponding drop in capabilities). In addition, the Communist process of modernization and the Marxist ethos have produced a mass exodus from the villages to the cities, leaving behind the least enterprising individuals, including old men, old women and the many children of those who have found only inadequate quarters in the cities and industrial towns of Romania. The agricultural crisis is therefore financial, technical and human. It is very serious; there are now shortages of bread, meat, fruits and vegetables. Thus, General Secretary Nicolae Ceaușescu has launch-

ed a campaign to "educate" the citizenry about a "scientific" diet with much lower calorie intake, in which the consumption of meat is reduced drastically.¹

The industrial situation is somewhat better, but not by any significant factor. Rapid industrialization has produced a relatively modern industrial plant, but there has also been a great deal of waste, and there are continuous shortages of spare parts. Labor productivity is very low, even compared to most other socialist systems, let alone West Europe and the United States. Sloppy work abounds; corruption is endemic; and there have been many scandals involving officials who have enriched themselves.

These problems are compounded by the severe energy crisis that has hit Romania in the 1980's. The regime's dramatic measures to combat this problem include the periodic shut-off of electrical power both to industrial and to residential quarters and the "suggestion" that citizens turn off their refrigerators entirely, especially during the winter months. These "suggestions" have been enforced by roaming vigilante squads whose members arrogantly and threateningly enter private apartments to enforce compliance. The perennial shortages in all fields of raw materials and spare parts have produced a vast network of illegal connections and transactions that grease the wheels but also reduce the party's capability to control this crucial area.

Since there is little to buy, even the paltry wages of Romanian workers create inflationary pressures. The latest "remedial" feature designed to deal with this problem has established a system whereby many workers are compelled to "buy" shares in their factories; this scheme surely amounts to something resembling confiscation and forced savings, with no popular control over the disposition of these funds. The resultant cynicism of the workers is palpable. The slogan, "The party pretends to pay me, and I pretend to work," seems more appropriate in Romania than most other places in socialist East Europe.²

Conditions are even worse in the service field. Here, the chronic shortages of parts and the understaffing of all service occupations have produced enormous lines and

¹Such a plan was produced in draft form in *Scintia*, July 14, 1982.

²The problem of labor productivity is raised again in considerable detail in *Scintia*, March 25, 1983, in a discussion of the 1983 yearly plan and the current five-year plan.

long waiting periods; at times, repairs are *never* performed. One can easily imagine the corruption and the corresponding frustrations of the consuming public under these circumstances.³

Finally, Romania has a serious foreign debt, which has necessitated periodic renegotiations and payments rescheduling. This remains a considerable headache, even after the few years in which Bucharest had a foreign trade surplus (chiefly brought about by a drastic lowering of imports rather than by an improvement in the competitiveness of Romanian exports). The policy of the Romanian Communist party (RCP) to reduce dependence on the Soviet Union by orienting its economic life toward the West thus has backfired, since many Western creditors now have serious doubts about the reliability of Romania's economic posture. And the Romanian attempt to diversify its supply of raw materials and fuels has made the country highly dependent on the Arab states of the Middle East; these sources of oil demand payment in hard currency, thus adding to the foreign exchange problems causing sleepless nights and gray hairs in Ceaușescu's capital.⁴

Lest this litany of problems be construed as anti-Romanian propaganda, it should be pointed out that the sources used for this compilation are all official Romanian sources and many of them are culled from the speeches of the General Secretary himself. The situation may therefore be even worse than depicted here.

THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CRISIS

In the cultural realm, there is an ongoing struggle between those who would like to see a freer exchange of ideas in films, the theater, literature and other fields of the arts, and the dogmatists, who advocate strict ideological controls. The dogmatists have clearly won, primarily because they have the strong backing of the General Secretary and his wife, Elena (the latter is now really in charge of culture, research, and science and technology). The dogmatists have also become increasingly nationalistic, indeed chauvinistic, and this is reflected in controversies with the Soviet Union over the national heritage of Bessarabia (much of which is now the Moldavian Soviet Republic), and with Hungary over

³These problems are vividly illustrated in the publication *Flacara*, which has a complaint column; see, for example, February 4, 1983. See also *Radio Free Europe Research, Romanian SR/4*, March 7, 1983.

⁴An analysis of these problems can be found in *The Wall Street Journal*, May 20, 1983.

⁵Elena Ceaușescu is even in charge of data processing (which is subordinate to her National Council on Science and Technology).

⁶*Romania Libera* conducted a campaign against such practices last year; see, for example, April 18 and 28, May 25, June 17 and 23, August 11.

⁷*Scinteia*, May 13, 1983, published a decree in which several Ceaușescu family members were elevated to important positions in the party and government.

Transylvania. Increased anti-Semitism in literature is also a feature of the dogmatists' reign in the cultural arena. Furthermore, the General Secretary is a firm believer in the idea of mass culture and has sponsored such manifestations thereof as the "Hymn to Romania" festival, in which thousands upon thousands of amateur poets and singers loudly and discordantly praise the leader and his entourage. Theater performances are now often staged in factories and offices, and workers and peasants sit on review boards that examine the merits or demerits of books, plays and films. When intellectuals complain, they are castigated for elitism. Scientific research is being similarly debased through the rule of Elena Ceaușescu, who capriciously dispenses her ire and favors with little reference to objective quality. The emphasis is heavily on applied research, while basic investigation, with little immediate payoff, is seriously downplayed.⁵

The crisis in cultural matters is only the tip of the iceberg. There is also a major social crisis in Romania; perhaps a better word for it is "the crisis of human interaction." Beset by chronic scarcities, imbued with cynicism, withdrawn into the private world of the immediate family and a small circle of friends, the average citizen must scrape and claw for the bare existential minimum, regardless of the needs of others. Such conditions undermine group cohesion and societal solidarity, with grave effects on public morality as it is defined in more affluent societies. It is certainly a serious problem for those in the political elite who may still believe in the ideals of a new socialist man and woman with superior moral behavior.⁶

A regime may survive an economic crisis for some time, and even the cultural, social, and moral crises discussed above may be less than fatal, at least in the short or intermediate run, if the political system remains intact and if the means of coercion are available to the political elite. There can be little doubt that the Ceaușescu leadership has been much stronger in the political realm than in the economy or in cultural matters. Nicolae Ceaușescu has consolidated his power after a rather shaky beginning in the period 1965–1969. He has dispensed enormous political favors to his wife, her brothers and his children, particularly his son, Nicu. There are many in-laws and other relatives in important political positions. By frequently rotating cadres, the General Secretary has prevented the formation of significant contending power centers; through judicious promotions and personnel placements, he has built a set of reliable cadres even outside his own family and the family of his wife.⁷ Yet there are indications that certain individuals and groups are dissatisfied with this personnel policy; furthermore, some of these cadres have serious policy differences with the regime. Taken together, political challenges to the Ceaușescu rulers may represent a real threat.

There are several important challenging groups. First

are the disgruntled military officers. Nicolae Ceaușescu has produced policies that run counter to the interests of the professional officer corps. The autonomous foreign policy of the regime has meant less participation in Warsaw Pact activities and a much greater emphasis on domestic arms (and indeed doctrine) than is the case elsewhere in socialist East Europe. While this has been rather popular in Romania, it has created added burdens for the military; chief of these are the risks of confrontation with the Soviet Union should the Kremlin get sufficiently angry with Ceaușescu's challenges and the imposed technological backwardness suffered by the Romanian military since Soviet leaders have not shared their most advanced weaponry or doctrine with the Bucharest recalcitrants. The irrational personality cult of the Ceaușescus and the Petrescu is also grating on the professionals, and not only in the military.

These conditions apparently sparked attempts to wrest political power from the current leadership at least twice, first in 1971 and then again in late 1982-early 1983. While unsuccessful, these efforts reflected stirrings of problems that continue to fester. Numerous defections from the Romanian security apparatus indicate similar problems there.⁸

Elements of the technical and cultural intelligentsia are also discontented. The party's economic policies have long exhibited certain tendencies that may be considered irrational, at least by technical, managerial and economic experts; chief of these policies are the overemphasis on industry (particularly heavy industry); the serious underfunding of agriculture; the frequent transfer of important personnel; a costly foreign policy that has pumped enormous sums into third world countries with little chance of repayment; waste, graft, and inefficient use of existing resources by leading cadres; and, finally, an excessive emphasis on ideological orthodoxy rather than technical expertise. The "ideologization" of the cultural sphere is another example of policies with such effects.

All these real and perceived problems have led to grumbling among the intelligentsia and, occasionally, to a veiled but unmistakable challenge to the leader. While this is not a massive phenomenon, it is nevertheless a disturbing one, because such manifestations are occurring precisely where they can least be afforded, namely,

⁸Süddeutsche Zeitung reported rumors about an abortive military coup on February 7, 1983.

⁹Ceaușescu has encountered some problems in his relationship even with the more educated members of the RCP apparatus; see his speech to cadres at the meeting of party officials in Mangalia, August 2-3, 1983, in *Scînteia*, August 5, 1983.

¹⁰The Pirvilescu incident has been discussed by Patrick Moore in "The Romanian Communist Party's 12th Congress: A Preliminary Review," *Radio Free Europe, RAD Background Report/263* (Romania), November 28, 1979. See also *Scînteia*, August 5, 1983.

¹¹Productivity is already a major problem. In addition, there are serious problems with alcoholism. *Scînteia*, March 25, 1984, discussed the negative effects of alcoholism on labor discipline and productivity.

among the experts who keep the country going.⁹ There are also dissatisfied party apparatchiki. The Romanian Communist party is a large party with many full-time professionals. Only a fraction of them belong to the Ceaușescu/Petrescu clan; some of the others feel that their personal fortunes are being blocked by the extended clan; others genuinely consider the present leadership to be a violation of the norms of "socialist legality" or "Communist morality." One of these party members was Constantin Pirvilescu, who openly denounced Nicolae Ceaușescu for such offenses against the party spirit at the 1979 RCP congress. Pirvilescu was hustled from the conference hall, and various rumors have circulated about his fate.¹⁰ It is not known how widespread the feeling of dissatisfaction is inside the party apparatus, but surely the case of Pirvilescu is not an isolated incident.

Elements of the urban proletariat also reflect unrest. Romania has not been plagued by the massive outbursts of popular dissatisfaction among the industrial proletariat that have so bedeviled Poland since 1956. The frequent work stoppages encountered in countries like Yugoslavia do not materialize in socialist Romania. But there are examples of serious political problems in the industrial working class in Romania. The most spectacular was the miners' strike in the Jiu Valley in 1977, which involved thousands of workers. This strike was ultimately quelled by Ceaușescu's personal appearance, plus repressive measures. There have been other cases as well, and defectors and others with inside information speak of high frustration levels in a population that cannot find adequate food while wages are being whittled away by the restrictive and exploitative tactics of the regime, like the forced purchase of stocks and bonds. Whatever the potential for violent outbreaks, such a level of frustration will have serious effects on production, thus ratcheting the economic spiral further downward.¹¹

Unhappy nationalities are also causing problems. The policies of Nicolae Ceaușescu have two pillars: namely, foreign policy autonomy and a great deal of Romanian nationalism at home. During the 1980's, specific policies toward the ethnic minorities, particularly the Hungarians, have become more restrictive and now amount to actual discrimination, at least in the eyes of many scholars as well as political leaders in Budapest. Such policies include the influx of large numbers of ethnic Romanians into areas traditionally inhabited by Hungarians and Germans, restrictions on educational opportunities in languages other than Romanian, and a constant emphasis on Romanian symbols and historical events, which directly and indirectly challenge the histories of the so-called "cohabiting nationalities." The regime's cultural offensive claims that the cradle of European civilization was located on Romanian territory, that the Romanians inhabited Transylvania long before the Hungarians came, thus representing Dacian and Roman continuity there, while the Magyars were simply intruders. In addition, increasingly, there is both overt

and covert anti-Semitism, especially in literature and historiography.¹²

Some of these developments may be side effects of the industrialization process (e.g., the influx of Romanians into minority areas), but many are the result of conscious policies on the part of the Ceaușescu leadership. They create resentment, cynicism and despair. This is an important element of the current political crisis in Romania.

This crisis is still manageable, from the vantage point of the regime, provided that all these disgruntled elements remain isolated from one another. If they were to coalesce, they would produce a serious challenge to the Ceaușescu/Petrescu leadership. It is possible that disgruntled military officers, some technocrats and cultural figures and elements of the party apparat might consolidate. Many of these groups loathe the personalized leadership now in vogue; they also fear irreparable economic damage from faulty policies. This may propel them to undertake a palace coup. Another possibility is the equivalent of the traditional Balkan jacquerie, based on the nearly urbanized half-proletariat of "peasant workers." A third possibility features an outbreak of violence among elements of the ethnic minorities, possibly combined with dissatisfied Romanian workers.

The first possibility is the most likely. An uprising by the ethnic minorities (or elements thereof) would probably founder, because the regime could play on the fervent Romanian nationalism of the ethnic majority. The modern-day jacquerie may yet come to pass if the economic situation deteriorates further, but it has little chance of success as long as the regime maintains control over the means of coercion, chiefly the security apparat and the armed forces.

There remains, then, the possibility of a palace coup, possibly triggered by unrest caused by one of the two other possibilities. That this possibility exists is probably as clear in Bucharest as it is in Philadelphia. The task of the current leadership is to prevent it.

The societal crisis discussed above did not develop accidentally; it was the result of a series of failed policies

¹²The most clearcut (and sharply worded) statement of the regime's attitudes on minority issues came in *Romania Libera*, May 16, 1983. The author, Eugen Florescu, is a close associate of the Ceaușescu clan.

¹³The Grand National Assembly (Romania's Parliament) approved a program designed to ensure "stable" production of food for the population. This program is scheduled to be implemented gradually by 1990—a tacit regime admission of the current problems in the food sector. See *Scintia*, July 1, 2, 1983.

¹⁴The regime has now retaliated by tightening rules on remuneration of labor; see *Scintia*, April 5, 1983.

¹⁵This concentration of power is coupled with a fervent personality cult, which reaches a high pitch in January of each year as Romania celebrates Nicolae Ceaușescu's birthday. For examples of this in 1984 see Arneli Maier, "Nicolae Ceaușescu and his Personality Cult," *Radio Free Europe Research*, Romanian SR/2, January 30, 1984.

on the part of the RCP, under Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and spectacularly aggravated under Nicolae Ceaușescu. True, there were some calamities that could not be controlled by the elite; there were severe floods during the 1970's, and the earthquake of 1977 did considerable damage to the economy. Furthermore, there were a few serious droughts, which reduced agricultural production. In addition, Romania's proximity to the Soviet Union and the complementarity of the economies supervised in Bucharest and Moscow reduced the options available to the RCP in foreign and economic policy. But the greatest source of the current troubles is the domestic policy of the last three decades. Thus, the crisis was produced by policy and it must be solved, if at all, through policy. What were these unsuccessful policies?

1) Bleeding the agricultural base to feed rapid and forced industrialization. This policy, well documented in the relevant literature, destroyed one economic foundation in order to produce another, highly costly, inefficient and basically noncompetitive in the outside world. The Romanian population is paying for this every day in the bread lines.¹³

2) Extensive industrialization that cannot be turned into intensive development. The Romanians industrialized in a way that seemed rational for a country with surplus rural population: they constructed a large number of inefficient, labor-intensive factories. The sequence, however, was irrational; the industries constructed did not produce enough goods and services to establish incentives for each worker to produce more once the reserve of cheap labor was exhausted (as is now the case). There have been massive efforts to upgrade machinery and, by and large, the capital plant in Romania is relatively modern. But the regime has not "upgraded" the people working in production, because economic policy still emphasizes heavy industrial development rather than the production of consumer goods. Modern machines help little if there are no real incentives for producing.¹⁴

3) Excessive centralization in planning and implementation. It is now a commonplace, even in socialist East Europe, that too much centralization in both planning and the implementation of plans hinders economic growth. Various schemes of decentralization are therefore common throughout the region. Romanian efforts in this area have been halfhearted, ultimately foundering on the self-interest of entrenched elites and the reluctance of the leader to delegate authority lest such authority turn into an autonomous center of political power. This problem becomes aggravated as the Ceaușescus continue to gather more and more power in their own hands.¹⁵

4) Excessive political interference in technical and managerial matters. Ever since the summer of 1971, when Nicolae Ceaușescu launched his so-called "mini-Cultural Revolution," the RCP has been conducting an ideological offensive in all walks of life, from the universi-

ties to the collective farmer's garden plot, which in many cases has directly interfered with rational decision making and implementation. This process continues unabated in Romania (perhaps it is even accelerating) at a time when almost all the other Communist-led regimes in East Europe are trying (Albania excepted) to draw sharper lines between ideology and socioeconomic theory and practice. Romania remains a case of obfuscating despotism.¹⁶

5) A Byzantine personality cult. During the last decade in particular (but even before that, to a lesser degree), the personality cult of Nicolae Ceaușescu has taken on epic proportions. Since the mid-1970's, he has been joined by his wife, Elena Ceaușescu, in this pantheon of greatness; since 1979, Nicu Ceaușescu, the youngest of the Ceaușescu children, has been worshiped in similar fashion, albeit at a somewhat lower level. The personality cult is enhanced by means of a well-developed system of nepotism. This policy is bound to create jealousies and cynicism, and it may propel people of mediocre ability to the fore (as it has in some cases in Romania). Furthermore, it reduces the possibilities that other, "non-clan" individuals can rise in the existing order, and this, in turn, shrinks the pool of available talent. Finally, such a concentration of power means that a few individuals must deal with many extremely complicated problems in an increasingly differentiated society. It is beyond the capacity of even the smartest and best-intentioned individual to accomplish this task.¹⁷

If the problems can be isolated this way, solutions also seem possible. There are several options:

First of all, the regime could decide to engage in fundamental reform, which would involve a major reorientation of economic priorities away from heavy industry and back toward agriculture, services and consumer goods production. This could be achieved only through meaningful decentralization and a partial dismantling of the central planning and supervision system. Furthermore, such a process would entail a much greater role for the expert and the manager, and a much reduced position for the party apparatchik and the members of the Ceaușescu/Petrescu clan. This, then, would be meaningful reform, not merely tinkering with the existing system.

But tinkering is precisely what Nicolae Ceaușescu has been doing in the past, and this is also what he is likely to do in the near future. For example, he announced an "agricultural revolution" a few years ago, but little has

¹⁶At the August, 1983, meeting at Mangalia, Ceaușescu also discussed his vision of more ideological vigilance, not less (*Scînteia*, August 5, 1983).

¹⁷Perhaps the heights of this cult can be seen in *Contemporanul*, January 26, 1983, celebrating Nicolae Ceaușescu's 65th birthday.

¹⁸The so-called "New Economic Mechanism" was introduced in Romania in 1978.

¹⁹In November, 1981, the RCP Central Committee held a plenum that severely criticized several individuals for faulty performance.

been done except to reintroduce a form of forced deliveries to the state from private plots and more stringent controls on the spare-time activities of collective farmers. Efforts to decentralize have amounted to a process whereby local governments have more responsibility for dealing with the economic crisis, but fewer means to do so. In the meantime, party controls have been enhanced at the local level. And the personality cult and rule by the clan has expanded, not contracted. There is no indication that the Ceaușescus and the Petrescu will change these trends in any significant way.¹⁸

Fundamental change in Romania is unlikely because it can only be implemented through a drastic change in the political system, with corresponding changes in the existing relationships. This process would be politically fatal to many of those now in power. There are many other entrenched elites that have profited from the current system; they are not likely to accept altered circumstances. The Soviet leaders, for all their annoyance with the self-proclaimed maverick in Bucharest, are not anxious to watch a process of reform that might challenge the very foundation of power in a Warsaw Pact member elite. And finally, there is the dynamic of the personality cult itself: having accepted (and probably promoted) the panegyrics to the greatest leader, philosopher, literary expert, and so on, how do you reverse the trend without a collapse of all personal authority, all individual power? Drastic changes, therefore, seem unlikely.

What small, remedial steps may be taken to ensure the survival of the current regime (as opposed to the system, which will survive, because even those who would like to see the removal of the Ceaușescus and the Petrescu are committed to the maintenance of the socialist system, as is the Soviet leadership)? Some options are open to Nicolae Ceaușescu and his associates. They may continue current leadership policies, including frequent rotation of cadres. This would help ensure that no rivals could build their power base over a period of years. It would also make it possible to provide scapegoats for faulty economic performance—a practice that has accelerated during the last two or three years.¹⁹

They may expand the clan. It should be remembered that rule by the clan is restrictive to those who are outside of it, but very beneficial to those on the inside. Thus, by admitting more people to this august circle, the regime can provide a form of political recruitment and upward social mobility in which the fortunate individuals involved owe their fortunes to the Ceaușescu/Petrescu group. This process, coupled with the rapid turnover of

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“The prospect that some 61.5 million West Germans will combine with about 16.7 million East Germans frightens some Europeans and Americans, who worry about such a basic change in the status quo. The possibility of German reunification is also a potent propaganda tool, especially for the Soviet Union.”

The Prospects for German–German Détente

BY ARTHUR M. HANHARDT JR.
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THE most heavily armed confrontation line between the superpower blocs is the border between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG or West Germany) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany).* Relations between the Germanys include talks on a variety of issues and thus stand in sharp contrast to the state of affairs between the superpowers. West German President Richard von Weizsaecker has welcomed East German efforts to negotiate. Erich Honecker, Secretary General of the East German Socialist Unity party (SED), has said that “It is better to negotiate ten times over than to shoot once.”¹

This attempt to negotiate has met a heavy barrage of propaganda from the Soviet Union. Charging the West Germans with “revanchism,” a code word for alleged West German efforts to alter the status quo in post-World War II Europe, the Soviet Union has conjured up all the anxieties left from the Nazi past. Nor has the Soviet Union spared its East German allies. A series of articles appearing in *Pravda* and *Izvestia* in July and August, 1984, were highly critical of East Germany for engaging in direct talks with West Germany and accepting West German loans.

Not to be outdone, the United States has let the West German leadership know of its displeasure, prompting West Germany’s Minister of Inner-German Affairs, Heinrich Windelin, to travel to Washington in an effort to allay anxieties about West Germany’s going its own way. Windelin explained that West German policy toward East Germany was aimed not at the far distant goal of German unification, but rather at the more modest goal of improving life for fellow Germans. Nonetheless, conservative American commentators like William Safire insisted that:

*The author is grateful to Barbara Keen of Battelle–HARC and Dennis Emerson of the University of Oregon Library, who provided bibliographical assistance, and to Wilma Bradley of the Seattle Consulate General of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Marianne Strenger and Marianne Balz of Inter Nations (Bonn), who provided access to recent German materials.

¹In an interview for *Deutsche Welle*, August 18, 1984.

²William Safire, “Revanche Is Sweet,” *The New York Times*, August 13, 1984.

40 years after the war, two generations after the division of the Third Reich by the victorious Allies, German leaders—East and West—are beginning to put on the pressure to reunite their country.²

What has brought about the superpowers’ dissatisfaction toward their respective most strategic European ally? Are the governments led by Helmut Kohl in West Germany and Erich Honecker in East Germany seeking unification? Or do other motivations, like a genuine fear of nuclear war in Central Europe, drive the Germanys to seek some form of mutuality beyond the cold war? These questions are difficult to answer, but they can be better understood against the background of recent political developments in the two German states.

WEST GERMAN CONSERVATIVES

As a result of the constitutional “constructive vote of no-confidence,” the coalition of Social Democrats (SPD) and Liberals (FDP), which had ruled West Germany since 1969, came to an end on October 1, 1982. The subsequent government was headed by Chancellor Kohl and included the conservative Christian Democratic parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU), and the FDP. Chancellor Kohl promised a fundamental change in direction (*Die Wende*—the turning-point). The welfare state would be cut back to reasonable levels; market mechanisms and private initiatives would be encouraged, along with the traditional virtues of family, enterprise and nation. In foreign policy, the new government promised to stick by the alliance with the West and to move forward with the two-track plan of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which sought negotiations with the Soviet Union to reduce nuclear weapons in Europe, while forwarding plans to station Pershing 2 and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM) in Europe to counter the continuing deployment of Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear weapons. The new government was less clear about policy toward East Germany.

West German policy toward East Germany is called *Deutschlandpolitik* to distinguish it from the *Ostpolitik* or the East European policies of the SPD–FDP coalition of the early 1970’s. *Ostpolitik*, as embodied in a series of treaties

with Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, stabilized relations between West Germany and East Europe. A separate treaty on relations with West Germany nearly brought down the coalition headed by Chancellor Willy Brandt in 1972. The CDU and CSU, then in opposition, had forced a national election on the issue of Ostpolitik and lost: the SPD-FDP government was returned. The Christian Democrats did not mute their harsh criticism of the government's handling of Deutschlandpolitik. Especially annoying to the CDU-CSU was the increasing political recognition given to East Germany, the apparently waning interest in reunification as a goal of the German people, and the practice of buying the freedom of political prisoners held by the GDR. Exchanging money for people was viewed as immoral, especially by CSU head Franz Josef Strauss, who led opposition to the SPD-FDP Deutschlandpolitik throughout the 1970's and the early 1980's.

With the conservative-liberal coalition in power and elections scheduled for March, 1983, it was widely expected that Deutschlandpolitik would undergo considerable change. The East German government warned of dire consequences should there be any major shift in West German policy. Erich Honecker, who has been General Secretary of the SED since 1971, clearly wanted to keep doing business as usual. Both East Berlin and Moscow undertook to influence the outcome of the 1983 West German election in favor of the SPD. But they failed; the West German conservative-liberal coalition was returned with a comfortable majority.³

EAST GERMANY: HONECKER ON COURSE

At the time, East Germany held its course. Noted as one of the most stable governments in the Eastern bloc,⁴ the GDR was most concerned with four issues: the forthcoming NATO missile deployment, leadership changes in the Soviet Union, the unofficial East German peace movement, and the economy.

The upgrading of NATO theater nuclear weapons with Pershing 2's and GLCM's was (and remains) anathema to the East German leadership. With an army of some 170,000 and about 380,000 Soviet troops stationed in a country the size of Tennessee, East Germany has one of the highest military densities in the world. It was clear that any NATO deployments would be answered by new Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) missiles. Honecker followed the hard and harsh line of the Soviet Union under Presidents Leonid Brezhnev and, later, Yuri Andropov. In fact, the Brezhnev funeral provided Honecker's first opportunity to meet with Chancellor Kohl.

Leadership changes in the Soviet Union opened an era

of insecurity for Honecker. The details of changes in the Soviet Union are seldom known. It seems likely that Honecker expected Konstantin Chernenko to succeed Brezhnev, but when the prize went to Andropov, it did not go to a stranger. The brief relationship between Honecker and Andropov was friendly.

In East Germany, an unofficial peace movement was causing domestic problems. As part of the effort to discourage West Germany from allowing the deployment of new NATO missiles, massive public efforts were undertaken to demonstrate that government peace policies were supported by a massive peace movement. This movement was directed exclusively at the West's policy on deployment. Nothing was said about Soviet SS-20's.

In contrast, the unofficial peace movement, which was predominantly a youth movement close to the Protestant church in East Germany, took as its symbol the "Swords into Ploughshares" statue that the Soviet Union presented to the United Nations in New York. The Swords into Ploughshares movement was suppressed and ultimately destroyed through intimidation and arrests, but it showed that elements of the East German population were not in accord with government policies. The treatment the movement received also showed that the authority of the East German state is virtually impossible to challenge.

Finally, East Germany's economy was a grave concern to the leadership. The economy has come to depend on two factors. East Germany's territory is considered part of West Germany for the purposes of trade with the European Economic Community (EEC). East Germany is the only Soviet bloc country with this privileged access to Western markets. In addition, East Germany depends on West Germany for the use of transit routes and other facilities, along with swing credits that allow East Germany interest-free overdraft rights on hard currency accounts. These subsidies that the West Germans supply to the East Germans are significant elements in the East German economy.

Since the early 1980's, the East German economy has continued to suffer from dependence in the area of raw materials, particularly Soviet petroleum price increases, and from inflation and the worldwide economic downturn. The government heavily subsidizes domestic consumption and housing. Since the East German public has come to expect a relatively high living standard (the highest in East Europe), the government was hard-pressed in early 1983 to maintain housing and consumption subsidies while export earnings were declining and imports were becoming more expensive.

GERMAN-GERMAN RELATIONS

The victory of West Germany's conservative-liberal coalition in the March, 1983, election was not to the liking of the East German leadership. Since the coalition was committed to the deployment of new NATO missiles and since the Christian Democratic parties had harshly criti-

³For an analysis of the 1980 and 1983 FRG elections see George Romoser and Peter Wallach, *West German Politics in the Eighties* (New York: Praeger, forthcoming, 1985).

⁴For a new treatment of the GDR see C. Bradley Scharf, *Politics and Change in East Germany: An Evaluation of Socialist Democracy* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984).

cized the East German government, Erich Honecker and his colleagues warned the newly elected government not to follow through on its campaign promises. At the same time Honecker let it be known that in those areas where cooperation between the German states was possible, efforts should be made to reach mutual agreement.

Just at this sensitive point in German-German relations, on April 10 and on April 26, 1983, two West German travelers died of natural causes at the border crossing while being questioned by East German border personnel. These incidents caused much criticism in West Germany even though foul play was apparently not involved.

On April 28, a day after visiting Soviet Ambassador P.A. Abrassimov, Honecker called off a long-planned visit to West Germany, letting it be known that the visit would not be possible in 1983, but could be rescheduled at a later time. Clearly the Soviet leadership did not approve of a visit to West Germany in the year of planned NATO missile deployment.

In the late spring, 1983, relations between the German states seemed to be particularly cool. In his postelection declaration on the state of the nation, Chancellor Kohl outlined a future *Deutschlandpolitik* that placed the unity of the German nation—the “consciousness of which” is both a “responsibility and mission”—at the center of his government’s efforts, which viewed the “present circumstances as not unchangeable.” Furthermore, relations with East Germany would proceed on the basis of existing domestic and international law. Any change would have to be based firmly on the principle of *quid pro quo*.⁵

Neues Deutschland, the official paper of East Germany’s SED and the organ of government policy, responded with moderation. The paper noted that Kohl had used formulations that bespoke less of continuity in *Deutschlandpolitik* and more of a return to earlier cold war rhetoric. The language of the response was generally low key and could lead to the conclusion that German-German relations would return roughly to the status quo before the change of government on October 1, 1982.

At this point (at the end of June, 1983), it was announced that East Germany had been granted a deutsch mark (DM) loan of 1 billion (about US\$370 million) by a consortium of Munich banks, guaranteed by the West German government. Most surprising, the loan was negotiated by Franz Josef Strauss, head of the Christian Democratic Union and a vehement critic of past *Deutschlandpolitik*. No public concessions from the East German government were involved. This made West German conservatives furious, and their fury was intensified when Strauss later turned up as a vacationer in East Germany. Strauss, who for years was a favorite target of the East German propaganda machine, met with Honecker in East Germany, was greeted in the streets with the adula-

tion of a movie star and was allowed the extraordinary privilege of flying home in his private aircraft.

For West Germany, the loan signaled clearly that there were areas of cooperation between the Germanys. As for East Germany, the irritating Soviet Ambassador Abrassimov was finally recalled on June 10, and his replacement, Vyachislav Kotchemassov, a German expert, was believed to have a better understanding of East Germany. This was apparently a signal that the Soviet Union would allow Honecker more discretion in German-German relations.

Beyond the German-German sphere there was no compromise, especially on the issue of NATO missiles due for deployment in late autumn, 1983. The Kohl government remained determined to accept all the Pershing 2’s and some of the GLCM’s slated for West Europe. In this commitment the Kohl government was under considerable domestic pressure. The antinuclear movement, incorporated in a new political party, the Green party, had entered Parliament in the 1983 election. Operating both within Parliament and outside in the streets, the Greens opposed the stationing of any new nuclear weapons on West German soil. Hundreds of thousands of Germans demonstrated at antinuclear rallies.

AFTER THE MISSILES

Once the West German Parliament approved the stationing of the Pershing 2’s and GLCM’s, the course of German-German relations changed very little; on the contrary, a mutual effort to exploit the areas of mutual interest that lay outside the superpower confrontation guided exchanges between the Germanys. By the end of December, 1983, following a relatively short bargaining period, West Germany and East Germany reached an agreement on the status of the Berlin *Stadtbahn* (urban rail system). This agreement followed successful negotiations on a postal treaty and an environmental cleanup of the Roeden River, both concluded just before the West German missile decision. Clearly German-German relations were to be conducted on a different level from the other international—or interstate—relations of either country.

The German-German relationship is firmly anchored in mutual self-interest. The leading East German interest is economic. Without West German economic support, the Honecker regime would find it difficult to fulfill East German expectations; the East Germans have become accustomed to low-priced (subsidized) necessities, like medical care, rent and food staples, and to a reasonable supply of consumer goods. West Germany is the East German path to hard currency markets. Hard currency, in turn, is required to propel the never-ending search for improved productivity and quality that are the keys to competing successfully in the West.

For the West Germans, the benefits of friendly relations with East Germany are less concrete. A principal aim of West German governments since the *Ostpolitik* of 15 years ago has been the improvement of conditions for

⁵“Bundeskanzler Kohl zur Deutschland- und Ostpolitik,” *Deutschland Archiv*, vol. 16, no. 6 (June, 1983), p. 666.

and contacts with fellow Germans. Thus West Germans hoped that in light of the 1983 loan the amount West Germans had to pay per day to visit the East (DM25) would be lowered; they also anticipated some easing of the conditions for familial visits to the West, and modification of the orders to shoot East Germans attempting to escape to the West. In 1983, two months after the loan had been negotiated, these expectations were met only partially by the East German government. On September 27, some of the SM-70 automated shrapnel firing devices inside the East German frontier were dismantled while the exchange minimum for pensioners was halved.

Beyond improving conditions for East Germans, positive relations with East Germany supports continuity in *Deutschlandpolitik*. For the Kohl government, this has the benefit of coopting the opposition Social Democrats who can hardly complain when their policy becomes the basis for continuity. Indeed, Chancellor Kohl has used his successes in *Deutschlandpolitik* to overcome criticisms of his alleged ineptitude in domestic politics.

General Secretary Honecker benefits in much the same way. When there are improvements in the climate between the Germanys and when these can be partly attributed to the SED leadership, the party's status is enhanced.

An increasingly significant area of mutual concern between the Germanys concerns the environment. Acid rain, ground water and soil contamination, and hazardous waste disposal are problems that cross the German-German border in both directions. Public awareness of environmental issues on both sides has increased in recent years and this has led to the Roeden River agreement and to further discussions about threats to the environment.

Many West German leaders visited East Germany in 1983 and early 1984. Opposition leader Hans-Jochen Vogel, Franz Josef Strauss, former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, Richard von Weizsächer and many others made formal and informal contacts in East Germany. There was also traffic in the other direction. In October, 1983, the arms experts of East and West met in Bonn amid the heat of the NATO missiles debate.

THE GERMAN QUESTION

At its core, the German Question concerns the unity of the German nation. After World War II, prewar Germany was divided several ways. Some territories were turned over to the Soviet Union and to Poland. Within a truncated Germany, in 1949 the American, British and French zones became West Germany, while the Soviet zone was transformed into East Germany. The issue of German reunification has come up from time to time.

⁶Interview with Rudolf Bahro, KWAX-FM (Eugene, Oregon), August 31, 1983.

⁷"Mindestumtausch für Rentner gesenkt," *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, August 2, 1984, p. 1.

The prospect that some 61.5 million West Germans will combine with about 16.7 million East Germans frightens some Europeans and Americans, who worry about such a basic change in the status quo. The possibility of German reunification is also a potent propaganda tool, especially for the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders frequently use the term "revanchism" to evoke fears of a revived, united and expansionist Germany in East Europe; according to the Soviet Union, such fears can be allayed only by cooperation with the armed might of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

West German views on reunification range from outright rejection of the idea as "unrealistic" to the romantic notion heard among the Greens and the peace movement that Germany should be unified as an example to the world. According to this view, a unified Germany would withdraw from the military pact systems, demilitarize, and deindustrialize.⁶ Ironically, this view of a German ecotopia comes close to the vision of the 1945 Morgenthau plan, which would have turned Germany into something approaching a pastoral nation.

During the spring and summer of 1984, several events attracted international attention to the German question. First and foremost was the negotiation of a \$330-million loan to East Germany. Coming a scant year after the DM 1-billion loan of 1983, the announcement of the credits (again by Franz Josef Strauss) caused heightened expectations: would this loan bring meaningful concessions from East Germany?

On July 27, East German Minister of State Philipp Jenninger formally stated the terms of the loan. In return, Jenninger announced a series of measures that would be put into effect by East Germany, which East Germany had agreed to "in its own sovereignty." (This last formula was meant to meet Soviet objections that West Germany was using credits as leverage to pry East Germany out of the Soviet bloc.) The catalogue of measures that Jenninger presented was an impressive 12 items long and included reductions in mandatory hard currency exchange for certain categories of pensioners and invalids, extending to 45 (from 30) days the amount of time West Berliners and West Germans could spend in East Germany each year, and regulating more generously the literature and printed matter that may be taken into East Germany. At the end of the accounting, Jenninger added that East Germany had assured West Germany that the reuniting of families would be furthered and that several thousand East Germans would be allowed to move legally to West Germany.⁷

On the same day that Jenninger announced the loan, *Pravda* launched a broadside against West Germany.

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BOOK REVIEWS

ON EAST EUROPE

ANTI POLITICS. *By George Konrád.* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1984. 243 pages, \$12.95.)

In 1979, George Konrád, a Hungarian novelist, and Ivan Szelényi, a sociologist, published *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*, a book that explored the unique symbiotic relationship between intellectuals and the state in East Europe. For their efforts the two authors were arrested and "invited" to leave Hungary; only Konrád stayed.

Antipolitics is in many ways an extended postscript to Konrád's earlier work. It is a free-flowing essay that touches on the roles of the intellectual and the people in a country whose every political move is overshadowed by the Soviet Union. Konrád's political opinions will rattle ideologues on the left and the right, and they will not find favor with the Hungarian government.

Konrád's main argument in *Antipolitics* is that real political reform in Hungary is impossible—the lessons of 1956, 1968 and 1981 have been learned. Short of revolution (which he does not rule out as a final solution), Konrád says the only way to remove the Soviet Union's imposed Marxism (but not Soviet domination) and revitalize the "real" Marx is for intellectuals to practice antipolitics; that is, avoid cooptation by the state and push for a "spiritual" reform of civic society. While Konrád's solution may sound chimerical, his exposition of the present-day East European Communist state is enlightening. W.W.F.

SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN RELATIONS: CONSOLIDATION AND CONFLICT, 1968-1980. *By Robert L. Hutchings.* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984. 314 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$27.50.)

Hutchings, the deputy director of Radio Free Europe, has produced a comprehensive overview of the period between the 1968 Prague Spring and the beginning of the Polish labor union Solidarity. After crushing the Czechoslovak liberalization, the Soviet Union implemented closer economic and political relations with the region; allowed the development of trade ties with the West; and encouraged consumerism—that is, raising the standard of living in East Europe. Hutchings concludes that the end of détente and the worldwide economic recession in the late 1970's have completed this phase of Soviet control of East Europe; the future years portend increasing instability and the need for a new Soviet response. W.W.F.

FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPE IN THE 1980s. *Edited by Michael I.*

Sodaro and Sharon L. Wolchik. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 265 pages, notes and index, \$25.00.)

This collection of well-written essays looks at the countries of East Europe from three perspectives: domestic-international linkages; the role of specialists and intellectuals in policymaking; and the impact of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. W.W.F.

FROM HITLER TO ULRICH: THE COMMUNIST RECONSTRUCTION OF EAST GERMANY, 1945-1946. *By Gregory W. Sandford.* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. 312 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$25.00.)

This is one of the first works in English that documents the imposition of Communist rule in East Germany. The author, a United States State Department Foreign Service officer, was allowed limited access to some East German archival material. He argues that although the German Communist party under Walter Ulbricht was determined from the start to control the political and economic institutions of East Germany, the party's emphasis on Marxist-style "democratization" was a genuine guiding principle and not just a sop to naive Germans. W.W.F.

THE WARSAW PACT: ALLIANCE IN TRANSITION? *Edited by David Holloway and Jane M. O. Sharp.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984. 290 pages, notes and index, \$29.95.)

The Warsaw Treaty will officially lapse in 1985; but it will of course be renewed, as David Holloway points out in his introduction to this volume of essays. Unlike most studies, this collection is less concerned with the military strategy and strength of the pact than with the social, political and economic impact of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). In some cases the strains between the WTO countries and Moscow are similar to those between the United States and NATO; witness the Soviet Union's attempt to increase burden-sharing among its East European clients. The analyses and perspectives of the contributors cover a wide variety of viewpoints to give an excellent, well-developed survey. W.W.F.

SELF-MANAGEMENT: ECONOMIC THEORY AND YUGOSLAV PRACTICE. *By Saul Estrin.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 266 pages, notes, appendices and index, \$44.50.)

This specialized work is a description of the self-management practice the Yugoslav government introduced in 1965. Many East European (and Chinese) intellectuals who reject a Soviet-style economic model

have looked to Yugoslavia's version of worker self-management as a practical approach to democratizing (that is, socializing) the economy. Estrin finds that self-management in Yugoslavia has widened income differentials and has interfered with labor force allocation.

W.W.F.

THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA: ORIGINS, HISTORY, POLITICS. By *Ivo Banac*. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984. 452 pages, notes, maps, bibliography and index, \$35.00.)

Banac maintains that the political problems of Yugoslavia's multi-ethnic population have their basis in the two-and-one-half years between unification in 1918 and the adoption of a centralist constitution in 1921. He covers all the nationalities that make up Yugoslavia—the Montenegrins, Albanians, Macedonians, and Bosnian Muslims—to provide a comprehensive history of the nationalities problem in its formative years.

O.E.S.

GOD'S PLAYGROUND: A HISTORY OF POLAND. VOL. I: THE ORIGINS TO 1795. VOL. II: 1795 TO THE PRESENT. By *Norman Davies*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983. 590 and 724 pages, maps, photographs, bibliography, notes and index, \$15.00 each volume, paper.)

This unfortunately titled work is a general history of Poland that manages to convey the richness and complexity of Polish history in an engaging style. Historical narrative is interrupted by thematic essays on the country's geography, urban life, the Jewish community and the Roman Catholic Church.

W.W.F.

BITTER LEGACY: POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II. By *Richard C. Lukas*. (Lexington: University of Kentucky

Press, 1982. 191 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$16.00.)

According to Lukas, the 1945 Yalta Conference that called for "free and unfettered elections" in Poland provided no enforcement mechanism; this lack of United States pressure on the Soviet Union to assure a pluralist state was part of a diplomatic maneuver that saw the United States more concerned with Germany's future than with Poland's. "The communization of Poland . . . was less the result of communist defensive reactions to American challenges than it was the consequence of Washington's having habituated the Kremlin to deal with political issues in eastern Europe without the United States during the war years."

W.W.F.

POLAND: GENESIS OF A REVOLUTION. Edited by *Abraham Brumberg*. (New York: Random House, 1983. 322 pages, notes, appendices and index, \$19.95, cloth; \$7.95, paper.)

The essays of the respected scholars published here are invaluable for understanding why Solidarity became a mass movement in Poland and why it continues to be a force. The politicization of the workers, the role of the Roman Catholic Church and the economic mismanagement that triggered the unrest are among the topics covered. A second section of the book includes articles, commentaries and interviews from dissident and official Polish publications that cover issues debated both before and after the formation of Solidarity.

W.W.F.

POLISH COMMUNISM IN CRISIS: THE POLITICS OF REFORM AND REACTION, 1980-1981. By *George Sanford*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 249 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$25.00.)

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KADAR'S HUNGARY

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ously weak in dealing with questions of succession, and the Hungarian regime is no exception. Figuratively speaking, in instance after instance, Kadar has chopped off the heads of potential successors (Rezso Nyers, Bela Biszku, Imre Pozsgay, Janos Berecz, to name just a few). The successor question is, of course, an orientation question as well, orientation toward the West or the East. The current potential successor, Ferenc Havasi, offers us no clues for the future, although his caution indicates a moderate approach and a recognition of the dangers of too high a profile.

Finally, in a social context, the conflict between the egalitarianism of Hungary's official ideology and the inequality permeating the system cannot be solved easily. The regime faces only one option if it is to continue with its New Economic Mechanism: continued and growing inequality of reward. Indeed, Hungary may be the first socialist state whose population violently opposes unbridled manifestations of privately accumulated rewards; the people may well pressure the party toward greater egalitarianism of incomes. Today, the party leadership and the people alike are marking time. Unable to undertake true democratization, the regime is trying to attain "cosmetic democratization," opening up the process of multicandidate elections.¹¹

The issue of freedom also remains alive. Today, the authorities must deal with articulate young people brought up under the socialist system, who see little hope for their future, who are unable to get decent jobs in their professions, who recognize that they must wait a decade or longer for an apartment of their own, and who thus have very little to lose when they question the very bases of party rule. They accept Communist rule, but they question the manner in which that rule is administered and thus they challenge the party leadership.

Finally, with regard to the treatment of Hungarians in Romania and Czechoslovakia, there is an issue that could unify the entire population against the party. It is a sad comment on the leadership that it has not understood the depth of resentment against the cultural genocide that is taking place in Romania against the Romanian Magyars and that it has not acted more forcibly, more openly in defending the Magyar minority there.

As the regime enters into the twilight era of Kadar's rule, however, it must be remembered that Kadar has ruled Hungary longer than any ruler of Hungary since the death of Emperor Franz Josef. For the last 28 years Kadar has been at the helm, and his leadership has brought the most humane administration in a contemporary Communist state, despite the difficulties caused by that leadership. After Kadar dies, Hungarians will do well to remember the accomplishments as well as the

failures of the former traitor to the revolution, who must be regarded as the architect of a social peace that has marked Hungary for the last two decades. And that is no mean feat for Janos Kadar and the era that bears his imprint. ■

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH EAST EUROPE

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Table 4:
CMEA Hard Currency Debt to the West, 1984
(in billions of dollars)

Country	Amount
Poland	27.0
USSR	21.0
Yugoslavia	19.5
East Germany	12.3
Romania	8.4
Hungary	8.2
Czechoslovakia	4.1
Bulgaria	2.5
CMEA banks	ca. 5.0
Total:	ca. 108.0

Source: Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, as cited by *The Wall Street Journal*, June 22, 1984, p. 30.

context, however, all East Europeans understood that "internal reactionary forces" would not be tolerated (the Brezhnev Doctrine)* by the Soviet Union, a grim reminder of the Soviet military occupation of Czechoslovakia.

Apart from the implicit threat of brute force, Moscow has been changing its watchdogs in East Europe. During 1983-1984, it replaced five of the seven ambassadors in the region. Only the ambassadors in Budapest and Belgrade were untouched. The new envoy to Warsaw, A. N. Aksenov, is a former deputy KGB (Committee for State Security) chairman for the republic of Byelorussia.¹⁶ Other KGB-related appointments throughout the bloc include the promotion of the Bulgarian interior minister to candidate status on the local Politburo and the advancement of his counterpart in Czechoslovakia to Deputy Prime Minister.

The domestic clampdown in Hungary has involved the first political trial in a decade. Last year a bookshop operated by Laszlo Rajk was closed down by authorities. In December, 1983, the manager of the AB publishing house, Gabor Demszky, received a six-month suspended sentence, which he is appealing. Even official periodicals are being censored; the editor of *Mozgo vilag* (The World in Motion) has been fired for holding deviationist views. It is possibly because of this tough domestic policy

*Editor's note: In November, 1968, President Brezhnev stated that internal "threats" to a Communist nation are a threat to all Communist nations and that Soviet intervention in those nations is therefore justified.

¹⁶V. G. Panov, chief ed., *Yezhegodnik bolshoi sovetskoi entsiklopedii 1981* (Moscow, 1981), p. 564; Herwig Kraus, comp., *The Composition of Leading Organs of the CPSU* (Munich: Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, May, 1984), p. 9.

¹¹"Kozlemeny as MSzMP KB 1983. junius 6-i uleserol," *Nepszabadsag*, July 9, 1983, pp. 1-2.

Table 5:
U.S. Trade with CMEA States
(millions of dollars, imports and exports f.o.b.)

Country of Origin	Imports from		Jan.-Sept. 1983	Exports from		Jan.-Sept. 1983
	1981	1982		1981	1982	
Bulgaria	34.1	28.0	26.0	258.2	106.5	55.2
Czechoslovakia	67.2	62.2	45.8	82.6	83.8	35.8
East Germany	47.4	53.9	41.9	295.7	222.8	90.2
Hungary	128.5	132.7	119.7	78.0	68.3	89.0
Poland	365.1	212.0	142.9	681.5	295.3	238.8
Romania	560.1	347.8	369.1	504.2	223.8	143.4
USSR	347.8	227.8	258.0	2,431.6	2,592.6	1,195.7
Total European CMEA	1,550.2	1,064.4	1,003.4	4,331.8	3,593.1	1,848.1
Total Imports from entire world	260,981.8	243,951.9	187,935.4	233,739.1	212,274.6	148,959.8

Source: U.S. Department of State, *Trade of NATO Countries with European CEMA Countries* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Report no. 726-AR, November 28, 1983), pp. 18-19.

against dissent that Hungary has been able to legalize small private enterprises and encourage personal initiative. An extension of previous reforms will theoretically allow prices to find their true market value, and workers will be allowed to have more voice in the economic decision-making process.¹⁷

Bulgaria seems to have the fewest problems with the Soviet Union. The movement toward greater cultural freedom, led until her recent death by First Secretary Todor Zhivkov's daughter, Lyudmila Zhivkova, seems to have been cut short by the unexpected ouster in September, 1983, of Aleksandr Lilov, who had been thought of as Zhivkov's possible successor.¹⁸ Zhivkov's visit to Moscow coincided with the opening on June 1, 1984, of a display, "40 Years Along the Road of Socialist Ascent: The People's Republic of Bulgaria." The display was part of a larger exhibition on Soviet achievements. The leaders in Sofia certainly remain more loyal to their mentors in the Kremlin than those in any of the other East European states.

Until recently, East Germany was apparently the second most loyal regime. Its ties with the Soviet Union can be assessed from the fact that each of these regimes is the largest trading partner of the other, despite the disparity in populations (17 million compared with 272 million). Some 167,000 indigenous troops, together with

380,000 "guests" from the Soviet Union are based in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), giving this state the world's highest concentration of military manpower and hardware per square mile.¹⁹ It is doubtful that Soviet leaders need to tighten their control here. The implicit threat of force should keep any internal dissent within tolerable limits.

However, toward the end of July, 1984, a *Pravda* editorial carried an open attack on the West German government for allegedly attempting to undermine East Germany's Communist system. When the latter received an offer of 950 million marks or \$335 million in hard currency credits from Bonn (a similar loan had been accepted in 1983), *Pravda* continued its verbal assault.²⁰ On September 4, Honecker postponed a planned late September visit to West Germany (less than a week later, Bulgaria's Zhivkov postponed his West German trip).

East Germans are the envy of other bloc countries, because they are the only bloc members with access to the European Economic Community (EEC) and to credits from the West Germans. As long as the Kremlin leadership is dominated by the "old guard," which will not tolerate change, ambitious East European leaders will attempt to find some elbow room. Latent nationalism throughout the bloc and the man in the street's indifference to government decrees appear to be destroying slowly what the Soviet Union has attempted to establish by force.²¹ It is doubtful whether this evolutionary process can be stopped, regardless of what efforts are made by the next generation of Soviet leaders. ■

¹⁷ Unsigned article, "The Party Shows the Way," *Nepszabad-sag* (Budapest), April 21, 1984, p. 5.

¹⁸ John D. Bell, "Bulgaria," in Richard F. Staar, ed., *1984 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1984), p. 303. See also *Rabotnichesko delo* (Sofia), June 25, 1984, for an interview on Soviet-Bulgarian technological cooperation, and *The Economist*, July 7, 1984, p. 45, for other relations.

¹⁹ James M. Markham, "East Germany Is Starting To Throw Its Weight Around," *The New York Times*, June 3, 1984.

²⁰ *Pravda*, July 27 and August 2, 1984.

²¹ William Pfaff, "Eastern Europeans Use Life to Defeat Ideology," *Los Angeles Times*, July 29, 1984.

GERMAN-GERMAN DÉTENTE

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There were two main thrusts to the Soviet criticism. First, the Soviet Union held that the aim of the West Germans was "revanchism." Loans and improved relations, according to Soviet leaders, were a subterfuge aimed at taking East Germany out of the Eastern bloc. The second

thrust was aimed at East German leaders, who were reminded that Honecker himself had once said that East and West Germany went together like "fire and ice." No possible good could come from closer relations between the two Germanys.

There were other expressions of Soviet displeasure with the state of affairs between the Germanys in the spring and summer of 1984. In April, the Warsaw Treaty Organization's foreign ministers warned of Western efforts to revise territorial realities in East Europe. The next indication was the Olympic Games boycott, which hit the sports-proud East Germans particularly hard. Finally, the Soviet army went on East German maneuvers in June. This was unusual for two reasons: the activity preceded the harvest, and no elements of the National People's Army participated. The Soviet Union was indicating that it could operate without the East German army if necessary.⁸

For their part, East Germany's SED leaders reacted with cool determination. *Neues Deutschland* and the provincial East German press refused to publish the full texts of the Soviet broadsides. This unusual procedure was emphasized by the fact that the press reprinted articles from sympathetic Hungarian publications that supported Honecker's policies.

THE HONECKER VISIT "POSTPONED"

Honecker's planned visit, the second object of international attention, was officially postponed on September 4 in a brief statement by Ewald Moldt, Permanent Representative of East Germany in Bonn. What the leaders of both Germanys had been forced to recognize is that there is no special "German path" to détente and, furthermore, that the road from Bonn to East Berlin runs through Moscow.

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was clearly opposed to the trip. From the Soviet perspective, Honecker's visit, scheduled shortly after the deployment of new NATO missiles, could be interpreted as acceptance of the new NATO-WTO status quo.

On the West German side, it must be recognized that debates within the governing coalition had done their part to diminish the prospects of meaningful negotiations between the Germanys. Both sides now expect that the postponed visit will take place following more careful preparation of substantive negotiations than was the case this past summer. Subsequently Chancellor Kohl kept the invitation open, while Secretary Honecker indicated to a delegation of Japanese parliamentarians that a "constructive dialogue on important issues" must continue.⁹ These issues include several fundamental and difficult German-German problems.

⁸Christian Schmidt-Häuer, "Der Lange Papierkrieg der Roten Brüder," *Die Zeit*, August 17, 1984, p. 3.

⁹Deutsche Welle, September 5, 1984, and "The World Today," BBC, September 6, 1984.

The first problem concerns the nature of German citizenship. The West German constitution recognizes only one German citizenship, its own. Thus all East Germans arriving in West Germany are automatically granted West German passports and citizens' rights. The East German constitution recognizes East German citizenship and views West German policy as a remnant of cold war reunification policy. This issue will be difficult to resolve.

The second issue concerns the East German demand that East Germany's sovereignty be recognized by changing into embassies the permanent missions each state maintains in the other. Since West Germany insists upon thinking about two German states in one German nation, an exchange of ambassadors is unlikely.

Finally there are border issues. The victorious allies left several ambiguities about river boundaries. This is, perhaps, the easiest issue to resolve.

The full catalogue of issues dividing the Germanys is considerably longer, including conditions along the armed border and the Berlin Wall, and the free movement of people and ideas across the dividing line. An estimated half million East Germans would like to emigrate to the West. (More East Germans have been allowed to emigrate legally in 1984—the total is likely to be about 32,000—than at any time since the Wall was built.)

Events are moving rapidly in the area of German-German relations. Both sides are taking genuine steps to improve relations. Still, German unification outside the superpower blocs seems totally out of the question. Unification at this time—and far into the future—would require the agreement of the United States and the Soviet Union, countries that are now barely communicating with one another.

The fear of a nuclear holocaust influences German-German relations. Even though the West German government accepted the NATO missiles and East Germany is hosting additional Soviet rockets, neither side is comfortable looking at the other as an arsenal. Perhaps by raising the specter of nuclear holocaust, both Germanys may make a contribution toward reducing the danger of superpower confrontation. ■

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

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quisite irony: in Czechoslovakia, the Communists wrested the power away from the bourgeoisie; they dispossessed and shattered the class enemy. But a quarter of a century later, the values of these losers have prevailed. It is in the interest of the allegedly socialist system to be on good terms with the new bourgeoisie, convincing them that life-long docility protects their acquisitions. (The Communist party card-carrying new bourgeoisie is of course virulently anti-Communist.) The size of this top echelon (the so-called *nomenklatura*) is estimated at 20,000.

Unlike their Soviet counterparts, the Czechoslovaks are a-nationalistic. A petty bourgeois tradition is not part of the Russian heritage. The Soviet Union is imbued with the Byzantine legacy, respect for authority, love of rank and uniforms. An exactly opposite tradition reigns in the Czech lands (rather than in Slovakia): ridicule and contempt for authority and a tendency to undermine it under the pretense of docile cooperation. In the opinion of *Listy*, the Czech bourgeoisie "maintains roughly the same attitude as do other traditionally democratic countries in which a military junta temporarily seizes power." Yet, this group is the backbone of the despised regime in Czechoslovakia; it is the only stratum that obeys because of its self-interest.

Traditionally, corruption has not been among the vices of the Czechoslovak political culture—a rare, welcome exception in that part of Europe. In the postinvasion period of disillusionment, however, corruption and bribery have blossomed with unexpected vigor.

"Augean Stable of Real Socialism," is the title of the most thorough examination of the Czechoslovak corruption phenomenon; it was authored by Miroslav Kusý, the party secretary in charge of ideology in Slovakia in 1968 and a political pariah ever since. Should the corrupted society or the corrupting system be blamed? Essentially, Kusý criticizes the ethics of Czechoslovakia's official structure. The standards are debased; the leading cadres are blatantly enriched; and the authorities are covering up the nature, extent and consequences of this problem.

During President Yuri Andropov's brief tenure in the Soviet Union some especially greedy Soviet cadres, including those of ministerial rank, faced a firing squad. In Czechoslovakia, this educative example was not emulated. Stealing by officials is generally tolerated or punished with token penalties. Everything seems to be for sale: admissions to hospitals and universities, exits to the West, temporary or permanent. However, aside from the ethical implications of this behavior, corruption facilitates results otherwise unachievable; it blunts the impact of injurious political demands; it makes life more liveable.

According to the classic Leninist dictum, the main responsibility of the mass media is to promote the interest of the party. The young generation is the prime target of the propagandists.

High on the agenda of the 1980's are proposals for improving ideological indoctrination at the kindergarten level.³¹ The indoctrination effort is fortified by the militarization of schools. "Military education" (*branná výchova*) begins in the first grade. Children take part in war games along with the units of the army, the police and Workers' Militia, the praetorian guard of the CPCS.

³¹To make indoctrination at all levels more effective, on January 1, 1983, a new law went into effect, aimed at the "perfect registration of all citizens," to build a data bank containing information, instantaneously available, on everybody's whereabouts. An infant must be registered within three days following the issuance of a birth certificate.

Firearms of various types are supplied by SVAZARM, a state-wide organization charged with the linkage between the military and the civilian component of the society. In addition, special military pre-college institutions (*vojenská gymnázia*) have been established.

Pacifism is applauded when it relates to the foreign policy of the West. In the domestic socialist setting, however, pacifism is condemned as "a bourgeois philosophy, a pernicious effort aimed at blunting the consciousness of . . . the young people."

The state maintains strict supervision of all educational institutions, the remnants of theological colleges included. The Leninist requirement of "the leading role of the party" is fully implemented. Yet in a search for perfection, five fundamental reforms and reorganizations took place (in 1948, 1953, 1959, 1976, 1980). By administrative fiat a sixth thorough change of the educational system was decreed in 1984. The change is complex, and judging from the letters to the editors and the editorial responses, it is incomprehensible to the public.

For the generation now in its thirties, the outcome of the year 1968 was a national defeat, a humiliation. The young in their twenties have experienced only the postinvasion so-called *reálný socialismus*. They have grown up with the "duality of truth"; private and public life are to them two different realms and the dogmas of Marxism-Leninism taught since infancy are dismissed as irrelevant.

Expressions of generational assertion differ. The existentially vulnerable students, dependent on the good will of the state, are likely to engage in quiet search for values meaningful to them; they establish contacts with the underground "parallel culture"; some become interested in religion. Their working class counterparts are less inhibited: males appear with one earring, both sexes wear Mohawk haircuts.

The government of Czechoslovakia is increasingly dependent on Moscow and increasingly isolated in its own country. The rulers have no sense of legitimacy that might encourage them to follow the Hungarian path of détente. Pessimists express doubts about the survival of the nation, while Husák's regime is making a great effort to erase the past. But as Milan Kundera, the prominent Czech novelist exiled in Paris, has pointed out, the nation must not forget the year 1968, its democratic tradition, and the rights it has cherished in the past. ■

ROMANIA

(Continued from page 379)

cadres and economic managers at lower levels, provides for the further expansion of the clan and the defusion of pent-up resentment. Some of this is already being undertaken.²⁰

They may provide more control over the military and the security police, while adding to their perquisites

²⁰See, for example, *Scintia*, May 13, 1983, promoting a number of family members and close associates to high positions.

and status in society as a whole. After his problems with the military almost two years ago, Nicolae Ceaușescu went to great lengths to visit military units, to depict himself as a military leader and thinker, and to demand personal allegiance from the armed forces. His brother is also a lieutenant general—a control element as well as an example of nepotism. So far, this amounts to added control. Ceaușescu's nationalism, as expressed personally or through the historians, writers and poets now engaged in historical rewriting and glorification, is highly complimentary of the military throughout Romanian history. This, then, is a symbolic carrot. On the other hand, the General Secretary has refused to accept the Warsaw Pact's demand for higher defense budgets, and this is not a particularly welcome policy for the leaders of the armed forces. Thus, the regime's current policy toward the military is somewhat contradictory and may represent a real trouble spot.²¹

The security forces, on the other hand, seem to be pampered by the political leadership. The "boys of the Securitate" have many official perquisites, and their opportunity for side payments from various elements of the population represents a considerable advantage. Trouble, if it comes for Ceaușescu, is not likely to emanate from this group.

These options are only the most important in the arsenal of political survival methods available to the current leadership in Romania. Nicolae Ceaușescu has shown consummate political skill in the past. He is likely to use those skills to deal with his problems in the near future, which can be defined as the next four or five years. His domestic options will most likely work alongside a continued emphasis on an autonomist foreign policy, which exhibits considerable Romanian activism in international affairs, stressing national sovereignty and the need for small and medium-sized powers to work together to reduce "hegemonism" and "great power chauvinism."

Furthermore, the Bucharest leadership will continue its active policy in the third world, partly because this enhances the stature of Romania and partly because Bucharest has become rather dependent on the raw materials and the markets of those regions. Some of these policies run counter to the interests of the Kremlin, and therefore there will be continued conflict with Soviet leaders and their loyal supporters in the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). This subject, in turn, helps bolster the regime internally, at least up to a point. But when a foreign policy becomes increasingly costly, the man and woman in the street may begin to ask if less autonomy and more meat may not be preferable. This time may be drawing near, if it has not already arrived. Nicolae Ceaușescu must find out at what point the advantages of an autonomist foreign policy are outweighed by its drawbacks.

There is a clear tendency in Western scholarship to

²¹Ceaușescu defended his military program and doctrine in no uncertain terms in *Scînteia*, March 5, 1983.

measure the performance of other societies in terms of our own value systems. This problem is compounded when examining Communist-led states, because the elites of those states have adopted the lingo of Western technology, rationality, and a good part of the so-called Protestant work ethic, and they have adopted economic policies that posit goals of development and modernization close to the achievements of the advanced West. Even Marxism itself is a product of the Western cultural heritage, often described as the "Judeo-Christian heritage." Thus, corruption is bad and honesty is good; sloth and laziness are the scourge of modernity and punctuality and thrift are its blessings. "Honest pay for honest work" is an ideal, but "side payments" and "the little envelope" under the table are, presumably, remnants of the underdeveloped and nefarious past. Western observers ridicule and distrust personalized and nepotistic leadership without institutionalized restraints, and hold the opinions of experts in high regard, while distrusting the utterances of "hacks." What they often fail to do is to analyze the beneficial aspects of these behavior patterns, and the conditions under which they may indeed be rational and system-supportive are ignored.

Succinctly put, in a situation of economic and social scarcity, "side payments" may be rational because they release resources that have been squirreled away. (Such payments are, clearly, beneficial to those who possess needed resources.) Corruption, as we define it, makes available goods and services to those who have no other way of obtaining them, and thus represents the reestablishment of a market (albeit in distorted form) in controlled economies. In such a system of modified market transactions, the expert may be less effective than the "hack," the troubleshooter, the "fixer."

And who is to say that personalized leadership is, ipso facto, detrimental in all cases? There is no real tradition of the Western version of representative democracy in the Balkans. On the other hand, there is a tradition of leadership by the "vozhd," the strong man, the warrior prince. The apparent atomization of Romanian society, in which people turn inward, to themselves, their families, their immediate communities, is an old phenomenon that helped the Romanian nation survive in the face of rapacious, often foreign, leaders. (Now, at least, the leadership is native.) Thus, contemporary Romanian society may have more political resources and thus be more resilient than most Western analysts realize.

This guarded optimism is tempered by two factors. First of all, a system based in part on "side payments" requires a basic level of economic performance; the middleman must have something to distribute. The current economic crisis in Romania is so severe that there may be few resources to utilize in such a way, because the larder is very nearly empty. Under such circumstances, the system is in trouble.

Second, the Romanian system has produced engineers and other technical experts raised in the value

system of Western-style rationality. The young people are highly enamored of Western music, dress and values. Many in the cultural realm are awed by the vitality of more open societies, where ideas and values compete in the marketplace of the mind and the heart. These individuals are silently upset about the traditional (some say Byzantine) aspects of political life in present-day Romania. Many of them cannot be bought off (especially since there is little with which to bribe, at least at a level necessitated by the relatively large number of individuals involved). Some have stated this openly.²²

Under these circumstances, a subculture of highly skilled, disenchanted individuals emerges. They ultimately represent the most serious threat to the current elite in Romania, because they will make or break the economy. If the Ceausescu regime cannot ultimately incorporate these individuals in the political order, the crisis may indeed become fundamental. ■

²²This is illustrated by the criticism of Elena Ceausescu in the monthly *Arges*, March, 1983.

YUGOSLAVIA

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those wartime partisan leaders who have held the top party and state positions since the inception of Communist Yugoslavia—make way for younger political generations.

The issue of “gerontocracy” may be sometimes overstated,¹³ but it is a real one. For unless the younger, better educated party leaders waiting in the wings see possibilities for advancement, their frustrations may compound repercussions of another serious demographic imbalance within the LCY. The tendency for the party to become disproportionately white collar leads to the potentially dangerous anomaly of a party dedicated to worker self-management with fewer and fewer workers. It makes top party leaders ever more vulnerable to a challenge from young Turks within the ranks that their elders suffer from a hardening of their revolutionary arteries: that the “Club of 1941” both won and abandoned the revolution. Or still more explosive, there could be a Polish scenario in which alienated Yugoslav workers, tired of looking for scapegoats to discover why self-management does not work the way it should, decide the party is hopelessly incapable of

*Democratic centralism is the Leninist organization principle dating from the Soviet tenth party congress in 1921. It assumes that policymakers at the top make their decisions with full “democratic” discussion, after which the minority submits to the will of the majority and “centralism” comes into play.

¹³One does not have to go so far as to charge that “sclerosis has taken over the political bloodstream,” *Danas* (Zagreb), November 23, 1982, to support the need to make room for the next political generation.

¹⁴The then President of the LCY CC Presidium, Dragoslav Markovic, concluding speech to the February, 1984, twelfth session of the Central Committee, *Borba* (Belgrade), March 1, 1984.

fulfilling its leading role. Undoubtedly the lesson of Poland intensifies party nervousness at the appearance of indecisiveness and the inability to implement decisions.

In turn, these organizational concerns are made more difficult by the procedural consequence of the de facto federalization of the party ratified by the 1982 twelfth LCY congress. Today the League of Communists of Yugoslavia is a confederation of eight regionally based parties and the party organization of the Yugoslav armed forces. With central party (LCY) policy largely a matter of negotiated solutions, democratic centralism* is regarded as an instrument of implementation rather than an organizing principle. The formal commitment remains. What it means in terms of day-to-day political dynamics is increasingly fuzzy.

Although far from the only problems facing Yugoslavia’s collective leadership, this package of economic/political/organizational dilemmas overshadows a variety of middle-range crises that Yugoslav decisionmakers confront daily, in an international environment dominated by what many Yugoslav diplomats see as a “second cold war.” As they see it, the urgency of defusing the intensity of United States–Soviet hostility is essential to future European and Mediterranean security and to the strategic safety of Yugoslavia.

PROSPECTS

Considering their working conditions, it is no wonder that this Yugoslav leadership is sometimes called the “sacrificed generation.” Yugoslav policymakers engage in painful self-criticism,¹⁴ tolerate sharp media attacks despite periodic crackdowns, and agonize about losing popular confidence.

No one would argue that economic collapse is impossible. Nonetheless, Yugoslavia did increase its exports by 27 percent in 1983 and significantly reduced its \$1.3-billion 1982 trade deficit.¹⁵ Problems of implementation aside, the dire predictions about collective leadership being synonymous with policy paralysis were wrong. This government has made the hard decisions and put in place an unpopular austerity program. There are clearly tactical blunders along the way; collective responsibility makes it extraordinarily difficult to hold anyone accountable.

However, the fundamental economic issue for Yugoslav decisionmakers and society is whether the way out of this economic mess is more or less “market socialism,” i.e., permitting realistic interest rates and prices while allowing unprofitable enterprises to go out of business. This is not a new problem. It was at the heart of the economic reforms of 1961 and 1965. With all his authority, Tito was unable to resolve the issue. All idols have feet of clay. The Tito myth is an essential cornerstone of Communist Yugoslavia, yet the fact is that Tito was not an economist and, worse, he was unwilling to listen to sound economic advice. Those who see the solution as “a firm hand” should pause to consider that the Yugoslav

¹⁵The *Wall Street Journal*, January 13, 1984.

economy is in its current crisis because Tito could not be held accountable.¹⁶ Both Yugoslavs and foreign observers may find it difficult to keep track of who is who in the post-Tito collective leadership. Of course, faceless policy-makers on a political merry-go-round cannot match Tito's dramatic presence on the world stage. Yet dedicated Yugoslav politicians are struggling against overwhelming odds with problems that Tito refused to face.

And it can be argued that they are not doing so badly as the intense political debate in Yugoslavia implies. Of course, in Yugoslavia, the move from charismatic authority to institutional solutions is painful. Yet the complex territorial/ethnic/army quota system mirrors the fundamental reality of Yugoslav political life. Yugoslavia can survive only if it accepts the principle of mutual advantage. The present broad-based power sharing arrangement is the logical outcome of "a pluralism of self-managing interests." It was adopted because, with the unspoken failure of Tito's mini-Cultural Revolution in the mid-1970's, this arrangement was seen as a better long-term bet. Despite overwhelming difficulties, it still is. Increasing awareness of the need for economic integration exists even among those most opposed to centralist political alternatives.¹⁷

For all the problems of making this complex political machinery work, it is an appropriate if perhaps transitional mechanism. The rotation schedules minimize time and energy wasted on factional struggles at the top. No winner can take all; there are no total losers.

Symbolically, Tito was the George Washington of Yugoslavia. Thereafter, he dominated the Yugoslav political scene for 35 years. The current collective leadership can best be understood as a phased transition to the next political generation. Frustrations with the slowness of this process notwithstanding, the average age of the 1984 State Presidency is 61, that of the party Presidency elected in 1982 was 58, with republic/provincial leaders on the average being still younger. Members of the Feder-

¹⁶The yearning for a sense of political authority was poignantly underlined by Rade Koncar's dramatic resignation from his party posts during the 1982 twelfth party congress. *Politika* (Belgrade), June 30, 1982.

¹⁷As indicated by my 1981/1982 interviews, most particularly in Novi Sad and Zagreb.

¹⁸Notwithstanding Chernenko's apparent pledge not to interfere in Yugoslav domestic affairs, the dramatic increase in Yugoslavia's economic dependence on Moscow has political implications. *Komunist* (Belgrade), March 23, 1984.

¹⁹Take for example, the April 20 detention of Yugoslavia's most prominent dissident, Milovan Djilas, the last survivor of the Yugoslav partisan leaders, who was removed from his party posts in 1954 for "revisionist" ideas that amounted to carrying the official turn to self-management to its logical conclusion.

²⁰Note that General Matic, for all his blunt warning about the "need to bear the price of economic stabilization," has also opposed becoming "an appendage" of Western financial capitals. *Komunist* (Belgrade), January 27, 1984.

²¹For analysis see A. Ross Johnson, "Yugoslavia's Significance for the West" (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, RAND P-6980, January, 1984).

al Executive Council tend to be in their 50's and 40's; officials of the 1984 government averaged 50 years of age. At a minimum this is a better record than that of the Soviet Union, considering that Konstantin Chernenko became head of the Communist party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) at 72 and heads a Politburo with an average age of more than 67.

There are still major political pitfalls for Yugoslav leaders.¹⁸ First, there is the tension between what may be seen as cautious efforts to find a more balanced perspective on Tito's contribution and an atavistic drive to maintain the post-Tito personality cult. Second, intermittent efforts to muzzle the increasingly hard-hitting Yugoslav media and crackdowns on domestic opposition damage the government's credibility at home and abroad.¹⁹ Third, and most important, there are inherent dangers in the generally positive open debate as to whether Yugoslavia should change its present political system, those running it, or perhaps both.

This is a kind of political avoidance behavior that has been an almost generic weakness of Yugoslav policy-makers. It is rooted in an understandable craving for a panacea to solve economic crises, achieve social equality, and sidetrack ethnic nationalism. During the war, partisan struggle and revolution were seen as the solution; in the 1950's, self-management was credited; in the 1960's, market socialism was praised; in the 1970's, recentralization of the party was to be the answer.

The real strength of the post-Tito organizational arrangement is that it emphasizes the importance of a political mechanism that is neither a miracle nor a personality cult. That mechanism must work more effectively, in particular with respect to coordinating central decision making with implementation in the powerful republics and provinces. If "true self-management" is to move into real "market socialism," opponents of that process must be persuaded step by step; no amount of "differentiation" (code for party purges) will make the difference.

There also remains the ever-present danger that the austerity programs demanded by the IMF will go too far, that ordinary Yugoslavs will rebel not against collective leadership or in an ethnically sparked civil war, but because they cannot tolerate the projected 130 percent inflation. Those who insist that Yugoslav leaders fight inflation with inflation might pause to think how most Americans would handle such pressures. If the present, however cumbersome, Yugoslav political institutions collapse, regional instability will escalate. At the same time, Western bankers will not be better off if those who favor cutting their losses and allowing Yugoslavia to slide eastward economically take over. The political/strategic consequences of that alternative are just as dangerous to the United States²⁰ as they are to those Yugoslavs committed to national independence. The "firm hand" (by implication a military coup?) would not necessarily be pro-Western.²¹

In short, American citizens and policymakers will bear a large part of the responsibility and some heavy costs if Yugoslavia becomes a victim of excessively theoretical IMF economic solutions. Americans and Yugoslavs alike have a great deal to lose if the World Bank surgically corrects the Yugoslav economy to such an extent that, as they say in the medical world, the operation was a success, but the patient died. ■

POLAND'S SOCIALISM

(Continued from page 360)

effort to present Polish-Soviet economic relations as free of politics and extremely advantageous for Poland, but such propaganda is counterproductive. If many Poles refrain from expressing anti-Russian feeling, they do so for geopolitical reasons: they are afraid that security-minded Soviet leaders may be prompted to solve the problem of a divided Germany at the expense of Poland. The threat of partition or territorial revision continues to haunt many Poles, who regard native Communists as a lesser evil than a Soviet-German deal.

Some recent Soviet political moves are already a source of considerable apprehension in Warsaw. Soviet strategy appears to be to bypass Poland strategically. For example, the Soviet Union has shown no interest in upgrading the railroad system in Poland and is instead developing a direct ferry link with East Germany. The East-West gas pipeline also bypasses Polish territory. These ominous signs make the Poles suspicious of long-range Soviet intentions. Anti-Russian feeling, Soviet threats and the uncertain nature of the Soviet commitment on behalf of Poland are among the key features of the political ambience of socialism in Poland.

The decline of Soviet imperialism, including the weakening of its leadership in Moscow, has given added incentive to the decentralization of the Communist bloc. In order to operate efficiently, the ruling parties in East Europe must become more responsive to nationalism. To use Marx's terminology, this is the "objective" cause of Polish socialism. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 385)

This is a detailed study of the Polish Communist party and government's response to the rise of Solidarity. Sanford holds that a military solution to Solidarity's protests was not inevitable; it was only after the regime realized that Solidarity did not intend to work within the party and that the party was unable to devise real reforms that military rule became necessary. W.W.F.

NEXT TO GOD . . . POLAND: POLITICS AND RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY POLAND. By Bogdan Szajkowski. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 264 pages, notes, appendices, bibliography and index, \$25.00.)

Szajkowski's study of the role of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland explains how the Church has become politically powerful while avoiding direct political participation.

W.W.F.

THE BIRTH OF SOLIDARITY: THE GDANSK NEGOTIATIONS, 1980. Edited and translated by A. Kemp Welch. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. 213 pages, notes and index, \$25.00.)

This is the full text of the negotiations held at the Gdansk Shipyards between Solidarity and the Polish Communist party.

O.E.S.

ROMANIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE UNITED NATIONS. By Robert Weiner. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984. 205 pages, notes and index, \$29.95.)

Romania's much discussed individualist foreign policy is the subject of this study. Weiner concentrates on how Romania has departed from the Soviet foreign policy line at the United Nations; he finds that the personality cult that surrounds President Nicolae Ceaușescu enables Romania to pursue its own policies.

O.E.S.

ALSO RECEIVED

SMALL STATE SECURITY IN THE BALKANS. By Aurel Braun. (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble Books, 1983. 334 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$23.50.)

POLISH DISSIDENT PUBLICATIONS: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY. Edited by Joanna M. Preibisz. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982. 382 pages, appendix and index, \$38.95.)

POLAND'S PLACE IN EUROPE: GENERAL SIKORSKI AND THE ORIGIN OF THE ODER-NEISSE LINE, 1939-1943. By Sarah Meiklejohn Terry. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. 393 pages, notes, bibliographical essay, maps and index, \$40.00, cloth; \$15.00, paper.)

SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE AFTER TITO: A POWDER-KEG FOR THE 1980s? Edited by David Carlton and Carlo Schaefer. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983. 211 pages, notes and index, \$22.50.)

BULGARIA, 1878-1918. By Richard J. Crampton. East European Monographs Number 138 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983. 580 pages, notes, maps, bibliography and index, \$35.00.)

ARCHDUKE OF SARAJEVO: THE ROMANCE AND TRAGEDY OF FRANZ FERDINAND OF AUSTRIA. By Gordon Brook-Shephard. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984. 301 pages, notes, appendices, photographs and index, \$19.95.) ■

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of September, 1984, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arms Control

Sept. 11—The European Disarmament Conference opens in Stockholm.

Contadora Process

(See *Nicaragua*)

International Monetary Fund (IMF)

(See also *Argentina*)

Sept. 24—The IMF and the World Bank begin a joint annual meeting in Washington, D.C.

Sept. 25—In a speech before the joint meeting, U.S. President Ronald Reagan claims his economic policies have led to "an American renaissance" that has economically benefited other countries.

Iran-Iraq War

Sept. 1—It is reported that Iran has closed its main oil export terminal at Kharg Island to repair damage caused by Iraqi air attacks.

Sept. 6—In a report broadcast over Teheran radio, Speaker of the Iranian Parliament Hojatolislam Hashemi Rafsanjani says that the long-awaited "offensive" by Iranian troops will occur at an "opportune" time.

Sept. 15—A spokesman for the British Foreign Ministry says that 11 crewmen were killed by an Iraqi missile attack on a West German ship in the Persian Gulf; the attack occurred on September 12.

Sept. 16—2 oil tankers are hit by missiles launched by unidentified warplanes; an officer on 1 ship says he saw Iranian markings on the planes.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

(See also *Germany, West*)

Sept. 5—The Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, General Bernard Rogers, says that the alliance will have to increase defense spending by 7 percent a year for the rest of this decade if the alliance's forces are to be able to stop a Soviet conventional attack in Europe.

Red Sea Mining

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Sept. 20—A Saudi-registered merchant ship is damaged after it hits a mine just south of the Suez Canal; this is the 19th ship to be damaged by a mine in the Red Sea since July 9.

Sept. 30—Egyptian military officials say that a mine found by the British on September 12 is of Soviet manufacture; a British spokesman says there is no reason to believe the Soviet Union planted the mine.

United Nations (UN)

(See also *U.S.S.R.; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Sept. 6—The U.S. vetoes a Security Council resolution that calls on Israel to lift all restrictions and obstacles placed on Lebanese civilians in Israeli-occupied southern Lebanon.

Sept. 8—Willibald Pahr, the chairman of the UN's International Conference on Kampuchea, tells a news conference in Bangkok that a minimum of 500,000 Vietnamese have been

settled in Kampuchea by the Vietnamese government; he says this influx threatens the independence of Kampuchea. Sept. 12—Gerard Bolla, the deputy director of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), says that the organization will refund \$80 million in unspent funds to several members; the U.S. is pressing for the immediate return of the money.

Sept. 18—The 39th annual meeting of the General Assembly opens.

World Bank

Sept. 15—At a meeting of the finance ministers of the member nations, a report is circulated claiming that the sub-Saharan African countries are facing their worst economic problems since the 1970's.

Sept. 23—The bank's development committee endorses a proposal that will channel \$2 billion a year more into the sub-Saharan African countries.

AFGHANISTAN

(See *Pakistan*)

ARGENTINA

Sept. 13—At a conference of major Latin American debtor nations, President Raúl Alfonsín says that the debtors have avoided default only by impoverishing their people; he urges the debtor nations to maintain a common front in dealing with their creditors.

Sept. 18—Bernardo Grinspun, the economy minister, says that technical work on an agreement with the IMF has been completed; the agreement will allow Argentina to secure a 15-month standby loan of \$1.4 billion from the IMF.

Sept. 20—A government panel of inquiry gives Alfonsín its report on the military's campaign against suspected subversives in the 1970's; the report says that the military participated in "kidnapping, torturing and assassinating thousands of human beings," many of whom were never involved in leftist political activities.

Sept. 25—The Armed Forces Supreme Council issues an interim report that finds "nothing objectionable" about orders military officers gave during the campaign against subversives.

AUSTRIA

Sept. 3—Chancellor Fred Sinowatz says he has replaced 4 of his Cabinet members.

BOTSWANA

Sept. 8—President Quett K. Masire and his Botswana Democratic party are returned to power in today's election; preliminary results show Masire's party winning 27 of 34 seats in the Parliament.

BOURKINA FASSO

Sept. 1—Captain Thomas Sankara, the leader of Bourkina Fasso, announces that he has named a new Cabinet that reduces the influence of the Marxist Patriotic Development League.

BULGARIA(See also *Germany, West*)

Sept. 9—A West German government spokesman discloses that Bulgarian President Todor Zhivkov has called off his scheduled visit to West Germany; no public reason is given for the postponement.

CANADA(See also *Vatican*)

Sept 3—A bomb explosion at Montreal's main rail station kills 3 people and wounds 29; the bombing is thought to be a warning to the Pope, who will visit later this month.

Sept. 4—The Progressive Conservative party wins over the ruling Liberal party in today's election; Brian Mulroney, the head of the Conservatives, will replace Liberal John Turner as Prime Minister. Mulroney's party wins 211 of 282 seats.

Sept. 28—Prime Minister Mulroney says his visit with President Reagan on September 25 did not produce any change in the President's attitude toward the acid rain problem.

CHAD(See also *France; Libya; Morocco*)

Sept. 25—The 1st 200 of 3,000 French soldiers begin to withdraw.

Sept. 27—Information Minister Mahamat Soumalia says that there is "no indication" that Libyan troops have begun to withdraw from the northern part of the country.

CHILE

Sept. 4—50 demonstrators are injured and a French priest is killed after riot police attack 300 people singing the national anthem in a protest in Santiago.

Sept. 5—3 demonstrators and a policeman are killed in violent clashes in a 2d day of protests against the military government of President Augusto Pinochet.

Sept. 10—Pinochet renews a decree that extends for another 6 months restrictions on freedom of assembly and information.

CHINA

Sept. 26—China's assistant foreign minister and Britain's ambassador to China initial the text of a draft agreement on the status of Hong Kong; the agreement will allow Hong Kong to keep its economic and social system for at least 50 years after 1997, the date China regains control of the territory.

London-based Amnesty International issues a report that says China is holding thousands of political prisoners in jails and "reeducation camps"; the report also notes that since 1981 China has doubled to 44 the number of crimes punishable by death.

Sept. 30—Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang reiterates China's offer that Taiwan can keep its capitalist system if it reunites with mainland China.

COSTA RICA(See *U.S., Administration*)**CYPRUS**

Sept. 20—Talks between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders end without any solution to the problem of the recently formed independent government of Turkish Cypriots in northern Cyprus.

EGYPT(See also *Intl, Red Sea; Jordan*)

Sept. 3—Minister of Electricity Mohammed Osman Abaza says that plans to build 8 nuclear power plants in Egypt by the year 2000 will be delayed because of financial problems.

Sept. 27—Foreign Minister Esmat Abdel Meguid arrives in Washington, D.C., to meet with President Reagan.

Sept. 30—107 Muslim extremists are sentenced to prison for attempting to overthrow the government after President Anwar Sadat's assassination in 1981.

EL SALVADOR(See also *Honduras; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Sept. 12—President Jose Napoleón Duarte says he has issued new rules that will reduce civilian casualties from bombings by the Salvadoran air force.

Sept. 14—Reuters news service reports that Salvadoran troops allegedly attacked a village of guerrilla supporters in Santa Lucia; the Roman Catholic Church's legal office in San Salvador says it has collected the names of 34 people who were killed in the alleged attack.

ETHIOPIA

Sept. 10—Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam becomes the 1st Secretary General of the newly created Workers party, the country's 1st Communist party.

Sept. 17—*The New York Times* reports that, according to Western diplomats and private relief organizations, thousands of Ethiopians are dying from starvation and 6 million need food immediately.

FRANCE(See also *Chad; Libya; Morocco*)

Sept. 5—In a television interview, Prime Minister Laurent Fabius says that France faces more economic hardship; he says that unless it modernizes its economy, "France in 20 years will no longer exist as a great power."

Sept. 12—Fabius's government releases its 1st budget; it calls for a 5 percent cut in income tax rates and only a 6 percent increase in public spending.

Sept. 17—The Foreign Ministry announces that France and Libya have agreed to a "total and simultaneous" withdrawal of troops from Chad; the withdrawals will begin September 25.

Sept. 23—Former President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing wins a seat in Parliament to represent his home district.

GERMANY, EAST(See also *Germany, West; U.S.S.R.*)

Sept. 4—Ewald Moldt, the head of the East German mission to West Germany, announces that East German President Erich Honecker has postponed his scheduled visit to West Germany.

GERMANY, WEST(See also *Bulgaria; Germany, East; U.S.S.R.*)

Sept. 12—Chancellor Helmut Kohl says that Honecker's and Zhivkov's visits were postponed because of internal strife in the Eastern bloc; he says he will continue to work toward improved relations with East Germany.

Sept. 29—Between 20,000 and 30,000 anti-nuclear protestors form 4 human chains around roads linking the town of Fulda with nearby U.S. military bases; yesterday, police arrested 180 protestors when they interfered with NATO exercises.

A spokesman for the ruling Christian Democratic Union says the Soviet Union has shifted SS-22 nuclear missiles from the western Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

GREECE

Sept. 25—The government announces that Greece and Libya signed a \$1-billion economic cooperation agreement yesterday.

HONDURAS

Sept. 28—Foreign Minister Edgardo Paz Barnica reports that Honduras has suspended the training of Salvadoran troops by U.S. advisers at a base in Honduras until new security and economic agreements are negotiated with the U.S.

INDIA

Sept. 2—Between 50,000 and 100,000 Sikhs stage an anti-government rally at a shrine in Amritsar; the Sikhs want the army to vacate the Golden Temple at Amritsar.

Sept. 15—50 demonstrators are wounded and 300 are arrested at a demonstration in Andhra Pradesh State; the protestors were demanding the reinstatement of the state's chief minister, N.T. Rama Rao, who was removed from his post by the state governor, an appointee of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.

Sept. 16—Rao is reinstated in his post by a new state governor.

Sept. 20—Rao easily wins a vote of confidence from the state legislature; he was removed from office ostensibly for not having the confidence of the majority of the legislature.

Sept. 29—The army officially returns the Golden Temple to the Sikhs.

INDONESIA

Sept. 13—Officials report at least 9 people were killed last night when about 1,500 extremist Muslims rioted in Jakarta's port area; the Muslims are reportedly critical of the government's policy toward Islam.

IRAN

(See also *Intl, Iran-Iraq War*)

Sept. 4—200 Iranians return home; their plane was hijacked to Iraq last week and the hijackers were granted political asylum by Iraq.

Sept. 7—Leaders of the opposition People's Mujahedeen issue a report from their headquarters in Paris that gives the names of 10,231 people executed by the Iranian government since the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came to power in June, 1981.

Sept. 9—Iraq grants political asylum to 5 Iranians who hijacked an Iranian plane yesterday; the 66 hostages are released.

IRAQ

(See *Intl, Iran-Iraq War; Iran*)

ISRAEL

(See also *Intl, UN; Lebanon; Syria*)

Sept. 10—The Labor party votes overwhelmingly to join a proposed coalition government with the Likud bloc; Shimon Peres, the head of the Labor party, tells the party that under the coalition government Israel will not annex the occupied Gaza Strip and West Bank.

Sept. 11—The Likud bloc agrees to join a coalition government with the Labor party.

Sept. 14—Parliament approves the new coalition government of the Labor party and the Likud bloc by a vote of 89 to 18, with 1 abstention. Shimon Peres is sworn in as the new Prime Minister; he will serve for the 1st 25 months and former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir will then serve for 25 months.

The Israeli army reports that the Palestinian mayor of a town in the Israeli-occupied West Bank was killed today by unidentified gunmen.

Sept. 16—The trial of 20 Israelis accused of carrying out acts of violence against Arabs living in the occupied West Bank begins in Jerusalem.

The government announces that it is devaluing the shekel by 9 percent and plans to cut this year's budget by \$1 billion;

Israel is suffering from an inflation rate of 400 percent a year. Sept. 22—A bomb is thrown into a Palestinian cafe in the old city quarter of Jerusalem; 4 people are wounded.

Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir says his government will ask the U.S. to negotiate with Syria over arrangements that would allow Israel to withdraw its troops from southern Lebanon.

Sept. 23—Finance Minister Yitzhak Modai says that the government will impose new income and property taxes as part of a new austerity program; the government will also cut back on subsidies for basic commodities, including bread and dairy products.

ITALY

Sept. 30—Police report that they made 58 arrests in an anti-Mafia operation today; the arrests follow the confession of a Mafia leader, who gave detailed information on those arrested.

JAPAN

(See also *Korea, South*)

Sept. 14—The Japanese Defense Agency issues its annual report, which accuses the Soviet Union of an "unrelenting military buildup" in East Asia.

Sept. 19—The Economic Planning Agency reports that Japan's gross national product is growing at an annual rate of 6.7 percent, based on figures for the quarter ending June 30.

JORDAN

Sept. 25—The government announces that it is restoring diplomatic relations with Egypt; in 1979, Jordan and 16 other Arab nations broke ties with Egypt after it signed a peace treaty with Israel.

Sept. 30—King Hussein asks Syria, Libya and other critical Arab states to meet with him to discuss his restoration of diplomatic relations with Egypt.

KAMPUCHEA

(See *Intl, UN; Vietnam*)

KENYA

Sept. 15—President Daniel arap Moi orders all civil servants to join his ruling Kenya African National Union.

KOREA, NORTH

(See *Korea, South*)

KOREA, SOUTH

Sept. 6—President Chun Doo Hwan is received by Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone in the 1st visit by a South Korean President to Japan.

Sept. 8—Chun ends his Japan visit.

Sept. 21—The government announces that it will take the "necessary" actions if exiled opposition leader and former presidential candidate Kim Dae Jung returns.

Sept. 29—370 North Korean trucks enter South Korea with supplies for the flood-ravaged south; this is the 1st time since the end of the Korean War that the 2 countries have agreed to such an action.

LEBANON

(See also *Intl, UN; Israel; Syria; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Sept. 3—President Amin Gemayel meets with Syrian President Hafez Assad in Damascus to discuss the problems facing the Lebanese government.

Sept. 5—Education Minister Salim al-Hoss narrowly escapes being caught in a car bomb blast that kills 4 people in Beirut; no group takes responsibility.

Sept. 8—A person claiming to represent the terrorist group Islamic Holy War calls a Western news agency in Beirut to say that the group will "strike at a vital United States interest" in retaliation for the U.S. veto of a UN Security Council resolution criticizing Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon.

Sept. 9—Nabih Berri, the justice minister and the head of Lebanon's Shiite Muslims, says 50 young Lebanese have been trained for suicide missions against the Israeli forces occupying southern Lebanon.

Sept. 18—Prime Minister Rashid Karami announces that the Cabinet ministers have agreed to tell their private armies to release all the people they have kidnapped.

Sept. 20—A truck loaded with an estimated 3,000 pounds of explosives blows up outside the U.S. embassy in Beirut; 1st reports say at least 23 people, including 2 Americans, have been killed in the blast. Islamic Holy War takes responsibility for the attack.

Militiamen from the Israeli-backed South Lebanese Army kill 13 residents of a south Lebanese village; the attack revenged a guerrilla ambush that killed 4 South Lebanese Army troops.

Sept. 21—An Israeli army officer reports that 15 Lebanese soldiers are being held in connection with yesterday's massacre.

Sept. 23—3 U.S. warships arrive off the coast of Lebanon.

Sept. 25—The U.S. State Department now says that between 5 and 15 people were killed in the September 20 bombing of the embassy.

LIBYA

(See also *Chad; France; Greece; Morocco*)

Sept. 1—Head of State Colonel Muammar Qaddafi says he has sent Libyan troops to Nicaragua.

Sept. 26—The official press agency confirms that Libyan troops are withdrawing from Chad in accordance with the agreement signed with France September 17.

MEXICO

Sept. 1—President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado tells Congress he firmly rejects any plans that would call for Mexico's defaulting on its foreign debt.

Sept. 7—Finance Minister Jesús Silva Herzog announces that his government has reached agreement with a bank advisory group to lower the interest rates on the repayment of Mexico's \$66-billion foreign debt.

MOROCCO

Sept. 17—Senior officials say that Libya's agreement with France to withdraw troops from Chad shows that last month's signing of a Libyan-Moroccan treaty, which sets up joint economic, cultural, diplomatic and defense councils, has moderated Libya's behavior.

NICARAGUA

(See also *Libya; U.S., Administration, Foreign Policy, Military*)

Sept. 3—Defense Minister Humberto Ortega Saavedra tells a news conference that 2 of the men killed on September 1 when their helicopter was shot down over northern Nicaragua were U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) mercenaries; the U.S. says that the men were private mercenaries working with right-wing guerrillas trying to overthrow the government.

Sept. 8—Foreign Minister Miguel d'Escoto Brockman says Nicaragua will reject any calls for regional disarmament as long as the U.S. continues its covert war against Nicaragua.

Sept. 9—The government denies that any Cubans were killed in the September 1 attack; the U.S. has said 4 Cubans were killed in the raid.

Sept. 13—Opposition leader Arturo José Cruz says that the government has "unnecessarily brought Nicaragua into the East-West conflict."

Sept. 22—The government announces that it will accept the terms of a draft treaty proposed by the Contadora nations; the treaty would require the signers to offer amnesty to dissidents, hold impartial elections and end support for groups trying to overthrow other governments.

Sept. 23—Victor Tirado, 1 of 9 Sandinista junta members, says that the government will not postpone the elections scheduled for November 4; 1 of the opposition groups has called for postponement and has said it will not register its candidate, Arturo Cruz, until all its demands for free elections are met.

Sept. 26—The leader of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force says his guerrilla forces have enough money and arms to fight for 6 more months without additional U.S. support.

Sept. 28—Bishop Pablo Antonio Vega announces that the Church hierarchy is preparing a letter to the 4 priests serving in the government, warning them that they could be defrocked and excommunicated if they do not give up their government posts.

PAKISTAN

Sept. 28—A government spokesman says that an Afghan warplane raided a border town in Pakistan, killing 32 people and wounding 48.

PHILIPPINES

Sept. 17—General Fabian C. Ver, chief of the Philippine armed forces, announces that the military will abide by the findings and recommendations of the committee investigating last year's assassination of opposition leader Benigno S. Aquino Jr.

Sept. 22—Police break up demonstrations against President Ferdinand E. Marcos in Manila outside the presidential palace; yesterday, thousands demonstrated against "the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship" and economic problems.

Sept. 28—An organizer for the rally held September 27 says that 11 bodies have been found throughout Manila; he says he believes they were protesters who were killed after the police broke up the rally.

SOUTH AFRICA

Sept. 3—At least 14 blacks are killed in rioting in 5 townships (including Sharpeville) surrounding Johannesburg; police have killed 10 of the protesters and 4 others have been burned to death in fires started by the protesters. The protests are over rent increases and education disputes.

Sept. 4—15 more blacks are killed.

Sept. 11—Police ban all meetings critical of the government; the banning affects 21 cities and towns.

Sept. 14—P.W. Botha is sworn in as President; a recently approved constitution provides for the new post, which empowers the President to veto legislation, declare war, and summon and dismiss Parliament.

Sept. 15—Botha announces a new Cabinet that includes 2 nonwhites: an Indian and a person of mixed race; blacks still are without representation.

Sept. 19—Police say that 7 striking mineworkers were killed yesterday after police opened fire on them at a mine outside Johannesburg.

Sept. 22—A survey of 551 black factory workers conducted by the anti-apartheid South African Institute of Race Relations is published; the survey finds that 75 percent of those blacks surveyed disagreed with the campaigns in the U.S. that seek to stop U.S. companies from investing in South Africa.

Those blacks against disinvestment said they thought it would reduce the number of jobs available to blacks.

Sept. 23—Police officials say they arrested over 600 blacks over the weekend. 500 were arrested for attending the funeral of a black killed by police in riots earlier this month.

SUDAN

Sept. 29—President Gaafar al-Nimeiry lifts his 5-month-old state of emergency order; he says that the corruption and domestic unrest that prompted it have been ended.

SYRIA

(See also *Lebanon*)

Sept. 11—In an interview with the West German magazine *Der Spiegel*, Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas says that President Hafez Assad's brother is "persona non grata forever"; Colonel Rifaat Assad has been living in Geneva since June. Sept. 12—Khalil Ahmed, a spokesman for President Assad, denies that Rifaat Assad is persona non grata in Syria; he says the defense minister denies making the statement to *Der Spiegel*.

Sept. 24—U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Middle Eastern Affairs Richard W. Murphy confers in Damascus with President Assad; the official Syrian press agency says the talks focused on Lebanon and the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon.

THAILAND

Sept. 3—The legislature votes to postpone a decision on whether the constitution should be changed to allow active military officers to hold government posts.

UGANDA

(See *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, Red Sea; Germany, West; Japan; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Sept. 1—A commentary in *Pravda*, the Communist party newspaper, accuses West Germany of planning to liquidate East Germany.

In a written answer to questions from *Pravda*, President Konstantin U. Chernenko says that an agreement with the U.S. on banning weapons in space would "facilitate" discussion on other strategic weapons.

Sept. 5—*The Times* of London reports that on September 3 a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman denied that there could be any linkage between talks on space weapons and resuming talks on nuclear weapons.

Chernenko makes his 1st public appearance in 7 weeks, to present awards to 3 Soviet cosmonauts.

Sept. 6—Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov, the chief of staff of the military, is relieved of his post and immediately replaced by Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev.

Sept. 13—Friends of Andrei Sakharov, the Nobel prize winner and dissident exiled in Gorky, report that his wife has been sentenced to 5 years of internal exile for slandering the state.

Sept. 19—Bankers in Frankfurt announce that the Soviet Union today received a loan of \$166 million from a consortium of Western banks.

Sept. 20—The government announces that it will allow international inspection of its civilian nuclear power reactors.

Sept. 26—Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko speaks before the UN, where he tells the Reagan administration that "concrete deeds and not verbal assurances" will set the stage for improved Soviet-American relations.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

(See also *China*)

Sept. 14—Talks with striking coal miners end when the National Coal Board says that the mineworkers union reneged on the tentative wording of part of an agreement.

Sept. 18—A 3-week dock strike is called off; the strike was called to support the coal miners.

Sept. 20—with party leader David Steel dissenting, the Liberal party votes at its annual conference for the removal of all U.S. cruise missiles from Britain.

Sept. 28—High Court Judge Sir Donald Nicholls rules that the 6-month coal miner strike is illegal because a national vote by all coal miners did not precede the strike.

UNITED STATES

Administration

Sept. 6—U.S. trade representative Bill Brock announces that President Ronald Reagan will not agree to a petition by the U.S. copper industry for protection from foreign copper imports.

Speaking in Washington, D.C., presidential counselor Edwin Meese 3d says the Social Security system is a "taxation and benefit program" and not the insurance system it was intended to be when first passed by Congress.

Sept. 7—The Postal Rate Commission recommends to the Postal Service Board of Governors that the price of a first-class postage stamp should be raised to 22 cents; it also recommends increases in other classes of mail.

Sept. 10—The Environmental Protection Agency announces that the emissions from coke ovens will now be listed as a hazardous air pollution and that it will issue regulations to reduce the emissions, which can cause cancer.

Sept. 11—Voice of America spokesman Rogene Waite announces that the agency has contracted with a private Costa Rican business group to use its transmitters in Costa Rica to broadcast to Costa Rica and Nicaragua.

Sept. 12—The Federal Aviation Administration agrees to approve a tentative agreement reached by the nation's airlines to reduce delays at 6 of the country's most heavily used airports.

Sept. 13—The Department of Agriculture embargoes the shipment of citrus fruits out of Florida; an attempt is being made to halt the spread of citrus canker in Florida orchards.

Sept. 18—President Reagan announces new steps to aid U.S. farmers, including federal loan guarantees, temporary interest subsidies and authorization to permit the Farmers Home Administration to forgive a portion of interest owed by farmers to the government.

Sept. 19—The Attorney General's Task Force on Family Violence issues a report calling for stronger actions to arrest and punish offenders.

Sept. 20—The Judicial Conference of the U.S. denies a petition by 28 newsgathering organizations to allow television and radio coverage of federal court proceedings.

Special court-appointed investigator (under the Ethics in Government Act) Jacob A. Stein reports that his 5-month inquiry into the financial affairs of presidential counselor Meese finds "no basis with respect to any of the 11 allegations for the bringing of a prosecution against Mr. Meese for the violation of a federal criminal statute."

Sept. 24—The Securities and Exchange Commission charges former head of the Federal Aviation Administration J. Lynn Helms and a business associate with diverting some \$1.2 million from a bond issue to their own use; the complaint and a consent order signed by Helms have been filed in U.S. district court in Philadelphia, thus settling the case against Helms.

Economy

Sept. 7—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate remained at 7.4 percent in August.

Sept. 17—The Commerce Department reports that the U.S. foreign trade deficit reached a record \$24.4 billion in the 2d quarter of 1984.

Sept. 20—A "flash" estimate by the Department of Commerce shows the nation's gross national product growing at an annual rate of 3.6 percent in the 3d quarter of 1984.

Sept. 21—The Morgan Guaranty Trust Company lowers its prime rate to 12.75 percent.

The Labor Department reports that its consumer price index rose 0.5 percent in August.

Sept. 27—Most of the nation's major banks lower their prime rate to 12.75 percent; yesterday Wells Fargo lowered its prime rate to 12.5 percent.

Sept. 28—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators rose 0.5 percent in August.

The Commerce Department says that the U.S. foreign trade deficit declined to \$9.9 billion in August.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl, IMF, UN; Canada; Egypt; Honduras; Israel; Lebanon; Nicaragua; Syria; U.S.S.R.; U.S., Politics, Military*)

Sept. 2—The State Department welcomes the statement of Soviet President Konstantin Chernenko, who proclaimed the Soviet Union's willingness to negotiate on arms.

Sept. 4—Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker ends a visit to Uganda; he has conferred with Uganda's President Milton Obote about human rights and other matters.

Associates of 2 men killed when their helicopter was shot down by Nicaraguan government forces on September 1 have identified them as Americans who were members of the Alabama-based Civilian Military Assistance, a group formed privately to help rightist rebel forces in Nicaragua.

Sept. 6—Spokesman for the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador Donald Hamilton confirms that U.S. military officers helped the private Civilian Military Assistance group donate military equipment and supplies to the Salvadoran armed forces; he says there "was nothing inappropriate or unethical about their conduct."

Sept. 8—According to U.S. officials and Nicaraguan rebel leaders, the rebels have raised over \$10 million from private sources in the U.S. and from sympathetic foreign governments in the last 6 months.

Sept. 9—Secretary of State George Shultz says that the U.S. is prepared to discuss a moratorium on tests for new space weapons with the Soviet Union; he rejects a Soviet proposal for a freeze before negotiations begin.

Sept. 10—The State Department says administration policy for much of 1984 has been not to "discourage other countries from providing support . . . or legal private U.S. contributions" for the Nicaraguan rebels.

Sept. 11—Secretary Shultz announces that the U.S. will admit the Amerasian children fathered by Americans in Vietnam plus some 10,000 political prisoners held in Vietnamese "reeducation" camps. Hanoi has promised to let them leave.

Sept. 13—The State Department says that a U.S. study accusing the Soviet Union of 17 violations of arms-control agreements will not be released at this time as had been expected.

Sept. 14—Secretary Shultz certifies that the government of El Salvador has made progress in human rights protection and is eligible for continued U.S. military aid.

In Miami, Secretary Shultz says that controlling the worldwide narcotics trade is "a top priority in our foreign policy."

Sept. 17—The State Department says that U.S. naval forces

searching for mines in the Gulf of Suez are preparing to withdraw.

Sept. 18—President Reagan directs trade negotiator Brock to negotiate "voluntary restraint agreements" with steel-exporting countries in order to aid the U.S. steel industry; he does not agree with the recommendations of the U.S. International Trade Commission or the steel industry, which sought protective tariffs.

Sept. 19—5 American seamen and their ship are released from Soviet custody after being held for a week in Siberia after they apparently wandered into Soviet waters.

Sept. 20—The temporary headquarters of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut is bombed by a truck carrying explosives; at least 23 people including 2 Americans are reported killed.

Sept. 23—President Reagan says that security arrangements at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut were incomplete but that the new location "represented more safety than the one we were in."

Sept. 24—President Reagan addresses the UN and calls for "a better working relationship" with the Soviet Union. After the speech, the President meets for a few minutes with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko.

Sept. 26—Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko meet in New York for talks before Gromyko's September 28 meeting with President Reagan at the White House.

President Reagan blames previous administrations for the "near destruction of our intelligence capabilities" as one reason for the lack of warning about the possible bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut.

Sept. 27—In Washington, D.C., President Reagan blames the press for distorting his remarks about the weaknesses in the CIA's intelligence establishment; he claims he was not talking about President Jimmy Carter's administration but about a "decade-long climate in Congress."

In Washington, D.C., senior intelligence officials report that senior Latin America analyst at the CIA John Horton resigned in May after refusing to revise his report on Mexico to conform to CIA Director William Casey's views that the CIA should support administration policy. Horton insisted the facts do not bear out the administration's view that Mexico's internal stability is gravely threatened by outside forces.

Sept. 28—President Reagan and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko hold what is called a "forceful and direct" discussion about U.S.-Soviet differences in a 3-hour meeting at the White House.

President Reagan telephones former President Jimmy Carter to say that he did not mean to imply that Carter was to blame for the recent bombing in Beirut.

Sept. 29—Secretary Shultz meets with Gromyko in Washington, D.C., in a "constructive, useful meeting."

Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy returns to the U.S. after a week's trip to confer with leaders in Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Jordan and Egypt.

Sept. 30—Secretary Shultz says that the U.S. and the Soviet Union will continue to confer.

Labor and Industry

Sept. 21—The General Motors Corporation and the United Automobile Workers union reach a tentative agreement on a new 3-year contract for some 350,000 workers, providing wage increases, increasing pension benefits and maintaining job security.

The United Mine Workers and the Bituminous Coal Operators Association agree on a 40-month contract providing a 10 percent pay increase over the life of the contract and job security safeguards.

Sept. 24—13 of the nation's major oil companies and representatives of 50,000 service station franchise holders agree on a settlement of the antitrust suit instituted in 1971 by the dealers against the oil companies; the settlement, still to be approved by the U.S. district court judge hearing the case, permits the dealers to sell any brand of gasoline they choose. Sept. 28—The Bituminous Coal Operators Association and the United Mine Workers sign the labor contract.

Legislation

Sept. 4—Congress returns for a 4-week session to conclude the 2d session of the 98th Congress.

Sept. 5—State Department spokesman John Hughes says that President Reagan will submit the 1948 UN convention against genocide to the Senate for approval.

Sept. 7—Senator Strom Thurmond (R., S.C.), chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, removes the nomination of Edwin Meese 3d from the committee's agenda for 1984.

Sept. 12—In a 368-41 vote, the House passes legislation identical with legislation passed in the Senate to protect 1.8 million acres of national forest land and 1.4 million acres of national park land in California.

Sept. 19—The Senate Ethics Committee staff recommends to the committee that there is not sufficient evidence for a formal inquiry into Senator Mark Hatfield's (R., Ore.) dealings with Greek entrepreneur Basil Tsakos.

The Senate, voting 99 to 0, and the House, voting 402 to 0, approve legislation making it more difficult to terminate Social Security disability benefits.

Sept. 26—Both houses of Congress pass legislation requiring cigarette manufacturers to use more forceful warnings on their products.

Sept. 28—Voting 92 to 4, the Senate approves a stopgap spending bill to keep government agencies operating after October 1.

Sept. 30—The White House announces that on Friday President Reagan signed legislation designating millions of California acreage as wilderness area.

Military

Sept. 4—In California, the Rockwell International Corporation displays the first production model of the 238-ton B-1B bomber; 100 of the planes are to be built at an estimated total cost of \$28.3 billion.

Sept. 11—Because they have been inadequately tested, the Defense Department refuses to accept dozens of military systems equipped with Texas Instrument microchips, which have been used by more than 80 military defense contractors. Last month the Defense Department suspended some \$30 million in payments to Hughes Aircraft for shoddy work on missiles, after charges of faulty inspection dating from 1982.

Sept. 18—Defense Department spokesman Michael Burch admits that 3 Cessna O-2 observation planes, used by rebel forces in a raid on Nicaraguan government installations on September 1, were given to another U.S. government agency by the Air Force; congressional officials say the planes were given to the CIA.

Sept. 20—In a report released by Representative Denny Smith (R., Ore.), the Defense Department's Inspector General charges that Ford Aerospace and Communications Company's contract to produce 276 Sergeant York antiaircraft guns for \$1.5 billion is at least \$84 million too high; the company denies the accusation. In February, the Defense Department criticized the company for "totally unacceptable" performance on the contract.

Sept. 28—Testifying before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Defense Department Inspector General Joseph Sherick says that the Sergeant York antiaircraft gun re-

ceived minimal testing because of unusual haste in the production and acquisition of the gun; the results were "oversimplified and misleading."

Politics

Sept. 2—In a radio speech attacking President Reagan's September comment that "religion and politics are necessarily related," Democratic presidential candidate Walter Mondale claims that the Republicans are raising "doubts whether they respect the wall our founders placed between government and religion."

Sept. 4—Speaking to the American Legion national convention in Salt Lake City, President Reagan reiterates his call for voluntary prayers in America's public schools; nonetheless, he maintains, "government should [not] show preference for one religious group over another."

Sept. 9—Calling abortion "the crucial issue in the upcoming presidential election," New York Archbishop John O'Connor, who heads a diocese of 1.8 million Catholics, declares that Democratic vice presidential candidate Geraldine Ferraro was mistaken when she gave the impression that the monolithic Catholic position on abortion was "open to interpretation." Ferraro denies she ever misrepresented church teachings but maintains that as a public official she cannot allow her religion to dictate her vote on abortion.

Sept. 10—Mondale proposes an economic program that would raise taxes some \$85 billion by 1989 and reduce the federal deficit by \$177 billion by that date.

Sept. 17—Republican and Democratic campaign officials and the sponsoring League of Women Voters announce that President Reagan and contender Mondale will hold 2 debates, on October 7 and 21; on October 11, Vice President George Bush and Democratic contender Ferraro will also debate.

Sept. 27—Walter Mondale, former President Jimmy Carter and former CIA heads deny President Reagan's statements that the Beirut bombing was caused in part by crippled intelligence operations; Mondale says the President is making an "inexcusable" attempt to shift blame from his administration.

Mondale meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York in a "serious and businesslike" discussion.

Science and Space

Sept. 5—The space shuttle *Discovery* returns after a successful 6-day flight; it deployed 3 communications satellites.

VATICAN

(See also *Canada*)

Sept. 3—The Vatican makes public a 36-page essay that criticizes the doctrine of liberation theology, which uses Marxist analysis to describe the situation of the poor. The Vatican will also begin to interrogate some of the leading Church proponents of liberation theology.

Sept. 20—The pope ends his 12-day tour of Canada.

VIETNAM

(See also *Intl.; UN; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Sept. 11—Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach says Vietnam would welcome attempts by a 3d country to mediate a peace settlement in Kampuchea.

ZIMBABWE

Sept. 4—The government releases former Prime Minister Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa from detention; he has been held for the last 10 months for allegedly plotting with South African agents to overthrow the government.

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